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ABSTRACT

The author begins with an explanation of the importance
of the distinction between treaty and customary law. The
author then presents six alternativeprinciples currently used
to inform that distinction (dichotomy, overlap, relativity,
interdependence, equivalence, and indeterminacy) and

evaluates the applicationof these principlesaccording to their
theoretical coherence, practicability, reconcilability, and
resolving power. The author concludes that each of the
alternativeprinciplesis unsatisfactory in at least one respect
and proposes a superior interpretive approach that does not
define customary law in terms of treaty, but ratheraccording
to its own independently defining attributes. Finally, the
author suggests that this approach, called sub-referential
threshold relativity (STR), may be applied to other key

distinctionsin legal doctrine and scholarship.
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MR. BASIE: If we mean distinction we should say distinction, if you mean
professionalsports as distinguishedfrom amateursports, that's one thing. If
you mean as opposed to that's something else
In this conte4 the way [amateur is) used here it implies failure, just
reeks of it. You've got your professional there being paid for these services
where the amateur'sefforts aren'tmaking him a dime.
This word amateurstarts out to mean doing somethingfor the love of it,
that's the root doing it for its own sake without a price on it. Now these days
where there's a price on everything, what's not worth getting paid for's not
worth doing. You say something's amateurish means it's a real halfassed
job. You want the best you hire a professional. A realpro, as they say.
You take van Gogh, the painterVincent van Gogh? A painting of his
brought overfifty million dollars afew years ago but in his whole lifetime he
only sold one picture, that make him an amateur? Some hobby he had,
turning out these halfassedpictureson Sunday afternoons? You get into this
you're getting into apples and oranges.
WILLIAM GADDIS**

I. INTRODUCTION
Developing a theory of interpretation for the recognition of
international law is of profound contemporary importance.' In

WILLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS OWN 190, 195-96 (1994).
See, e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The
1.
Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (1988) (noting the "great
practical importance" of source identification).
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response to increasing global interdependence, prominent
scholars are calling for the recognition of universal 2 or world3 law.

These proposals may intensify challenges to the time-honored
distinction between treaty and customary4 law,5 which are still

2.
See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J.
INr'L L. 529, 529 (1993) (stressing that, given the increasing interdependence of
nations resulting from cross-border integration, "it may be necessary to establish
new rules that are binding on all subjects of international law regardless of the
attitude of any particular state").
3.
See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT% L.J. 1617,
1621-22 (1995) (arguing for use of the phrase, "world law," based on a "new era of
global interdependence").
4.
The term "customary law' is distinct from custom. As Harold Berman
has written, "Custom, for example, in the sense of habitual patterns of behavior,
is distinguished from customary law, in the sense of customary norms of behavior
that are considered to be legally binding."
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION 8 (1983).
5.
The relationship between treaty and customary law has drawn much
scholarly attention. See generally MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMAR IMERNAMONAL
LAW AND TREAtiES (1985); R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 R.C.A.D.I. 35
(1970) ("The determination whether a treaty is declared customary international
law at the time of its adoption or coming into force or whether, on the other hand,
it subsequently passed into customary international law is not always easy to
make. However difficult that task may be, the distinction is of first importance
and must be maintained."); Jonathan I. Charney, InternationalAgreements and the
Development of Customary InternationalLaw, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 996 (1986)
(discussing alternative ways in which "international agreements may be relevant
to finding customary international law," but cautioning that agreements "should
be carefully viewed in the context of state practice and opino juts"); Anthony
D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of
International Law, 64 AM. J. INTL L. 892, 892, 902 (1970) (arguing for a "new
method" to accord "well with the growing need to objectify and place upon a
scientific basis the methodology by which one may determine what in fact are the
rules of customary law." "By looking at the form in which a treaty provision is
couched, and the structure of the treaty itself, the generalizability or
nongeneralizability of the provision, and hence its impact upon customary law,
may be scientifically determined.'); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INTL L. 281 (1988)
(noting that "the borderline between norms de lege lata-binding now-and those
de lege ferenda-meant to be binding in the future-must be carefully drawn");
John K. Gamble, Jr., The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 305 (1981); Lawrence A. Howard, The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INTL L.J. 321 (1981);

Leslie M. MacRae, Customary InternationalLaw and the United Nations' Law of the
Sea Treaty, 13 COL. W. INT'L L.J. 181 (1983); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The
InternationalCourt of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INTL L.J.
347 (1981); E.W. Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between Partiesto
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States Not Party to the
Convention, 76 AM. J. INrL L. 779 (1982) ("Although codifying conventions can
settle the law not only for the parties to them, but also for states that-for
whatever reason-have not become parties to them, it is nevertheless clear that,
in a conflict between a state that is party to such an instrument and a nonparty,
the latter will firmly deny that it is bound by the codified rules if the denial will
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7
considered the two6 primary sources of international law.
In the construction of a proverbial tower designed to
eliminate international legal babble, treaty and customary law
remain the major conceptual tools. Treaty is the more frequently
utilized international law-making instrument; however, unlike

customary law, it is not presumed to be universally binding. 8 Its

more restricted rule of application renders treaty less well-suited

9
to the creation of an international law binding on all nations.

make a difference in the conflict (as it did in the North Sea Continental Shelf

cases).") (citation omitted).
6.
This trend has also spurred theoretical attention to the development of
additional sources of international law that are neither treaty nor customary.
See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of
DeclarativeInternationalLaw, 26 TEX. INrT L.J. 87 (1991).
7.
The descriptions of treaty and customary law as sources of
international law are codified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (the I.C.J.). Article 38 provides that the I.C.J. shall apply treaty,
customary law, general principles, and (subject to significant qualification)
judicial decisions and scholarship as a subsidiary source.
Article 38
1.
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a.
international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b.
international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c.
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d.
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 105,
1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter STATLTF OFTHE I.C.J.].
8.
See Gulf of Maine (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 292-93 (Oct. 12)
(describing customary law as "undoubtedly of general application, valid for all

States and in relation to all Idnds of maritime delimitation"); North Sea

Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb. 20)
(discussing customary international law as having "equal force for all members of
the international community" and not subject to "any right of unilateral
exclusion"). See also Charney, supra note 2, at 531 ("While treaties may require
the consent of individual states to be binding on them, such consent is not
required for customary norms."); Sir Humphrey Waldock, General Course on
PublicInternationalLaw, 106 RC.A.D.I. 49 (1962) ("[Customary law is not a form
of tacit treaty but an independent form of law[,]... constitut[ing] a general rule of
international law which, subject to one reservation, applies to every State."), cited
in Gamble, supranote 5, at 306.
9.
See Chamey, supranote 2, at 551 ("[G]eneral [customary] international
law may be established on the basis of less formal indications of consent or
acquiescence. This makes worldwide law possible; it cannot be done through
treaties alone.").
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This comparative disadvantage of treaty, combined with the
universal reach of customary law, currently motivates a
conclusory equivalence of treaty provisions (binding only on
treaty-parties) with customary, hence universally applicable,

rules. Although some scholars have expressed strong reactions to

this

proclivity,' 0

the

voluminous

literature

dedicated

to

understanding the distinction between treaty and customary law

still lacks a theoretically coherent and practicable interpretive
approach that can resolve disputes over the recognition vel non of
distinct sources of international law,"1 in particular those
sources, such as customary law, that have universal applicability.
The absence of a coherent theory and practical approach
allows for a wide range of contradictory and divergent views.
Inconsistent views of the distinction between treaty and
customary law may be identified and evaluated according to a
number of alternative categorical principles. These principles
may be viewed as architectonic1 2 because they structure the

10.
See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 439 (1983) (critiquing the "veritable deconventionalization of conventional rules").
11.
See, e.g., Sir Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundationsof the Authority of
InternationalLaw and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1, 10 (1956)
("The absence of any patent and obvious source of obligation . .. deprives...
international ljurists] of any manifest point at which [they] can rest, and which
[they] can regard as a satisfactory terminal point beyond which there is no
practical necessity to go.") (quotingTHOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGmMACY
AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990)).
12.
"Architectonic" is a term used along similar lines in many diverse
disciplines, including, without limitation: (1) philosophy (the principles that
structure knowledge and meaning), see, e.g., WALTER WATSON, THE ARCHIEO"NICS
OF

MEANING

(1985);

W.H.

WERKMEISTER,

KANT

THE

ARCHrIECTONIC

AND

DEVELOPMENr OF HIS PHILOSOPHY (1980); (2) psychology (the study of theories that
have a unifying structural design), see, e.g., PHILIP POMPER, THE STRUCIURE OF
MIND IN HISrORY (1985) (identifying genetic, epigenetic, catastrophic, dialectic, and
systemic structures in psychoanalytical theory); (3) architecture (the study of the
principles of architectural design), see, e.g., HUGO LEIPZIGER, THE ARCHflEcTONIC
CITY IN THE AMERICAS (1944); M.A. ANANMHALWAR AND ALEXANDER RFA, INDIAN

ARCH1TECR V. 1, ARCHrIECTINICS (1980); (4) science, see, e.g., WOLFGANG BALZER
BT AL., AN ARCECTONIC FOR SCIENCE: THE STRUCTURALIST PROGRAM (1987);
WENDELL J.S. KRIEG, ARCHnCTNICS OF HUMAN CEREBRAL FIBER SYSTEMS (1973);

and (5) law, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSInCE 250, 302 (1971)
(discussing the first principle of the architectonic system: "Each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."). Yet, the use of architectonics
in this study differs from that in the foregoing literature in one critical respect.
Whereas architectonics is understood to denote "the unifying structural design of
something," (MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 61 (10th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY], this study focuses on the competing designs underlying
one's comprehension of distinct linguistic expressions and the arguably distinct
phenomena they seek to grasp. Whereas this study is set in the context of public
international legal theory, the identification of competing architectonic principles,
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understanding of any two presumably distinct terms or concepts.
This Article denominates these architectonic principles as follows:
dichotomy, overlap, relativity, interdependence, 1 3 equivalence,
and indeterminacy. These six principles represent a typology of
different ways in which the distinction between any two terms or
combinations of terms may be understood. 14 Given the escalation
of a wide array of international law-making projects, 1 5 a
reexamination of the alternative principles that underlie the
treaty/customary law distinction is particularly central to the
further development of coherent and practicable rules of
recognition 16 for international law.
The choice among alternative views is not merely of academic
significance. The distinction between treaty and customary law is
critical because the identification of an international rule as
treaty or customary law directly affects the scope of the rule's
applicability. 17 If a treaty is considered binding only on parties to
the treaty, and customary law is presumed universally binding,
the nature of the distinction (if any) between the two sources may

have a profound consequence for the nontreaty party.

For

example, if treaty and customary law are deemed mutually
exclusive, 18 then the treaty and customary rules must be different

the normative comparison of them, and the proposed theory of sub-referential
threshold relativity carry the potential for broad application to several pairs of
substance/procedure,
(e.g.,
the
law
in
distinctions
critical
territoriality/personality, and lex/ius). See LEOPOLD POSIMIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF
See
LAW 1-2 (1971) (discussing these as three fundamental dichotomies).
generally OWEN FISS & ROBERT COVER, THE STRUCIURE OF PROCEDURE (1979).
Interdependence is often related to oppositional thinking (e.g., Sir
13.
Thomas Browne "declaring that contraries are the life of one another," and
Swedenborg "explaining that a thing cannot exist without its contrary"). RODNEY
NEEDHAM, COUNTERPOS 100 (1987).
This is not intended to be a necessarily exhaustive list of possibilities.
14.
This study attempts to identify those conceptual possibilities that best
correspond, however roughly, to both explicit and implicit conceptions evident in
the preexisting literature, and to discuss them in a manner designed to make
conceptual comparisons both intelligible and constructive.
15.
See discussion infra in Section II.A on the different approaches to
conflicts of law caused by increases in cross-border activity in a wide range of
legal subject matter.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961) (on rules of
16.
recognition); id. at 208-31 (on the absence of rules of recognition in international
law). See also Thomas M. Franck, Legitmacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM.
J. INTrLL. 705 (1988); FRANCK, supra note 11.
Given the increasing interdependence of nations resulting from cross17.
border integration, Jonathan Charney stresses that "it may be necessary to
establish new rules that are binding on all subjects of international law regardless
of the attitude of any particular state." Charney, supranote 2, at 529.
This is referred to as the dichotomous view. See discussion infra
18.

Section III.A.
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and, accordingly, the nontreaty party would not be bound by the
treaty rule. On the other hand, if treaty and customary law are
considered to be the same, 1 9 nontreaty parties would be bound by
20
the treaty rule.
In an attempt to reconcile and resolve disagreements over the
recognition of customary law based on evidence of treaty, this
Article critiques ways in which the distinction between treaty and
customary law has been understood and proposes a new
interpretive approach to address the theoretical and practical
weaknesses of prior methods. At its most rudimentary level, this
article argues that customary law should not necessarily be
understood 21 according to the terms of treaty, whether in
dichotomous, equivalent, or some other relationship, but rather
23
according to its own independently2 2 defining attributes.

19.
This is referred to as the equivalent view. See discussion infra Section
III.E. Even where treaty and customary rules both apply but resolve the same
issue differently, treaty rules do not necessarily override customary law. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(rejecting U.S. claim that multilateral treaty reservations barring adjudication also
barred claims based on even identical rules under customary international law).
20.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
21.
This view is referred to throughout this article as "cross-referential"
(i.e., the understanding of two expressions in terms of one another). This term is
used instead of many alternatives, such as "opposite," "opposed," "polar," or
"antithetical.' See NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 27. Each of these alternatives
assumes a significant contrast, indeed a mutual exclusivity, whereas crossreference may include an equivalent relationship between two terms and is
intended to be neutral as to whether the existence of two terms denotes contrast
or similarity. Cross-referential is also used in lieu of several Aristotelian
typologies of distinctions, developed in ARTISTOTLE, CATEGORIES AND DE
INTERPRETATIONE (J.L. Ackrill trans., 1963) and ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (John
WARRINGTON trans., 1956). Cross-reference is broader than and inclusive of (i)
correlative terms such as senior/junior, i.e., terms defined in relation to one
another (e.g., "the double and the half"), (ii) contraries, of which there are two
types, i.e., the first includes a pair of terms with no intermediate between them
(e.g., a number must be odd or even but may not be both, and the second
encompasses pairs of terms that denote maximum difference and have
intermediates between them, such as black and white, between which there are
hues of grey; (iii) privation and possession, i.e., opposites that are connected with
the same thing (e.g., blindness and sight of the eye); and (iv) affirmation and
negation, in which it is necessary as a matter of logic for one to be true and the
other false (e.g., a contradiction). See G.E.R. LLOYD, POLARITY AND ANALOGY (1966),
summarized in NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 44-49, and critiqued in id. at 50-60
(describing the use of opposition as a spatial metaphor for contrasted terms).
Needham correctly questions Aristotle's treatment of each of these pairs of
distinctions as merely oppositional. Id. at 50-52.
22.
This view is referred to herein as "sub-referential" (i.e., the
understanding of two expressions not in terms of one another, but by reference to
those attributes that define each term independently). Thus, unlike cross-

referential definitions, sub-referential definitions define expressions in terms of
what they are, rather than what they are not. For a discussion of classical,
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This Article evaluates each of the identified architectonic
principles according to its theoretical coherence, practicability,
reconcilability, and resolving power. These evaluative standards
are designed to assess each architectonic principle in the area of
law. This Article concludes that none of the architectonic
principles currently utilized in the international law literature
sufficiently satisfies all of the postulated standards. In response
to this common failure, this Article proposes a set of interpretive
steps designed to overcome the various shortcomings of the other
views. This four-step interpretive approach is called "subreferential threshold relativity" (STR).
This Article is organized accordingly. Given the abstract
nature of this study, Section II provides a more extensive
presentation of the problems posed and the solutions proposesd
by this study. Part A discusses the contemporary and future
importance of the distinction between treaty and customary law.
Part B describes in greater detail the interpretive problems posed
by the distinction between any two terms. To introduce the
interpretive theory, Part C addresses the question of whether
minivans are cars or trucks. Sections III and IV apply the
interpretive theory to the treaty/customary law distinction.
Section III provides a critique of the competing views and
concludes that each view exhibits at least one significant
disadvantage. Based on this critique, Section IV proposes a new
interpretive approach, sub-referential threshold relativity, which
is designed to achieve greater theoretical coherence, practicability,
reconcilability with alternative generalizations, and resolving
power.

II.

PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. Significance of the Treaty/CustomaryLaw Distinction
The need to develop a theory of interpretation designed for
rules of recognition that distinguish different sources of

traditional, and modem definitions of customary international law, see Chodosh,
supranote 6, at 97-105.
Thus, instead of defining truth in terms of what is false, it must be
23.
defined according to some other term or set of terms considered affrative
definitional attributes of truth, such as in accordance with fact. See, e.g.,
SPINOZA'S ETHMCs 69 (A. Boyle trans., 1941) ("[H]e who would distinguish the true
").
from the false must have an adequate idea of what is true and false.
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international law2 4 is of profound contemporary and future
importance in both international and national 25 settings. Not
only is the distinction between treaty and customary law still
important in areas of traditional international conflicts, 2 6 but it
may also become increasingly critical in the resolution of legal
problems caused by intensifications of transnational activity.
Such activity includes the cross-border movement and exchange
of people, 2 7 goods, 28 currency, 29 services, 3 0 communication

24.
Unpacking the ambiguity of the phrase "international law" may be
accomplished by posing a fundamental, dynamic, and multidimensional tripartite
question: whose law applied by whom to whom? By the term international, one
may intend to grasp (i) law (even domestic law) that applies to legal personalities
of more than one nation (i.e., conflict of laws, or private international law); (ii) law
that is made or created by more than one nation (i.e., the sources of international
law); or (iii) law that is applied by formal institutions created or established by
more than one nation (e.g., the European Union, North American Free Trade
Agreement Arbitration Panels) or by decision-makers from more than one nation
(e.g., international arbitration). By the term "law," one may mean (i) actual
behavior, (ii) the abstract rules intended to prescribe and proscribe certain
behavior, or (iii) authoritative decision. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941); POSPfWIL, supra note 12, at 193; W. Michael Reisman, The
Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133 (1987)
[hereinafter Reisman, Cult of Custom]. See also W. Michael Reisman, International
Incidents: Introductionto a New Genre in the Study of InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J.
INr'L L. 1, 9 (1984) [hereinafter Reisman, International Incidents] ("Operational

code.., must be sought in elite behavior.").
25.
The question "what is international law?" is often difficult, but
necessary to answer, and is of great practical importance in U.S. law. There are
many examples of statutory and common law rules that presuppose a knowledge
of what international law is. For example, the U.S. Constitution vests Congress

with the power "[t]o define and punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations,"
U.S. CoNSr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Second, the Alien Tort Statute confers jurisdiction
over a suit "by an alien, for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. In order to determine
whether a court has jurisdiction under this statute, it must determine whether
the law of nations has been violated. Third, in The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423
(1815), Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that in the absence of a congressional
enactment, U.S. courts are "bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law
of the land." Id. Finally, in Murray v. Schooner ChanningBetsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804),
he declared that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. For an excellent
analysis of the Charming Betsy doctrine, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
InternationalLaw As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,43 VAND. L. REV.
1103, 1106 n.7 (1990).
Each of these rules or doctrines presupposes a
knowledge of what international law is or requires.
26.
See, e.g., infra text and notes discussing I.C.J. case law in Sections III
and IV.
27.
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: CONTINUOUS REPORTING SYSrEM (1992).
28.
See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS:
YEARBOOK (1994); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, MOMLY STATISTICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (1994) (reporting that the
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technologies,3 1 and environmental harms.3 2 Given pronounced
differences between the nations affected by cross-border
transactions, these activities give rise to profound social,3
and political3 5 controversies, and result in
economic,3
increasingly frequent confficts of law. These conflicts involve the

$224,915,000,000 of world trade among member nations in 1992 is an increase
over trade values in 1991).
29.
Currency exchange markets have experienced remarkable growth, at
times requiring governmental interventions in currency markets to bolster a
The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank recently purchased
national currency.
undisclosed, large quantities of U.S. dollars in order to keep the dollar from falling
beneath its all-time, post-WWII low. Richard Chang, Stocks Rise to New Record,
DolarHits Post-WarLow, REUrIER EUR. BUS. REP., Mar. 23, 1995.
30.
Transnational service industries have also grown enormously.
31.
U.S. entertainment industries, in particular movies and television, are
perhaps the most desired by foreign consumers and thus feared by commercial
interests in foreign nations. This combination of demand and fear has made the
cultural industries a heated topic of international trade regimes. For example,
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement contains exemptions for Canadian
barriers to U.S. cultural industries. See The United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, art. 2005-07, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 359.
See Michael Anders, Climate Conference to Take on Global Warming,
32.
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 26, 1995 (relating that the Berlin conference will
focus on environmental harms that have a global impact, e.g., the greenhouse
effect).
"The wave of immigration from poor territories to rich countries and
33.
the influx of people from rural areas to cities have reached an unprecedented
scale, forming what the U.N. Population Fund has called the 'current crisis of
Liu Binyan, Civilization Grafting; No Culture Is an Island, FOREIGN
mankind.'
AFFAIRS, Fall 1993, at 19. For descriptions of overall population trends and their
interrelationship with environmental changes, see AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BAlANCE
(1992).
See, e.g., The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., U.S., Japan Still
34.
Negotiatingto Resolve Flat Glass Dispute, 11 INr'L TRADE REP. 1888 (discussing the
flat glass agreement between the United States and Japan and reporting the
disagreement between the two countries on how to measure improved access to
this market).
See Lori Rodriguez, View of Reaction to Proposition187, HOUS. CHRON.,
35.
Dec. 3, 1994, at 33A (describing Mexican demolition of a McDonalds restaurant
in Mexico City in response to California's passage of Proposition 187, which
denies legal immigrants education, welfare, and non-emergency medical care); see
also Mary Lee, West's Values Take a Beating in Asia, S. CHINA MORNING PoSr, Aug.
21, 1994, at 8 (discussing issues raised by Singapore's arrest and subsequent
caning of Michael Fay, a U.S. citizen accused of vandalism in Singapore); The

Birth of a New Europe, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1993, at 1 (stating that French
farmers, with government backing, oppose economic integration and prefer safety
of protectionist measures); David Israelson, It's a Big If How Danes Will Vote on
Treaty, TORONTO STAR, May 16, 1993, at F1 (referring to opposition faced by John
Major to the new European Currency Unit); Matt Miller, Pragmatic Policy Shift
Reflects Bejifng's Value, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 27, 1994, at 8 (concluding
that the United States caved into Chinese opposition to considering human rights
as a condition to renewed most-favored nation status).
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diverse subject matter of child custody,3
crime, 3 7 human
41
4°
39
38
sales, 42
securities,
antitrust,
discrimination,
rights,
trade,4
currencies, 4 4
bankruptcy,4
banking,4
labor,4 7
49
broadcasting and media,48 and the environment.

36.
Robert P. Hey, ParentsBattle for Children Across InternationalBorders,
CHISTIAN SCI. MON1TOR, Jan. 2, 1987, at 1 (in many cases, U.S. parents face
insurmountable legal difficulties in regaining custody of a child abducted to a
foreign country); Dona Munker, Driven to Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, §
7, at 17 (reviewing Betty Mahmoudy's book, For the Love of a Child, about her
battle with her Iranian husband to retrieve her daughter from Iran).
37.
See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1514 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (holding extra-territorial jurisdiction appropriate over a case involving the
leader of Panamanian armed forces because his drug related activities had direct
effect within United States).
38.
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Cruz Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 256-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding a
Mexican-U.S. defendant properly received capital punishment).
39.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59
(1991) (discussing applicability of Title VII to a discrimination claim brought by a
U.S. citizen against a U.S. employer for acts which occurred outside the United
States).
40.
See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 604
F. Supp. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that a British Corporation doing
business in the U.S. was subject to U.S. antitrust law).
41.
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987);
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
42.
See Corporation Venezolana de Fometo v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629
F.2d 786, 792-794 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding it appropriate to apply a federal
common law choice of law rule in order to decide which of the concerned
jurisdiction's substantive law of fraud (i.e., that of New York or that of Venezuela)
should govern and holding the latter to apply).
43.
Thomas L. Friedman, A Dispute on Wheat Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1994, at 39 (trade dispute between Canada and the United States about
Canadian subsidies of its wheat).
44.
See Ronald David Greenberg, The EurodollarMarket: The Case for
Disclosure, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1492, 1493 (1983) (arguing that "the international
character of the Eurodollar market makes comprehensive regulatory strategies
unfeasible," recommending "the creation of a system of disclosure to assist
Euro-banks in the proper evaluation of risk, without unnecessarily hampering
their Eurodollar operations").
45.
See In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (1992);
Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (1987).
46.
Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1988)
(involving a multi-national bank's liability for deposits in a foreign branch
expropriated by the country in which the branch was located).
47.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218 (1991).
48.
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publs. Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). See
Donald S. Macdonald, The CanadianCulturalIndustriesExemption under CanadaU.S. Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S.L.J. 253 (1994).
49.
Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
See generallySean D. Murphy, ProspectiveLiability Regimesfor the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INrL L. 28-40 (1994) (discussing the
conflict-of-law obstacles to transnational litigation of environmental disputes).
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The treaty/customary law distinction is critical to three
interrelated and at times overlapping strategies to accommodate,
reconcile, or eliminate such conflicts. First, nations may attempt
through legislation to apply their domestic law extraterritorially

based on internationally acceptable conflict-of-law principles. 50
Second, nations may create or recognize uniform rules, whether
through international agreement or through domestic acceptance

of an emerging norm.

Third, nations may unify, federalize, or

internationalize their municipal jurisdictions.5 1
Each of these three approaches presupposes a coherent,
practicable, and explicable way to identify distinct international
legal sources, including treaty and customary international law.
First, source recognition is necessary to the identification of
internationally acceptable conflict-of-law principles and the
permissible scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Second, and
most directly, source theory is important for the identification and
application of international rules themselves.
Finally,
international institutions, such as the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.), are obligated to identify and apply distinctions
between different types of international legal sources, such as
treaty and customary law, which remain the two most important
52
manifestations of international legal obligation.

50.
For a seminal introduction to conflict of laws, see LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1995). International conflict of laws is also traditionally
referred to as private international law, a term confusing to U.S. lawyers, who
often misunderstand private international law to be a body of international law
that regulates private, nonstate conduct. States also use jurisdiction-avoidance
devices, not formally considered under the discipline of conflict of laws, but
utilized in fact patterns not dissimilar from those addressed by conflict of laws,
e.g., personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, political question, etc. See
Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2382
(1991) (discussing doctrinal targeting to solve problems of jurisdiction avoidance
devices).
51.
The appropriate condominium of the foregoing strategies should be
guided by a normative comparison of these three basic approaches to
accommodating, reconciling, or eliminating the conflicts of law that result from
intensifications of cross-border activity.
52.
The noncontroversial statement that treaty and customary law
comprise two sources of international legal obligation remains silent on three
critical, related issues: first, the categorical de facto totality of these two sources;
second, the nature of the distinction between them either in relation to each other
or in relation to other definitional standards of recognition; and, third, the
practical consequences flowing from answers to the foregoing questions. For a
discussion of the first question see Chodosh, supranote 6. This Article addresses
the latter two questions concerning competing conceptions of the distinction
between treaty and customary law. First, this Article suggests that the choice of
competing conceptions of treaty and customary law as mutually exclusive,
categorically overlapping, different only in degree, interdependent, equivalent, or
indeterminate is not determined by the mere existence of two terms, but by the
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1. Extraterritorial Principles

Renewed attention to international legal sources is important
in the conflict-of-law area. Conflicts of law call for two types of

normative uniformity: (1) uniformity of the permissible bases for

the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, and (2) uniformity of the
substantive domestic rules that themselves are in conflict.
Conflict-of-law principles are concerned with the former type of
uniformity; however, they vary considerably concerning the
priority given to different types of cross-border factors. Such
53
principles may focus alternatively on the situs of (1) the forum;
(2) the legal personalities of the parties in dispute,5 4 including the
nationality of the claimant (passive personality)5 5 or the defendant
(nationality);5 6 (3) specific conduct (territoriality),5 7 including
intent and resulting consequences (effects/intent);5 8 (4) the
content of the conflicting laws themselves (universality);59 or (5)

conceptual assumptions brought to the reading. Additionally, this Article
explores the practical consequences of any particular choice among the foregoing
alternatives.
53.
For domestic application of the lexfori rule, see for example, Foster v.
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. App. 1972) ("The basic law is the law of the forum,
which should not be displaced without valid reasons.").
54.
For domestic law theories that prioritize legal personality factors, see
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). For U.S.
views on international legal personality principles, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS] (discussing principles of nationality (of the defendant) and passive
personality (of the plaintiff)).
55.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54. See also United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. 1988) (holding that passive personality
and universality principles together provide ample grounds to support an
assertion of U.S. jurisdiction in prosecution against hijacking by foreigners on
foreign soil of aircraft occupied in part by several U.S. nationals).
56.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 54.
57.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (1934)

(Wrongs); id. at 22 (Contracts); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 54,
§ 402(1) (territoriality principle).
58.
RESTAITEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54, § 402 {territoriality
principle). See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 920-25 (1983).
59.
Several domestic law doctrines focus on the content of the law in
conflict. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985) (public policy exception); Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 239
N.E. 2d 799 (111. 1968) (public policy exception); Jepson v. General Cas. Co., 513
N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1994) (better law doctrine). For the procedural law and penal
law exceptions, see Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) (holding burden of proof in contributory negligence
defense substantive for Eriepurposes but procedural according to Massachusetts
law, thus justifying application of forum rule); and Paper Products v. Doggrell,
261 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1953) (refusing to apply Arkansas statute, determined to
be penal for choice of law purposes, that permitted personal liability of
shareholders for breach of contract by corporation that failed to file corporate
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factors

However, in the absence of
(reasonableness or comity).6 0
agreement on or acceptance of the priority to be accorded to
certain factors over others, these principles will remain an area of
disagreement within conflict-of-law doctrine itself.
Not only are several bases of transnational subject matter
jurisdiction less settled (e.g., effects/intent, passive personality,
and universality),6 1 but even well-settled principles of nationality
and territoriality lead to the possibility that more than one law
might apply to the same transaction or dispute.6 2 For example, a
U.S. national working abroad may be obligated (by virtue of
nationality) under U.S. law to do what is considered illegal under
the foreign nation's law (by virtue of territoriality).63 Even if one
assumes that both the nationality and territoriality principles

have attained customary status, there are neither general treaty"
nor customary law rules for resolving such conflicts among
conflict-of-law principles themselves. 6 5

The uncertain status of at

documents with local county). The continental European analogue to the public
policy exception is the principle of ordre publique. See David J. Gerber,
ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the
United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986). In international jurisprudence,
U.S. courts focus on congressional intent of extraterritorial application; see
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991) (holding Title
VII-which was later amended as a result of this opinion-to fall short of
demonstrating affirmative congressional intent to overcome presumption against
extraterritorial effect of legislation). U.S. courts have also based decisions on the
international principle of universality. See Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 577 F. Supp.
860, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Torture is viewed with universal abhorrence; the
prohibition of torture by international consensus and express international
accords is clear and unambigous."). See also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
See generally, RESrATEMENT OF
at 900-01 (discussing universality principle).
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 54, §§ 402, 404.
60.
See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976) (preferring a jurisdictional rule of reason to the territoriality test and the
effects/intent test); Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign
Conduct: Has Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J.
IN'L BUS. L. 221 (1994).
61.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 54, §§ 402, 404.
62.
See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness' and Choice of Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1191 (1987) (arguing for the general principle that the choice of forum
should not determine the choice of law that governs a particular dispute).
63.
See Mahoney v. Radio Free Europe, Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 170
(BNA) (D.C. Cir. 1995).
64.
That is, there is no international treaty dedicated solely to conflict-oflaw problems.
In specific instances, however, courts often draw on jurisdictional
65.
principles embodied in treaties and arguably extend those principles to nationals
of nontreaty states, implicitly interposing notions of what is customary law. See,
e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. 1988) (applying passive
personality and universality principles embodied in specific treaties signed by a
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least some extraterritorial principles under international law and
the lack of priority among potentially conflicting, authoritative
principles 66 present significant obstacles to solving legal problems
caused by increasing cross-border activities. 6 7
2. Uniform Rules
Most significantly, the treaty/customary law distinction poses
a difficult problem when attempting to achieve uniformity of
applicable law.
As cross-border activity increases, and in
instances when conflict-of-law doctrines are deemed inadequate,
nations seek to create uniform, international rules. 6 8 On their
face, these rules eliminate the underlying differences of law that
create conflicts. Progress in the internationalization of rules
child abduction, 6 9
touches many diverse fields of the law:
7
7
1
immigration, " sale of goods, currency standards, 72 protections

majority of states applicable to assert U.S. jurisdiction over hijacking by foreign
national on foreign soil of aircraft occupied by several U.S. nationals).
66.
Assuming both the nationality and territoriality principles are equally
sufficient bases for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the choice of
national law will then depend on the availability and choice of the forum.
67.
The strategy of utilizing conflict-of-law principles carries the advantage
of maintaining local preferences in law. Indeed, whether to continue to employ
choice of law over other strategies may depend on how frequent and important
such conflicts are. If conflicts are rare and unimportant compared with the
interest in local normative preferences, it makes little sense to alter local law. On
the other hand, as cross-border transactions become increasingly numerous and

central to the well-being of the local community, choice of law may be
comparatively inadequate. This disadvantage of unpredictability in choice of law
as a strategy is simultaneously an advantage of the second type of uniformity,
that is, making uniform the substantive norms that govern cross-border activity.
68.
This body of law has been traditionally referred to as public
international law, law made by and between nations. See Ralph G. Steinhardt,
The Privatizationof PublicInternationalLaw, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INr'L L. & ECON. 523
(1991).
69.
See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400
(6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a child's "habitual residence" for purposes of the
Hague Convention must not be confused with domicile, and concluding that to
determine the habitual residence a court must focus on the child rather than on
the parents and examine past experience instead of future intentions).
70.
See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their
Common Borders, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68 (giving nation where first entry is
made exclusive jurisdiction over immigration status).
71.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671.
72.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [Maastricht Treaty or TEU], ch. 2, arts. 10509. See also Learning to Fly, THE ECONOMISr, Jan. 15, 1994, at 75; European
Monetary Union; the Twisting Road from Here to There, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 19,
1994, at 91 (discussing the European Union's actions toward establishment of a
monetary union with a single currency).
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regulation,
environmental
sovereignty, 73
cultural
of
76
5
human rights,
foreign investment, 7 7 and
extradition,
78
trade.
especially
Strategies to create uniform rules take one of two overlapping
and interrelated forms: (1) domestic, noncontractual acceptance
of the uniform rule, often prompted by international criticism and
sanctions 7 9 or as a condition to either international assistance" °

North American Free Trade Agreement, art 2107, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
73.
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (definition of cultural industries); European
Convention on Cultural Property, June 23, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 44; UNESCO
Convention, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971).
74.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 20 I.L.M. 656. The 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (or Earth Summit),
held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, produced several international agreements
for the signature of delegates, including the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)
[hereinafter RIO DECLARATION] (A declaration of principles of environmental

protection and its link to sustainable development.).

75.

See European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 813

(1978); Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 723.
76.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 58; European Convention for Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1154 (1988).
See, e.g., Patrick Del Duca, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INrL L. 240 (1991)
77.
(reviewing LUIGI MIGUORINO, GLI ACCORDI INTERNAZIONALI/SUGLI INVESTIMENTI (1989))
(discussing approximately 250 bilateral treaties governing international
investment, and investigating whether the treaties, together with elements of state
practice, permit the inference of general principles of customary international
law).
78.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
[hereinafter GAIT]. See A Dream of Free Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at
35 (reporting on the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, held
in November 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, where the 18 members declared their
commitment to the establishment of a free trade area stretching from the United
States to China); Julian Ozanne & Mark Nicholson, Summit Paves Way for Mideast
Trade Zone, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at 22 (summit grouping public and
private sector leaders from the Middle East and North Africa declared the goal of
establishing a common market based on free movement of goods and services).
79.
South Africa's rejection of apartheidrepresents a prominent example.
See Steven Mufson, South Africa 1990, FOREIGN AFF., 1990, at 120 (explaining the
dismantling of apartheid).
For example, monetary assistance from the World Bank or the
80.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are often conditioned on national reforms of
the political, economic, and legal systems, and on policy choices in favor of
democratic suffrage, human rights, or (more recently) environmental protection.
See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New ImperialAuthority: The World Bank and
the DemocratizationofDevelopment 6 HARV. HUM. RIS. J. 159 (1993) (arguing that
the World Bank performs law-making functions in recipient countries); Cynthia C.
Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformationof Economies: Is the Fund's Conditionality
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or membership in common unionss; or (2) bi- or multilateral
adoption of the uniform rule through consensual agreement
(treaty),8 2 recognition of general practice accepted as law
(customary law), or declarations of what the law is or should be
(declarative law).8 3 Although the uniformity of rules carries the
significant advantage of reconciling formal conflicts between legal
rules, residual disagreements over the rules of recognition and
the interpretive application of these potential sources of law
require additional scholarly attention.8 4 In this respect, the
nature of the treaty/customary law distinction may determine

Appropriate to the Task?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1947-48 (1994) (assistance
from the IMF is conditioned on economic and monetary policy reforms).
81.
Mexico, for example, agreed to strengthen its internal environmental

laws in order to strengthen U.S. support for the North American Free Trade
Agreement. See Damian Fraser, Mexico Ponders Price it Must Pay for NAFTA-Side
Accords Demanded by the U.S. Raise Some Thorny Issues, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar.

23, 1993, at 9 (reporting that despite sovereignty concerns, Mexico expected to
agree to new environmental regulations to accede to NAFTA). The European
Union also has placed conditions on countries applying for membership. See
Robert Mauthner, No Quick Entry, but the Log Jam is Broken, FINANCIAL TIMES, May

19, 1986, Survey rec., at 3 (discussing political obstacles to Turkey's membership
in EEC); Victor Walker, The Key to Successful EEC Integration, FINANCIAL TIMES,

Dec. 22, 1982, § 3, at 6 (discussing Greece's economic adjustments as requisites
to EEC membership).
82.
See Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089
(1990); KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS INTREAY LAW (1967).
Whereas the relationship between treaty and customary law is the
83.
focus of this article, declarative law, referred to herein, is discussed thoroughly in
Chodosh, supranote 6, and mentioned in Koh, supranote 50, at 276.

84.

Even uniform treaty language is vulnerable to conflicting national

interpretations, and subject to appeals to customary methods of interpretation.
The U.S.-Japan trade negotiations provide a prominent example. The Japanese
are accustomed to describing the immediate disagreements over the correct
interpretation of uniform language in international agreements with the United
States by referring to an insect ("takshimuro) that changes appearance depending
on the angle from which it is viewed. See also Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
(holding permissive language in Hague Evidence Convention (e.g., use of the word
"may") as indication that Hague procedures were merely one of many U.S. litigant
options, whereas European parties had interpreted the same provision to indicate
the exclusive procedure for obtaining evidence within their countries). See also

FRANCK, supranote 11, at 53-54 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
intentional indeterminacy). Franck identifies certain advantages to constructive
ambiguity in a 1958 treaty provision on the underwater continental shelf: "The
parties to the treaty simply disguised their differences, using a word-formula that
left the matter in abeyance pending further work by courts, administrators, and
by the evolution of customary state practice. The resultant vagueness permitted

a rule to evolve flexibly, in response to advances in technology [that] the drafters
could not foresee." Yet, he argues that "indeterminacy also makes it easier to
justify non-compliance." Id.
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who
makes the law, who applies the law, and who is subject to
8

it. 5

First, regarding who makes the law, in the United States, for
example, a treaty must be ratified by the Senate to become U.S.
federal law.8 6 Arguably, however, no congressional consent is a
prerequisite for customary international law to become binding in
the U.S. courts.8 7 Therefore, the identification of customary
international law by either the executive or judicial branches may
at times remove Congress from the active formal process of
international normative development.
Second, regarding who applies the law, the application of
customary law by U.S. courts invokes separation-of-powers

concerns (e.g., if the courts allow the President to displace
customary international law in which Congress played a lawmaking role pursuant to its constitutional authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations).8 8

As a constitutional

matter, treaty is on a par with federal legislation, but the status of

customary

international law in U.S. court adjudication

is

controversial.8 9
Finally, concerning who is subject to the law, treaty is
presumed binding only on parties to international conventions or
treaties. In contrast, customary international law, defined as

85.
See Chodosh, supra note 6 (discussing three views of customary
international law addressing respectively these three questions).
86.
U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
87.
See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 727-31 (1986).
88.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, which allocates law-maling power to
Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, which has
been equated by our courts with customary international law. See Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Richard Pregent, Presidential
Authority to Displace Customary InternationalLaw, 129 MIL. L. REV. 77 (1990).
89.
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S.
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.
1978); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Fiocanni v. Attorney
General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Marley, 509
P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973); Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d
698 (N.Y. 1969); American League for a Free Palestine v. Tyre Shipping Co., 119
N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
For discussions of the relationship between
customary law and domestic court adjudication, see James Crawford et al.,
Application of Customary International Law by National Tribunals: General

InternationalLaw and Common Law: A Decade of Developments, 76 AM. SOCY INT-L
L. PROC. 231 (1982); C. Donald Johnson, Jr., Filartigav. Pena-Irala A Contribution
to the Development of Customary InternationalLaw by a Domestic Court, 11 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 336-37 (1981); David F. Klein, Comment, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic
Courts, 13 YALE J. INTL L. 332 (1988); Eric George Reeves, Note, United States v.
Javino: Reconsidering the Relationship of Customary InternationalLaw to Domestic
Law, 50 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 877 (1993).
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general practice accepted as law, is presumed universally
binding. 90 Increasing numbers of disputes involving at least one
legal personality of a nontreaty party therefore may be resolved by
applying customary international law or some other previously
unrecognized source of law or by finding that no international law
applies. Given a general increase in the quantity and scope of
treaty, the architectonic principle chosen to inform the
relationship between treaty and customary law may determine the
outcome of such disputes. For example, under the dichotomous
view, 9 1 if the rule is one of treaty, then no customary law applies;
thus, the nontreaty party has no obligation under customary
93
international law. 2 Alternatively, under an equivalent view,
treaty (with little more) 94 is customary law. Therefore, even the
9
nontreaty party is bound by the treaty qua customary rule. 5
3. Unification of National Jurisdictions
Finally, comprehension of the treaty/customary law
distinction is equally important to the legal functions of
international institutions.
Because they are aware of the
limitations of both conflict-of-law doctrines and because they rely
upon national institutions to apply uniform rules, nations may
create international institutions in order to develop consistent
and
authoritative
organization, 9 6
interpretation, 9 7
and

90.
Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of
the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INr'L L.J. 457 (1985);
Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of
Customary InternationalLaw, 1985 BRrr. Y.B. IN'L L. 1.
91.
See infra Section I.A.
92.
See e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger.
v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26-27 (Feb. 20); Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. at 277. See generally Richard E. Levy, InternationalLaw and the Chernobyl
Accident. Reflecting on an Important but Imperfect System, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 81
(1987); VILLIGER, supra note 5 (raising question whether "the refusal of states to
become parties to a treaty [should] be evidence that no such rule exists").
93.
See infra Section HI.E.
94.
Under this view, it is unclear what "little more" would be needed.
95.
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 704, 706-07 (1900). See

also VILlUGER, supra note 5, at 18-22 (1985) (raising the question of whether

treaties are "examples of state practice which may form the basis of customary
law binding on nonparties!).
96.
Uniformity of norms is intended to be a broader concept than
legislation of uniform norms.
Uniformity may be achieved without an
international legislative institution, although the result of normative uniformity
may be the same.
Furthermore, uniformity may extend to regulate all
intranational activity rather than merely trans- or international activity.
97.
Treaty Establishing the European Community as Amended by
Subsequent Treaties, and Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
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enforcement 9 8 of rules.
Such institutions may perform a variety of arguably quasilegislative,99
quasi-judicial, 20
and
quasi-executive 01
1 2
functions. 0 Each of these functions presupposes the ability to

European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 164-188, 31 I.L.M. 247
(Arts. 173 and 177 confer authority on the European Court of Justice to review
actions of members as well as the legality of acts adopted by the Parliament,
Council, and Commission.); NAFTA, supra note 73, arts. 2008-2019 (establishing
arbitration panels to resolve disputes between parties regarding the interpretation
of treaty provisions); STAIUTE OF THE I.C.J., supra note 7, art. 36 (confers
jurisdiction on the I.C.J. to hear any case brought to it by state parties, and any
case on a matter specifically provided for in the U.N. Charter or other treaty or
convention).
98.
Allocations of executive powers to international bodies are evidenced in
the growing role of the U.N. peace-keeping and enforcement activities. See H.E.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113
(1992).
99.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22 (functions of the General Assembly); id. arts.
23-32 (functions of the Security Council). Art. 10 grants the General Assembly
the power to make recommendations to the United Nations or the Security
Council on any question within the scope of the Charter. Id. art. 10. The Security
Council is authorized to pass resolutions mandating certain actions by member
states which are binding on those member states. Id. art. 25.
100. STATUTEOFTHE I.C.J., supra note 7; NAFTA, supra note 73, arts. 20162017.
101. S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3087th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/761 (1992); G.A. Res. 45/2, Electoral Assistance to Haiti, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 154, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/2 (1990); G.A. Res 45/3, Situation
in Cambodia, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 32, U.N. Doc. a/46/61-

s/22059 (1991); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (1992).
102. This strategy of creating international institutions carries the
advantage of nearly eliminating conflicts of both law and legal interpretation
between nations. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. 56/LOS/CRP.1/Rev.1 (June 3, 1994])); Louis B. Sohn,
InternationalLaw Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM. J. INTI L. 696, 701
(1994) (The agreement of the implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention is
evidence that "there is a new dynamic mechanism, allowing the international
community to create a new law directly by all nations gathering around a
conference table.... and long public debate to agree on what the law should be.
It is a more democratic process than that of national parliaments . .
").
However, it also has the disadvantages of diluting local influence and oversight.
In this respect, one may also compare unification and extraterritorial approaches,
or choice of law, as approaches to international legal problems in terms of choice
between local control and international coordination. As Franck notes, Kant
admonished against amalgamating national states under a single power because,
"the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range,
and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse
into anarchy." Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in POLICAL WRIiNGS 114 (H.
Reiss ed., H. Nisbet trans., 1970), cited in FRANCK, supra note 11, at 22. The
creation of internationalized jurisdiction also causes conflicts between
international and municipal institutions. See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, With
GATT, We Must Guard Our Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, § 3 at 13. Local
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recognize which rules are binding on whom (i.e., whether the
rules have legal effect and whom they obligate).
In these three approaches or strategies to conflicts caused by
cross-border activity, such as the utilization of extraterritoriality
principles and conflict-of-law doctrines, the creation of uniform
rules, and unification of national jurisdictions, the distinction
between treaty and customary law is of practical contemporary
significance, not merely of linguistic or academic concern. Thus,
the importance of the distinction compels an interpretive
exploration of conflicting ways in which the distinction may be
understood.
B. The Problemwith Cross-Reference
It is neither original nor controversial to state that the
meaning of words is relational. To define is to fix or mark the
limits of one meaning in relation to other meanings.1 0 3 But the
facial difference of the words themselves does not determine the
specific nature of the terms' interrelationship 1° 4 or their
relationship to other terms.10 5 In other words, language provides
the medium through which knowledge about sources of
international law is structured.
But the recognition and
differentiation of international legal sources depend on structural
principles that underlie the face of the linguistic medium. 106

control is diminished by allocations of authority to supra-national institutions,

which result in poor access for local interests to various legislative, adjudicatory,
and executive processes. For example, the Norwegian public's perception of the
inefficiency of the "bureaucrats in Brussels" was a major factor in Norway's
referendum vote to not join the European Union. John Darnton, Vote in Norway
Blocks JoiningEurope's Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al. Furthermore, the
institutional functions are performed by professionals from diverse legal cultures
and political ideologies; thus, conflicts of interpretation and process are not
altogether avoided. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, Panel No. ECC-94-1904-01-USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at 15-16.
103. DICnONARY, supra note 12, at 303.
104. Compare NEEDHAM, supranote 13, at 83 ("Pairs of terms can be related
by adjunction, conjunction, subsumption, alternation, mutual exclusion, and in
other ways.")
105. For example, words expressed differently may have the same meaning
(i.e., synonyms). The same word used in different contexts (often colloquial) may
have opposite meanings (e.g., a "bad" car may mean either a bad car or a very
good one indeed, or an "awful-awful" may denote a particularly rich milkshake).
A same-sounding word may have altogether different but not necessarily
oppositional meaning (i.e., homonyms). Furthermore, the very same word when
applied to real phenomena may have an inherently oppositional meaning (e.g.,
enemies).
106. Cf. NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 96.
The dyad potted bloom/wild flower is composed of terms that can be seen
as contraries: a taxonomic connection between them is that they are...
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Martti Koskenniemi underscores the relational quality of
language 1° 7 by noting that "expressions are like holes in a net.
Each is empty in itself and has identity only through the strings
However
which separate it from the neighbouring holes."1 0 8
appealing the net metaphor, °9 the image raises three sets of
issues concerning the relationship between two concepts, such as
(1) the precise structure of the
treaty and customary law:
distinction between the two distinguished terms; (2) the purposes
poorly or well-served by the chosen characterization of the

distinction; and (3) the superficiality of understanding different
concepts cross-referentially (i.e., in terms of one another).
1. Alternative Relationships
The first set of issues raised by the net metaphor concerns
the nature of the potential cross-referential relationships between
the two distinguished terms. Six different possibilities of crossreferential interrelationships between two distinct terms may be
(1) dichotomy-the string may
applied to the net metaphor:
divide the two semantic holes into hermetically sealed meanings;
(2) overlap-the net may fold onto itself; (3) relativity-if the string
moves from time to time, the meaning is not fixed; (4)
interdependence-one hole may be shaped by the other, or the
two holes may rely upon the same string; (5) equivalence-when
the string deteriorates, the two holes may become one; or (6)

species of the genus flower. But all this means is that they can be classed
together under the superior taxon of flower; the name of that taxon is not

the name of the two of them considered together as a unity.
Id.
107. MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY To UTOPIA (1989).
108. Id. at xx. Koskenniemi utilizes a form of linguistic structuralism to
support his jurisprudential analysis. However, his dichotomous treatment of
objectivity and subjectivity is vulnerable to attack. For example, in his discussion

of liberalism, he writes that "any constraint [to prevent harm to others] seems a
violation of individual freedom as what counts as 'harm' can only be subjectively

determined." Id. at 66. Yet, as Terry Eagleton has pointed out, meaning may be
intersubjective in being comprised of a common

understanding.

Such

intersubjective meaning may be short of objectivity, but it nonetheless constrains
"what counts as harm." See TERRY EAGLETON, LYIERARY THEORY (1983) (critiquing
structuralism in literary criticism and linguistic theory).
109. The net metaphor is hardly new. It is familiar to Buddhist philosophy.
See, e.g., FRANCIS H. COOK, HUA-YEN BUDDHISM: THE JEWEL NET OF INDIA (1977).

There is a notable distinction. Koskenniemi's net tends to have only two holes
because he focuses much of his interpretive attention on putative oppositions;
whereas the jewel net in Buddhist philosophy is infinite in its relationships of
"mutual identity and mutual intercausaliy." Id. at 2.
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indeterminacy-the string may be too weak to delimit a boundary
of meaning.
The foregoing possibilities each focus on different points of
relationship in the spectrum of meaning and suggest a distinct
architectonic principle.110
A dichotomous understanding
perceives only the extremes; the distinction will require the choice
of one term or the other.
An overlapping understanding
presumes a starting point of binary oppositions and focuses on
the middle where the extremes meet. A relative perspective posits
opposing polarities, and aims at the subtlety of shades and the
differentiation of gradient degrees across the spectrum of meaning
between the poles. A dialectic or interdependent conception of the
distinction between opposites (like its dichotomous counterpart)
focuses on the extremes but presupposes a counter-magnetic
relationship between the poles. Under this conception, not only

are meanings interdependent, but they may also be in causal
relation to each other. An equivalence of the two terms focuses
on both the overlapping middle where the two opposites are both
in evidence and on the interdependence between the two-one
being unthinkable or impossible without the other. Finally, an
indeterminate view draws selectively on the insights and failings
of each of the foregoing views, and concludes that the distinctions
11 1
are too indeterminate for purposes of ordering experience.

110. Before exploring applications of the architectonic principles thus
identified, some preliminary points about the architectonics of the principles
themselves should be made: they are not arbitrarily ordered; they may be
understood reflexively; and they are often dynamically interrelated. First, the
sequence in which these relational principles are listed here is not arbitrary. The
progression from one to the next is frequently a reaction to the perceived
disadvantages of the former.
Thus, on the scale from dichotomy to
indeterminacy, one sees not only a progression of comprehension and criticism,
but also a digression of logic and legal administrability. Related to the foregoing
point, the first three principles tend to support more static, categorical analyses;
the latter three are found in more dynamically process-oriented texts. Second,
the distinctions between these architectonic principles, as identified here, may be
understood according to the principles themselves. Finally, the principles are
also dynamically interrelated. Several principles may be employed in a single text
or treatise. Thus, the identification of any one principle with any one text may be
itself one of relative emphasis.
111. Each of the principles may be summarized in more or less algebraic
terms: (i) dichotomy-T equals negative C, where C equals negative T; (ii)
overlap-some T are C; (iii) relativity-X equals T attributes minus C attributes; if
X is positive, then X is (relatively) T; if X is negative, X is (relatively) C; (iv)
interdependence-because T equals negative C, and C equals negative T, the two
values of T and C are interdependent; the meaning of one inheres in the other; (v)
equivalence- even where T equals negative C, T may equal C, however, where C
equals zero; and (vi) indeterminacy-the value assigned to T or C is arbitrarily
variable (subjective and political); thus, there is no determinate (objective and
legal) distinction between T and C. With regard to equivalence, compare John M.
Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential
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2. Purposes Served
The second general set of questions raised by the idea of
words as relational concerns the purposes served by the choice of
a particular relationship and the consequence of any particular
choice. From this perspective, the net metaphor is too static.
Adding motion to the image, expressions of language, law, and
nets serve a variety of social purposes. For example, language
grasps phenomena, law resolves disputes, and nets catch fish.
The more precisely tailored the differences between the holes and
the purpose of differentiation,1 1 2 the more likely it is that

coherent and practicable use of language will facilitate the
resolution of disputes.
The alternative ways of appreciating or rejecting distinctions
as dichotomous, overlapping, relative, interdependent, equivalent,
or indeterminate, serve a variety of different goals. In evaluating
the architectonic principles that inform distinctions between
international legal sources, this Article suggests tendencies within
the particular purposes served by each architectonic principle.
Overlap
Dichotomy tends to serve hierarchical 113 order.1 1 4
attempts to capture commonality, when mutual exclusivity was
Relativity tries to grasp subtlety.
previously presumed.
Interdependence aspires to uncover dynamic relationships.
Indeterminacy
Equivalence works to demystify dichotomies.
tends to facilitate criticism.
These principles are employed by a wide array of political and
legal international commentators who debate many issues,

Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992, 999 (1992) ("A system of
statements could be invented in which both X and not-X are true, but it could
soon be proved that all statements in the system are true, and the system would
not be of much use.") (citing ERNESr NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF
50-51 (1958) and RAYMOND SMULLYAN, FOREVER UNDECIDED: A PUZZLE GUIDE TO
G6DEL 57-58 (1987)).
112. For a contrary view, see Anthony A. D'Amato, Why Do We Need
Customary Law, in INIERNAtiONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 51 (Anthony A. D'Amato ed.,

1994) [hereinafter D'Amato, ANTHOLOGY] ("Disputes tend to arise when a treaty
provision does not cover the dispute, or when its coverage is ambiguous or
otherwise contestable," arguing that Jeremy Bentham's wish "that the more finemeshed the treaty system, the fewer disputes-or at least the fewer important
disputes-will tend to arise" is not realizable.). See also Anthony D'Amato, Legal

Uncertainty,71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1983) [hereinafter D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty].
113. For an anthropological view of a hierarchical opposition, see Louis
Dumont, La Communautd anthropologixque et l'iddologie, 18 L'HOMME 83-110;
Louis Dumont, On Value, 66 PROC. BRYI'SH ACADEMY 207-41 (1980). For a critical
analysis of Dumont's views, see NEEDHAM, supranote 13, at 102-45.
114. Indeed, it may be a function of dualism generally to provide "a
conceptual order." NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 221.
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including: alternative descriptions of newly emerging, post-cold
war dichotomies;1 1 5 overlapping ethnic admixtures;"16 cultural
relativity;" 7
economic,
environmental,
and
general
interdependence; I1 8 the equivalence 1 9 of international law and

115.

Kishore Mahbubani, The West and the Rest, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer

1992, at 3 (Such dichotomies are coined as battles between 'the West and the
Rest."). See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 41; Christopher C. Joyner & John C. Dettling, Bridging the
Cultural Chasm: CulturalRelativism and the Future of InternationalLaw, 20 CAL.
W. IN'L L.J. 275, 276 (1990) ("The problem for the future of international law is
couched in the chasm between Western and non-Western notions of law and
morality."). A permutation of "the West and the Rest" is the dichotomy of liberal
and non-liberal states, based on the attribute of political democracy. See, e.g.,
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory:
A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INTL L. 205, 229, 236 (1993) [hereinafter Burley, Dual
Agenda] (arguing for recognition of the "sovereignty paradox" in connection with
the relations between "liberal and non-liberal states," addressing the argument
that "a government founded on any principle other than some form of selfgovernment should no longer qualify for recognition as an independent state");
see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992)
[hereinafter Burley, Liberal Internationalism](arguing that the act of state doctrine
helps to circumscribe a zone of "legitimate difference" among liberal states).
Competing dichotomous characterizations of national taxonomies, such as
North/South, Developed/Developing, First/Third World, also shape much
international commentary. See, e.g., Greta Gainer, Nationalization:The Dichotomy
Between Western and Third World Perspectives in InternationalLaw, 26 HOW. L.J.
1547, 1550 (1983).
116. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Responses to Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash
of Civilizations": The Modernizing Imperative; Traditionand Change, FOREIGN AFF.,
FALL 1993, at 22.
117. See ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUJURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD
(1971); see also Joyner & Dettling, supranote 115, at 275 ("[R]nternational lawyers
must address critical questions about the limits of universalism,' especially in
light of pervasive international conflict, widespread human rights abuse and,
arguably, depreciation of the rule of law during this century.") (citing A. CARMY,
THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? (1986)). Joyner states that "[tlhe problem of
cultural relativism is rooted in large part from the influx of more than 100 new,
non-Western States into the international legal system since 1960." Id. at 276.
Joyner points out that "[a] major thesis of cultural relativism is that many
cultures stand in relation to each other in varying degrees of mutual
unintelligibility." Id. at 279. However, an equally valid thesis might hold that

there are also varying degrees of "intelligibility" upon which a common set of
principles, norms, standards, and rules might be based. Id. at 312. "Cultures in
many ways may be unique. [T]hey may also be in many ways strikingly similar."
Id.
118. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 3, at 1621-22 (discussing the need for
world law to address problems of global interdependence: "We are still stuck with
a separation of international law from comparative law and of both of these from
the customary law of communities that transcend national boundaries."). The
strained relationship between cultural relativity and global interdependence is
noted by Joyner: "[Iln an age of accelerating multifaceted global interdependence,"
the challenge of promoting cultural relativity as a universal value by future
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politics;1 2 0 and the indeterminacy 1 2 ' of key distinctions between

international law "seems likely to become increasingly more difficult." Joyner &
Dettling, supranote 115, at 291.
119. The prophetic accuracy of George Orwell's 1984 is still debatable;
however, in at least one critical respect, Orwell may have accurately anticipated a
modernist tendency to equate putative opposites. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 5
(1949) ("WAR IS PEACE[;] FREEDOM IS SLAVERY[;] IGNORANCE IS
STRENGTH."). Equivalence, or the modernist "antipathy for, or rejection of,
absolute polarities," is discussed in NORMAN F. CANTOR, TWENT h-CENIiJRY
CULTURE:
MODERNISM TO DECONSTRUCTION 38 (1988); the juxtaposition of
"elements considered irreconcilable under traditional criteria of coherence" is
discussed in Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of
Reconstruction, 4 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 351, 354 (1992). Both sources are noted in
Carl Landauer, J.L. Brierly and the Modernizationof InternationalLaw, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNA'IL L. 881, 892 n.68 (1993) (discussing Brierly's "strategy of positing
proximate opposites," such as between natural rights and natural law, and the
fusion of "categories traditionally placed in sharp opposition," such as those of
international and national law).
120. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN EnHCS 1141b25-30 (1987) (contrasting
law as "architectonic" with politics); Reisman, Cult of Custom, supranote 24, at B6
("The factitious distinction between law and politics is nowhere more
preposterous than in discussions of law-making."); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS
BEHAVE 22 (2d Ed. 1979) (law is politics), later qualified in LOUIS HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS (1989), discussed in Nicholas

Greenwood Onuf, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 834 (1992); W. Michael
Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 6 (Myres S.

McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW
ESSAYS] at 6 ("A moment's reflection will show that this distinction between law
and politics is artificial, even preposterous."). Although many describe the New
Haven school of jurisprudence to which Reisman belongs as standing for the
proposition that law is politics, Reisman's essay does not treat law and politics as
equivalent. He views the relationship between law and politics alternatively as
overlapping, relative, and interdependent. See id. For example, he writes further:
"This does not mean that every exercise of power is lawful or that every putative
act by someone in a manifest law role is effective." Id. at 6-7. In rejecting
equivalence, Reisman accepts that they overlap in part. Id. at 8. He utilizes both
relativity ("Power and authority are always co-present in varying degrees.") and
interdependence ("[L]awful acts, to be such, will require a minimum degree of
effectiveness ....
over time, effective acts are likely to be deemed lawful."). Id. at
7. Reisman is not concerned so much with the distinction, except to the extent
he rejects the dichotomy, but more so with the symbiosis between law and
politics: "[P]ower and authority are in a sort of symbiotic relationship."). Id. at 8.
He is primarily concerned with "the very intimate and permanent relationship
between them." Id. at 9. Several scholars are working to bridge the gap between
the study of political science and international law. See Burley, Dual Agenda,
supra note 115; Karen F. Botterud, Crossing the GreatDivide: Views of a Political
Scientist Wandering in the World of InternationalLaw in Bridging the Gap Between
PoliticalScientists andLaunjers, 81 AM. SOCYIII% L. 161 (1987).
121. Indeterminacy is the conclusion reached with the analytical tools of
"deconstruction," a term derived from Derrida's French philosophy and
popularized in legal literature by the critical legal studies movement, which has
made inroads in international legal scholarship. The primary critical legal studies
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the terms 2 2 chosen to comprehend and reorder these changes.
Likewise, international legal theorists use the same six principles
as alternative ways of understanding key distinctions between
public and private international law, 123 horizontal and vertical
party structures 2 4 in international disputes, 12 5 and the
126
international and national legal systems.

scholars in international law are David Kennedy and Martii Koskenniemi.

See

DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCURES (1987); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note
107. For an excellent discussion of this movement in international legal theory,
see Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INTL
L.J. 81 (1991). Deconstruction operates by arguing that because language is
relational and circularly delimited, the meaning of any one term depends on the
meaning of another, and concluding (however illogically) that because terms are
interdependent in meaning they are indeterminate. This article argues that
indeterminacy is only logical if one sets the standard of determinacy at the
unattainable level of absolute, purely objective meaning. See discussion of
indeterminacy, infra Section II.F.
See generally CHRISTOPHER NORRIS,
DECONSTRUCION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982) (describing philosophical debate
between deconstruction and ordinary language/speech act school).
122.
Joyner & Dettling, supra note 115, at 285 ("International lawyers
undoubtedly will have to seriously examine the linguistic niceties and nuances of
transcultural communication to discover what relevant indeterminacies exist in
communicating legal precepts across cultures.").
123.
See Hilary Charlesworth, et al., Feminist Approaches to International

Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L. 613 (1991). Charlesworth notes that
[M]odern international law rests on and reproduces various dichotomies
between the public and private spheres, and the "public" sphere is
regarded as the province of international law. One such distinction is
between public international law, the law governing the relations between
nation-states, and private international law, the rules about conflicts
between national legal systems. Another is the distinction between
matters of international "public" concern and matters "private" to states
that are considered within their domestic jurisdiction, in which the
international community has no recognized legal interest.
Id. at 625. See also ELIZABETH JANEWAY, MAN'S WORLD, WOMEN'S PLACE: A STUDY IN
SOCIAL MYTHOOGY (1971); JEAN BEIHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBUC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN
(1981); THE PUB3UC AND THE PRIVATE (E. Gamarnikow et al. eds., 1983); Carole
Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomym, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983);
Steinhardt, supranote 68.
124. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989); Lea
Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.
REV. 2277 (1991); Koh, supranote 50 (critiquing Brilmayer's vertical thesis).
125. See M.W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17
CORNELL INr'L L.J. 61, 75 (1984) (noting that the distinction between public and
private international law is based on an outmoded dichotomy between public and
private subjects of international law).
126.
See discussion of monism in J. G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the
Theory of International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 66. See also Ralph G.
Steinhardt, supranote 25 (describing monism as the view that "the international
and municipal legal systems comprise a single universal order.. .") (citing LOUIS
HENKIN Er AL., INERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 140-41 (2d ed. 1988)
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The broad and often conflicting use of these principles raises
the question of how to evaluate each principle in the context of
international law. For present purposes, this Article postulates
that the choice of architectonic principle in legal interpretation
should be (1) theoretically coherent (i.e., the conception of
distinction should be empirically accurate and the reasoning
supporting it should be logical); 127 (2) practicable (i.e., the terms

HENKIN, CASES AND MATERIALS]; HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-88 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter KELSEN, PRINCIPLES]; Josef L.
Kunz, The "Vienna School" and InternationalLaw, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. 370, 399-402
(1934). Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-35 (3d ed.
1979) (noting two traditional theories of public international law, monism, and
dualism); Michael Bernard Bernacchi, Standing for the Doctrine of Specialty in
Extradition Treaties: A More Liberal Exposition of Private Rights, 25 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1377 (1992) (discussing the two schools of thought concerning the effect of
international law on United States domestic practices: "monism" and "dualism");
HAN KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND TIE STATE 34 (1945) [hereinafter
KELSEN, THEORY] (arguing that there is no distinction between national and
international law); MANLEY 0. HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1937) (arguing that because international law is conceived
as governing the relations between states, it exists separately from municipal
law); Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of InternationalLegisprudence,
44 HASIINGS L.J. 185 (1993); Myres S. McDougal, The Impact ofInternationalLaw
upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25 (1959); The
Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 7 UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMrI'EE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts, eds., 1987); LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUIIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) [hereinafter HENKIN,
CONSTITUrIONALISM] ("All states have incorporated international law into their legal
system to some extent in some ways, but states differ both as to extent and as to
ways. States differ also as to what-if anything--is necessary to make a treaty
part of national law and what are the jurisprudential consequences."); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin,
Chinese Exclusion]; Christoph Sasse, The Common Market Between International
and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1966); M. WAELBROECK, TRAITES
INTERNATIONALES Er JURIDICTIONS INTERNES DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN
(1969); ILO V. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUTOMATIC INCORPORATION OF TREATIES IN NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS (1982); Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of
Secession Under Canadian and InternationalLaw, 32 VA. J. INTL L. 583 (1992);
Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties:Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 71
(1992).
See generally GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFUCT' AND POLITICAL
CONTRADICTION: THE DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 103 (1988); Georg Ress, Der Rang
[hereinafter

V61kerrechtlicherVertrdge Nach FranzosischmemVerfassungsrecht, 35 ZEITSHCRIFT
FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENMUCHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 445, 452-56 (1975)
(positing that the French ruling concerning the internal validity of international

law may be characterized as qualified monism).
127. That is, the conception of distinction should be empirically accurate
and the reasoning supporting it should be logical. See FRANCK, supra note 10, at
15-16 (discussing non-coercive factors in explanations of obedience to law, e.g.,
legitimation, noting "the tradition of Aeschylus and Aristotle, who may have been
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distinguished and the understanding of such distinctions should
be consistent with preexisting law and administrable);12 8 (3)
reconcilable with alternative conclusions justifiably reached in
specific cases; and (4) powerful as an intellectual technique for
resolving disputes over the existence vel non of international legal
sources. 129

Thus, the following, more specific, tests should guide the
choice of architectonic principle to be applied to the distinction
between treaty and customary law. First, the concepts should be
shaped by the phenomena they describe. Second, a statement

and its negation should not both be true. Third, one should work
with the linguistic expressions already embodied in the law.
Fourth, the method of understanding linguistic distinctions
should satisfy common sense and fall within the limits of human
capability. Fifth, the general choice of architectonic principle
should be sufficiently open-ended and nonconclusory to allow the
application of alternative architectonic principles in specific cases.
Sixth, an approach to the interpretation of distinctions should be
able to explain divergent views and resolve disputes over the
application of terms to any particular phenomenon.
Taken
together, these criteria derive from the view that the
treaty/customary law distinction in particular cases should
determine the nature of generalizations, and conversely,
conclusory characterizations should not control the outcomes of
specific applications of the treaty/customary law distinction.
3. From Cross- to Sub-Referential Interpretation
The third problem with the relational quality of language and
the net metaphor in particular is its superficiality.
The
alternative principles that order one's comprehension of
distinctions often first assume binary opposition between
distinguished terms; that is, one term is defined crossreferentially in negative opposition to the other. For example, one
may not determine the law in the United States through a binary,
cross-referential definition of legislation and judicial precedent;
one must know the rules of recognition for each source before
distinguishing between them. Cross-referential principles, by

the first in the Western tradition to have identified reasoned communication as an
essential factor in securing social assent to elites' exercise of power."). As Franck
notes, "the widely regretted fact that there is not more obedience to mor norms...
maybe due to a lack of legitimacy in the rules and the institutional processes by
which they are made, interpreted and applied." Id. at 21.
128. That is, the terms distinguished and the understanding of such
distinctions should be both consistent with preexisting law and administrable.
129. See supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text in Section II.A.
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defining one source in terms of the other, fail to identify the rule
of recognition for each source. None of the cross-referential
architectonic principles this Article critiques in Section III below
makes it possible to identify customary law independently of
treaty.13 0 Before concluding that treaty and customary law are
opposed to one another in some or all respects, one should
suspend judgment on supposedly cross-referential relationships
until after one applies the standards of recognition for each
singular phenomenon. Cross-referential architectonic principles
prejudice the determination of whether a particular treaty
Of course, many crossprovision is also customary law.
referential views are based on sub-referential differentiation,
albeit overly narrow and skewed, 13 1 and independent subreference to additional terms defining customary law does not
circumvent the need for interpreting the scope of application of
However, the interpretive technique
the term qua attribute.
proposed here, sub-referential threshold relativity (STR), would
ensure that the oppositions (in respect of attributes) are not false
and then identify and apply a threshold standard in order to
Thus, the
make the distinction coherent and practicable.
relationship between treaty and customary law in any particular
case would not be presupposed, but rather the conclusion would
be supported by a rigorous application of the accepted attributes
of customary law on a specific issue.
C. An lllustration: The Minivan Problem

The nature of the distinction between two concepts is of
particular importance in addressing the significance of new
phenomena. 13 2 In order to introduce the issues this Article

However, in the case of treaty and customary law, the authoritative
130.
texts do not define one concept in terms of the other. These texts include treaty
provisions themselves. See, e.g., STAlUME OF THE I.C.J., supra note 7, art. 38 and
I.C.J. case law, discussed and referred to in text and notes infra in Sections III
and IV.
See, e.g., infra, discussion in Section llI.A. This section demonstrates,
131.
for example, how presumed cross-referential relationships of dichotomy (i.e.,

rules may be either treaty or customary but never both) are often combined with a
narrow choice of differentiating characteristics (written/unwritten, instant/long,
explicit/implicit, etc.) based on a perceived attribute of the better known concept
(treaty law) and a projected negation of that attribute as a defining characteristic
of the lesser known concept (customary law).
132. In this respect, minivans are particularly analogous to new problems
in international legal source identification, problems which recur in an
increasingly wide array of phenomena that (at least on their face) are neither
treaty nor customary law. See RIO DECLARAION, supra note 74. International law
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identifies and addresses, it is helpful to take as an example the
distinction between cars and trucks, and the problem of
classifying minivans. 133 Assuming decision-makers are forced to
categorize minivans as either cars or trucks, 13 4 the process of
categorization will require them to consider the precise nature of
the distinction between the two types of vehicles. The choice of
characterization is not merely of academic significance, because
the result will affect the conflicting tariff, safety, and
environmental regimes to which minivans are subject.
If
imported minivans are classified as cars, they are subject to a 2.5
percent tariff1 35 and to safety, fuel, and emission standards that

are stricter than the standards for trucks.1 36 On the other hand,
if minivans are trucks, they are subject to a twenty-five percent
tariff13 7 and more liberal regulatory standards. 138

In order to

determine the correct classification of minivans, it is fruitful to
consider the alternative ways of understanding the distinction
between cars and trucks. Therefore, an array of architectonic
possibilities should be considered and evaluated. This illustration
will demonstrate that, in contrast to the six architectonic
principles this Article critiques below, the minivan classification
problem can be most coherently and practically resolved by the
STR approach.

that is neither treaty nor customary law is discussed in Chodosh, supranote 6, at
97-105.
133.
See Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (affirming Court of International Trade ruling that two-door, two-wheel, and
four-wheel drive Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicles were properly classified
as vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons). See Max Gates,
Nissan Challenges Tariff, AUTrOMOTVE NEWS, Mar. 29, 1993, at 3 ("Nissan is
appealing a 1989 ruling by the U.S. Treasury Department that made two-door
sport-utility vehicles and cargo minivans subject to the 25% duty," claiming that
"the two-door Pathfinder was designed and marketed as a passenger vehicle.... .
134.
Obviously, it is possible to avoid these difficulties by rejecting the
categorical totality itself through more precise and knowledgeable rule-drafting.
That is, concluding that minivans are neither cars nor trucks, it is possible to
create a third category and a set of rules to apply to minivans, thereby ostensibly
resolving the problem. Although this removes some of the attention placed on the
car/truck distinction, it shifts this attention to the distinction between minivans
and the other two previously recognized vehicles (risking the difficulties of
trichotomy rather than dichotomy). It also shifts attention to the distinction
between minivans and potentially fourth or fifth categories of vehicles (e.g., luxury
trucks). Another equally obvious option would be to eliminate the regulatory
distinction altogether.
135.
Gates, supra note 133, at 4.
136.
Renee Bergen & William R. Mattox Jr., Import Tax on Minivans Would
Hit FamiliesHard,USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 1993, at 13a.
137. Id.
138. Id.

1995]

AN INTERPRETIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1005

First, a dichotomy of mutual exclusivity between cars and
trucks is of little assistance. Neither the statement that no cars
are trucks nor the statement that no trucks are cars provides any
guidance as to whether minivans are either cars or trucks.
Dichotomy only suggests the conclusion that a minivan may not
simultaneously be a car and a truck. Stated otherwise, with
dichotomy, either result is possible: (1) minivans are not cars and
are therefore trucks; or (2) minivans are not trucks and are
therefore cars. 13 9 Thus, dichotomy offers no resolution.
Second, relaxation of the dichotomy through the recognition
of categorical overlap, in which some cars may be trucks and
some trucks may be cars, is equally unhelpful. If minivans fall
within the overlapping category of both cars and trucks, one is
still left with no guidance on the application of the rule. Again, as
with a dichotomous conception, two conflicting results could
logically follow: (1) minivans, though trucks, are also cars; or (2),
minivans, though cars, are also trucks. Therefore, one must look
to other conceptions.
Third, one may conceive of cars and trucks as two polar
According to this
extremes bounded by a scale of degrees.
concept, minivans should be located somewhere along the
spectrum of vehicles. Although relativity offers the most promise
(as this Article will argue below), in the absence of a dispositive
criterion that differentiates the two poles (e.g., passenger use),
and a threshold of recognition (e.g., more than fifty percent for
passenger use),14 ° one is left without guidance for making a
determination as to whether minivans are relatively more or less
cars or trucks. Thus, relativity without modification is of no help.
Fourth, one may stress the dynamic relationship between the

two poles represented at either extreme. Not only is the meaning

of one polar opposite senseless without the other, the very
magnetic force of one keeps the other in the opposite position.
But here, too, positing that the meaning of cars is inconceivable

without the concept of trucks, or that the sensory perception of

139. Of course, if it had already been predetermined that minivans are cars,
then it would follow under a dichotomous view that they are not trucks, and thus
the different tariff, fuel, and safety rules would not apply. This pattern differs
from the treaty/customary law context because an international decision-maker
is often presented with one or more treaties and must then decide whether the

treaties may be used to support the claim of customary law and universal
application, even to nontreaty parties.
140. As another example, in delimiting the term "orange" one may
determine whether the phenomenon in question is that portion of the visible
spectrum lying between red and yellow, evoked in the human observer by radiant
energy with wavelengths of 590 to 630 nanometers.
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one is dependent on the sensory perception of the other does not
aid in the categorization of minivans.
Fifth, one may critique the dichotomy, yet confirm categorical
overlap and dynamic interdependence, and conclude that the
distinction is meaningless-the two are the same. Cars may be
equated with trucks, however illogically, if some cars are trucks or
if one category cannot exist without the other. Yet, once more,
unable to make a
equivalence
leaves
decision-makers
determination. If cars are trucks in refutation of the distinction,
trucks are also cars. The semantic edge of the rule is entirely
abandoned. Either trucks, now also cars, may be treated as cars,
or cars, now also trucks, may be treated as trucks. Accordingly,
the determination regarding minivans may be made either way.
Finally, based on each of the inadequacies of the foregoing
conceptual approaches to the distinction between cars and
trucks, one may conclude that the question of classifying
minivans is too indeterminate to satisfy the requirements of law
itself. "Car-ness" or "truck-ness" exists only in the eye of the
beholder. The distinction for the purpose of rendering counsel on
the importation of minivans is hopelessly indeterminate. But this
provides neither guidance nor comfort to one who is entrusted
with making a determination one way or another.
Given the inadequacies of these six architectonic alternatives,
the best and perhaps only one that is at once empirically
accurate, logical, consistent with preexisting language, and
practicable is relativity with certain modifications, sub-referential
threshold relativity (STR). Using the STR approach, one first
looks sub-referentially to affirmative attributes that define the
terms "car" or "truck." When given two possible categories, one
must find the critical attributes that differentiate between the two

categories.1 41 (Exclusive cross-reference to the terms "car" and
"truck" is by itself superficial and unhelpful.) Second, one places
such sub-referential attributes on a relative scale bounded by
absolute polarities.1 4 2 Third, one establishes threshold standards

141. Although dichotomy is referred to as cross-referential, in one sense it
is also sub-referential in that dichotomy tends to set up a sub-referential
threshold opposition. Dichotomy, however, is a cruder conceptual tool than subreferential relativity in at least three critical respects. First, dichotomy does not
necessarily focus on the most critical differentiating attribute. Second, it often
bases the opposition on knowledge of only one side of the opposition (e.g., cars
transport passengers; therefore, trucks do not). Finally, it states oppositions in
such confident terms that it presupposes that making distinctions in grey areas is
an easy task).
142. For example, if one is distinguishing between water and ice, one must
identify the key differentiating attribute of temperature, place the two phenomena
on a common scale of fahrenheit or centigrade, and identify a threshold at which
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or ranges of recognition to differentiate between gradient degrees
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the attributive standard.
Finally, one applies the evidence of compliance with the standard
to the threshold thus established.14
Applying this approach to the problem of minivans, first, one
identifies the underlying attribute of "cars," in this case, that
attribute that is not shared by trucks. This attribute serves as
the basis for statutory differentiation. Therefore, the choice of
differentiating attribute is the first hurdle. Alternative attributes
that differentiate cars and trucks include origin (e.g., the origin of
manufacturing design or the division of the company responsible
for manufacture), or primary use as a passenger 14 4 or cargo
vehicle. The selection of differentiating attributes should be
justified by its connection to the policies achieved by treating cars
and trucks differently. If the critical attribute of cars is one of
primary purpose as a passenger vehicle (Step One), this attribute
may be set on a scale of degrees bound by the extremes of
vehicles that do not carry any passengers and vehicles that only
Degrees may be quantified by
carry passengers (Step Two).
evidence of actual use in accordance with the social purpose or by

a physical proxy of vehicle space or other features designed for

passengers, as distinct from cargo space. Once the scale of polar
extremes is established, one may establish a threshold for
differentiating passenger from cargo use (e.g., more than fifty
percent) (Step Three). 14 Evidence may be gathered regarding the
actual use of minivans or the physical aspects of design among
minivans for either passenger or cargo use. 14 6
Finally, the

point water becomes ice (i.e., freezing levels of zero degrees centigrade or thirtytwo degrees fahrenheit).
143. In the event of more than one standard and the related conjunctivity or
disjunctivity of multiple standards, one applies the same four-step analysis.
144. See Gates, supranote 133, at 4. (In its complaint, "Nissan argued that
two-door sport utility vehicles are typically bought by families with two or more
children and are 'principally used as a large station wagon.').
145. See Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 534. The
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States heading for "motor vehicles
principally designed for the transport of persons" requires that vehicles be
designed "!more' for transport of persons than goods," and the Court of Appeals
held that a vehicle would not properly be classified thereunder if it is equally
designed for the transport of goods and persons, but it is not required that
vehicles be uniquely constructed for the purpose of transporting persons to the
exclusion of any other use. Id.
146. In Marubeni, the Court of Appeals applied several indicia of both
structural and auxiliary design features. Id. at 535 (noting structural design
features of placement of gas tank and spare tire to accommodate rear passenger
seat, new rear suspension providing smoother ride for passengers, intrusion on
cargo space by rear seat (folded down) and spare tire, carpeted cargo area, pop-up
tailgate to accommodate loading and unloading of small packages, and auxiliary

1008

VANDERB1LT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:973

evidence should be applied to the threshold standard (Step Four).
If the evidence shows that more than fifty percent of minivax use
is for passenger transportation, 147 or that more than fifty percent
of the space is used for such purpose, as distinct from cargo use,
then minivans may be justifiably classified as cars under the
1 4s
statute.
This analysis demonstrates, at least in a limited context, that
dichotomy,
overlap,
relativity
(without
modification),
interdependence, equivalence, and indeterminacy have no
resolving power; whereas STR shows promise as an approach to
the interpretation of legal distinctions.
III. AN INTERPRETwE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
TREATY/ CUSTOMARY LAW DISTINCTION

The identification and classification of sources of
international law pose problems similar to those found in the
classification of minivans. 14 9 The minivan analysis in Part C of
Section II demonstrates the failings of dichotomy, overlap,
relativity, interdependence, equivalence, and indeterminacy as
well as the promise of STR as an approach to the interpretation of
legal distinctions. This Section provides a detailed exploration of
these interpretive problems in the context of the treaty/customary

design features of lower vehicle height, reclining rear seats, rear seat stereo
outlets, ashtrays, cubby holds, arm rests, handholds, footwells, seat belts, child
seat tie down hooks, etc.). The Court also noted that the Court of International
Trade in its trial "evaluated both marketing and engineering design goals
(consumer demands, off the line parts availability, etc.)". Id. at 536.
147.
See Bergen & Mattox, supra note 136 (noting a problem with the
classification of minivans as trucks: "They haul kids, not dirt." This article also
quoted a Ford official as saying: "We know that the people who purchase both
minivans and compact utilities typically replace passenger cars, rather than
trucks, and use them primarily as people-movers, not cargo-movers.").
148.
Of course, other concerns may counsel the classification of minivans
as trucks. The Clinton Administration, for example, argues that were minivans to
be reclassified as cars, domestic manufacturers would have to do the same in
order to apply consistent standards to imported and domestic minivans.
Assuming consistency is necessary, U.S. minivan manufacturers, too, would have
to meet such standards, which would be likely to increase the cost of
manufacturing and, subsequently, the cost to the consumer. The increase in cost
is estimated at between $3,000 and $6,000 on the price of Toyota Previas, Mazda
MPVs, and Isuzu Troopers. See Bergen & Mattox, supra note 136. However,
classification of minivans as passenger vehicles is favored by environmental
advocates.
149.
See, e.g., Maarten Bos, The Recognized Manifestations of International

Law, ANew Theory of "Sources," 1977 GERM. Y.B. INr'L L. 9.
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law distinction,150 and evaluates each competing principle in
terms of its theoretical coherence (empirical accuracy and logic),
practicability, (consistency with existing law and administrability),
151
and resolving
reconcilability with other competing conceptions,
power.
This Section concludes that none of the architectonic
principles applied to the treaty/customary law distinction, except
coherent and practicable.
overlap, is both theoretically
Furthermore, none of the principles is reconcilable with each of
the other competing principles, and, with limited exceptions, none
has any resolving power in particular disputes involving at least
The common disadvantage of each
one nontreaty party.
architectonic principle discussed in this section rests in the crossreferential nature of the competing conceptual understandings of
the distinction between treaty and customary law.
The findings of this Section are as follows: First, the
dichotomous view of the treaty/customary law distinction is
logical and arguably administrable, but is empirically inaccurate,
inconsistent with the law, irreconcilable with other architectonic
Second, the
principles, and has limited resolving power.152
overlapping view is logical, administrable, empirically accurate,
consistent with the law, but is irreconcilable with dichotomy and
(unmodified) relativity, and has no resolving power in particular
disputes, 153 other than to refute conclusory utilization of other
architectonic principles.' 1 4 Third, the relative view, without some
nonadministrable,
illogical,
is
attribution,
sub-referential
empirically inaccurate, inconsistent with the law, not reconcilable
with overlap or equivalence, and has no resolving power in
particular disputes. 15 5 Fourth, the interdependent view is logical,

As noted above, the nature of the treaty/customary law distinction has
150
received much scholarly attention. See supranote 5.
Secondarily, the reconcilability of each principle with the other five is
151.
noted. The purpose in noting irreconcilability is to point out that generalizations
(often cross-referential) about the relationship between treaty and customary law
tend to prejudice specific case-by-case determinations. Any analysis of the
relationship between treaty and customary law should be nonprejudicial;
therefore, the conceptual approach implemented in particular cases should be
able to render a wide array of results.
See infra Section III.A.
152.
See infra Section ilI.B.
153.
154. For such an analysis, see criticism in Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Note, A
Concept of InternationalLaw: Protecting Systemic Values, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 197,
229-30 (1992) (discussing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), which rejected a U.S. claim that multilateral treaty
reservations barring adjudication also barred claims based on even identical rules
under customary international law).

155.

See infra Section IuI.C.
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empirically accurate, consistent with the law, and reconcilable
with each principle except dichotomy, but is not easily
administered and has no resolving power in particular

disputes.156

Fifth, the equivalent view is arguably easy to

administer, but is empirically inaccurate, illogical, inconsistent

with the law, irreconcilable with all but interdependence, 1 7 and
has only limited resolving power in particular disputes. Finally,
the indeterminate view is reconcilable with all but dichotomy, but
is illogical, inconsistent with the law, nonadministrable, and has
no resolving power in particular disputes. 158
A. The Dichotomous View

Applying a dichotomous architectonic principle to the
treaty/customary law distinction, the two sources appear not
only to have independent authority, 159 but also to be "isolated,"160
mutually exclusive, 16 1 and analogous to "parallel lines in

Euclidean geometry," 162 which never intersect or touch one

another. Dichotomies draw rigid boundaries1 6 3 of generalized
associations between two concepts or things, 16 and are more
frequently value-laden than value-neutral. 16 5 A dichotomous

156.
157.
158.

See infraSection III.D.
See infra Section III.E.
See infraSection III.F.

159.

See generallyWaldock, supranote 8.

160. Gamble, supranote 5, at 306.
161. As David Kennedy observed, "The sense that it is important to
elaborate a theoretical boundary which has an on-off quality reflects the shared
understanding among those doing this work that the abstract categories will
control the content of the norms, rather than merely register them." KENNEDY,
supra note 121, at 21.
162.
Gamble, supranote 5, at 307.
163. David Kennedy has written that Article 38 "develop[s the boundaries
of these categories." KENNEDY, supra note 121, at 12. However, nothing in the
listing of sources indicates anything in particular about the nature of such
"boundaries" or "categories."
164.
Such boundaries may push one of two differentiated phenomena
closer to a third phenomenon or concept. For example, Koskennieni points out
that "[t]he initial differentiation between custom and treaty tends constantly to
push the former into natural law." KOSKENNIEMI, supranote 107, at 353.
165.
See NEEDHAM, supranote 13, at 18.
The Pythagoreans reported by Aristotle placed 'ight' in the column to
proper right, and left' in the column to proper left; male, straight, light,
and good were in the right column, and female, crooked, darkness, and
evil were in the column of the left. When read in Greek or English, the
first term in each contrast appears to be superior in some respect or
another to the second term .... [I]t has become a standard expectation
that an arrangement in two columns is meant to be read as expressing
contrasts not only in terms but also in values. It is not a matter of
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architectonic principle is often used to bolster the conclusion that
relationship'66 with one
the two concepts exist in a hierarchical
1 67

opposite superior to the other.

Most scholars who adopt a dichotomous view conclude that
treaty is superior 168 to customary law. 16 9 This view is supported
by describing attributes

170

of the two sources in

ways that

indifference, therefore, whether we write below/above or above/below, and
so on.
Id. Thomas Mann once wrote: "We are most likely to get angry and excited in our
opposition to some idea when we ourselves are not quite certain of our own
position, and are inwardly tempted to take the other side." BUDDENBROOKS Part
VIII, Chap. 2 (1903).
See generally Dumont, supra note 113, applying the hierarchical
166.
principle to binary classifications, (e.g., the opposition between right and left). For
a discussion of the hierarchical relationship between treaty and customary law,
see Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchyof the Sources of InternationalLaw, 195 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 275-78 (1974).
Opposites, in and of themselves, do not necessarily determine positive
167.
and negative associations. See MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF
BEING 5-6 (1985):
We might find this division [by Parmenides] into positive and negative
poles childishly simple except for one difficulty: which one is positive,
weight or lightness? Parmenides responded: lightness is positive, weight
negative. Was he correct or not? That is the question. The only certainty
the lightness/weight opposition is the most mysterious, most
is:
ambiguous of all.
Id.
See GODEFRIDUS J.H. VAN HOOF, RErHINKING THE SOURCES OF
168.
INTERNAtiONAL LAW 113-16, 117-19 (1983); Bin Cheng, Custom: The Fluture of
General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Macdonald & Johnston eds., 1983); Reisman, Cult of Custom,
supra note 24 (arguing that customary law alone is insufficient to address
increasingly complex world problems).
Some international legal scholars find the opposite hierarchy in the
169.
qualified application of treaty "expressly recognized by contesting States" and the
absence of any such qualification for international custom. STATI'E OFTHEI.C.J.,
supra note 7, art. 1, para. a & b. See, e.g., Anthony A. D'Amato, Wanted.- A
Comprehensive Theory of Custom in InternationalLaw, 4 TEx. INT'L L.J. 28 (1967)
[hereinafter D'Amato, Comprehensive Theory]. Customary law is often perceived
as superior due to its universally binding character. See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPtI OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971) [hereinafter D'AMATO, CONCEPT

OF CUSrOM] ("[O]f [treaty and custom], perhaps custom is the more important, for
it is generally regarded as having universal application, whether or not any given
state participated in its formation or later 'consented' to it .... "). For views of
custom as superior to treaty, see also KELSEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 126, at 44546; TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 166-73 (1983).
For a general critique of the contemporary definitions of customary law, see
Chodosh, supranote 6.
It should be noted that attributes are not necessarily definitional.
170.
One
Water may be blue, but blue is not a definitional attribute of water.
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connote-if not always denote-positive and negative associations.
This approach supports arguments that customary law is inferior
because it is presumed to be "unwritten,"17 1 temporally long in
making, 1 72

the

nonconsensual,

17 4

"unconscious,

"soft,"'

75

implicitly

unintentional,"

behavioral

73

(jus

overriding problem with the attributions discussed directly below is that many of
them are nondefinitional. Cf. STATUE OFTHEI.C.J., supra note 7.
171.

Chodosh, supra note 6, at 97 n.38 ("Although Justinian divided all law

into ius scriptur [written law] and

ius non scriptur [unwritten law], [Francisco]

Suarez pointed out in the seventeenth century that the very term 'law' to most
Roman writers meant written law, and custom was only labeled for convenience of
classification as ius non scriptum."). D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note
169, at 238 (citing Francisco Suarez, A Treatiseon Laws and God the Law Giver, in
2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 446-47 (The Classics of International Law No.
20, 1944). The view of customary law as unwritten would, of course, foreclose
"the recognition of codified customary (international) law." Chodosh, supra note
6, at 98. For a discussion of the equation of custom with unwritten law in
previously nonliterate societies, see POSPlsIL, supra note 12, at 194 (cited in
Chodosh, supra note 6, at 92). Ted Stein noted the trend toward codification
when he wrote that the "ambiguity of language has replaced the ambiguity of
nature or of events as the central problem of international law analysis." Ted
Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objectorin InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457, 464 (1985).
172.
See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (The Classics of
International Law No. 3, 1925) (describing "unbroken custom"); 3 EMERICH DE
VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (The Classics of International
Law No. 4 1916) (describing custom as "consecrated by long usage"); see also
Levy, supra note 92 ("Aside from the uncertainties surrounding the elements of
customary rules of international law, such rules are generally vague and slow to
develop."); Chodosh, supranote 6, at 98 ("ITIhe requirement of long use forecloses
the recognition of customary rules developed in periods of rapid legal change.").
173.
See KEIsEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 126, at 441 ("Legislation is
conscious and deliberate law-making . . . custom is unconscious and
unintentional law-making. In establishing a custom, men do not necessarily
know that they create by their conduct a rule of law, nor do they necessarily
intend to create law.") (cited in Gamble, supra note 5, at 312); see also Chodosh,
supra note 6, at 107-110 (critiquing Reisman's views of customary law as "inferior
because it is made implicitly and less democratically by a few politically relevant
actors, who are frequently unaware that law is being, or has been, made'," and as
"'ndistinguishable from the aggregate flow of community behavior.'); Reisman,
Cult of Customs, supranote 120, discussed in Chodosh, supra note 6, at 108-09.
174. Some scholars view the arguable lack of a consent-based requirement
as an advantage to the creation of a universal law, binding on all nations. See

Chamey, supra note 2, at 551 ("[G]eneral [customary] international law may be
established on the basis of less formal indications of consent or acquiescence.
This makes worldwide law possible; it cannot be done through treaties alone.").
175. The equation of international "soft" law with customary law is dubious.
See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 96 (describing the distinction between customary
and declarative [soft] law). The more common distinction between hard and soft
law is based on the criteria of precision (hard) or vagueness (soft) of the rule or
standard in question. See Weil, supra note 10, at 414 ("hard law' [is] made up of
the norms creating precise legal rights and obligations, [whereas, "soft" law] is so
vague, so uncompelling, that A's obligation and B's right all but elude the mind.").
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dispositivum), ambiguously aspirational (jus cogens),' 76 or weak in
its

political

according

foundations

in

domestic

to this dichotomous

view,

law. 17 7

Conversely,

treaty is explicit, 178

Weil would also add another criterion to differentiate law from nonlaw, regardless
of precision: whether the rule is practically "compelling." Id. at 415 n.7.
Although the presumed express character of treaty and the puntatively inferred
character of custom would lead one to align the hard/soft distinction with the
treaty/custom dichotomy, such over-generalizations are best avoided. See infra
note 190 (discussing the softness of some treaty provisions, and citing Weil). An
alternative criterion for differentiating "soft" from "hard" law is found in the
The
context of structuralist critiques on international legal argumentation.
association of consent-based norms with "hard" law and non-consent-based
norms with "soft" law is adopted by KENNEDY, supra note 121, at 11-99 (in
particular at 29) ("A 'hard' argument will seek to ground compliance in the
A 'soft' argument relies upon some
'consent' of the state to be bound.
extraconsensual notion of the good or the just."). However, here again, no
coterminous associations with customary law or treaty are made. Kennedy does
not see any one particular source as hard or soft. He identifies arguments based
on consent or justice inhering in all international legal argument based on source.
For a comprehensive discussion of the two categories of customary
176.
international law, see Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT' L. 55 (1966); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Jus
Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw: In the Light of Recent Decisionof
the German Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, 60 AM. J. INTL L. 511, 514-15 (1966).

Jus Cogens is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention as "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 80/31, as corrected by U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/31/Corr.2,
For a stimulating-albeit
Oct. 27, 1978 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
brief-discussion of this provision in an analysis of self-referential statements in
the law, see Rogers and Molzon, supra note 111, at 1015-16 (discussing
alternative propositions, such as (i) "the article states a rule of law only if the
article itself is a peremptory norm"; otherwise, Art. 53 could be superseded by a
subsequent treaty; (ii) Art. 53 might "be interpreted to say that new peremptory
This latter argument would lead to the
norms cannot arise by treaty").
paradoxical proposition that "[t]his peremptory norm cannot be a peremptory
norm". Id.
See Trimble, supra note 87 (arguing that customary law is inferior to
177.
Trimble argues that "because of the 'weak political foundation of
treaty).
customary international law' at the domestic level, [custom] Is less authoritative
than treaty law" and that "It is erroneous to think about the two types of
international law in the same way' at the international level as well." Chodosh,
supranote 6, at 110 (quoting Trimble, supranote 87, at 669).
See Teresa M. OToole, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
178.
Republic: An Alien Tort Statute Exception to ForeignSovereign Immunity, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 829, 831 n.9 (1988) ("Treaty law consists of express obligations set forth in
international agreements freely adhered to by states, while customary
international law consists of obligations inferred from state practice.") (citing
Trimble, supranote 87, at 669).
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contemporaneous, conscious, deliberate, consensual, 17 9 "hard,"

real, and firmly grounded in domestic law. 180

A dichotomous view need not necessarily be value-laden.
One such value-neutral, yet dichotomous, view of treaty and
customary law sees customary international law as "that
international law not embodied in treaties."1 8 1
This view,

stemming from the recognition of two primary sources, 18 2 renders
the relationship between the two sources a "zero-sum game of
sources of international law-if law is not being made by treaty,
1 83
then... custom swing[s] into place... [to pick] up the slack."

179. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 107, at 351 ("Custom is distinguished from
treaty by its less consensual character."). It is important to note that this is only
true for those states that do not exhibit conformity with general practice accepted
as law. In other words, if a generality of states engage in a practice accepted as
law, customary law is consensual for such practicing states, but if applied to
other states who do not exhibit adherence to the rule, customary law is not
consensual for such nonpracticing states.
180.
See Trimble, supranote 87.
181.
Chodosh, supra note 6, at 88. Koskenniemi discusses the commonly
assumed view that "[ciustom is the all-important network of non-treaty-based,

generally applicable standards." KOSKENNIEMI, supranote 107, at 343. "'Custom'
has become a generic name for nearly all nonconventional standards, including
acts and decisions of international organizations and conferences." Id. at 346. In
effect, Kelsen adopted this view of customary law as a gap-filler in a frequently
quoted passage:
That neither conventional nor customary international law is applicable to
a concrete case is logically not possible . . . If there is no norm of
conventional or customary international law imposing upon the state (or
another subject of international law) the obligation to behave in a certain
way, the subject is under international law legally free to behave as it
pleases; and by a decision to this effect existing international law is
applied to the case.
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES, supranote 126, at 438-39 (quoted in KOSKENNIEMI, supranote
107, at 28). Viewed as a completeness theory, in which international law itself
determines whether it imposes obligations, this statement poses a self-referential
paradox-whether international law applies is determined by international law.
Such paradoxes are discussed above in notes 111 and 176 (discussing Rogers
and Molzon). This view ignores other sources of authority (e.g., national law) to
determine whether international law applies. This demonstrates the importance
of treating source and system as dynamically interrelated. Kelsen, himself a
"monist," viewed the international (superior) and national (inferior) legal orders as
one. Accordingly, his view of system (as one) allowed him to ignore other sources
of authority for the proposition that international law does not apply.
182.
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBIC INIERNATIONAL LAW 3-4
(1966).
183.
See Gamble, supranote 5, at 314. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900) (in ascertaining international law, "where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations .... "); see also D'AMATO, CONCEPT
OF CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 4 ("[Llegal argumentation tends to be based upon
'custom' because there was not treaty or agreement covering the situation.");
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As this Section argues, the dichotomous view suffers from
many difficulties. Although easy to comprehend, it is empirically
inaccurate, inconsistent with current law, irreconcilable with

alternative conceptions, and lacking in any resolving power in
specific disputes, unless one concedes that the disputed rule falls
into at least one of the possible categories.

1. Theoretical Incoherence
Whereas the dichotomous view is not illogical, both the valueladen and value-neutral dichotomous views of treaty and
customary law distort the understanding of treaty and customary
law in several key respects. First, these characterizations are
hyperbolic and overly general. Some customary law is often
expressly codified 18 4 (in treaties themselves),' 8S occasionally
considered "instant,"18 6 based on the conscious belief of legal
obligation,1 87 and universally binding.' 8 8 In contrast, treaty may

OToole, supra note 178, at 831 n.9 ("Rules of international law fall into the
categories of treaty law and customary international law." (citing Gamble, supra
note 5, at 305-06)).
184. See H. W. A. THRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION
(1972); Chodosh, supranote 6, at 100 n. 50 ("ius non scriptum, or unwritten law,
is another criterion of the classical definition [of customary law] that has been
appropriately relaxed. In fact, it has become so obvious that customary law need
not be unwritten that this criterion has almost completely disappeared from
contemporary literature.").
185. See Weisburd, supra note 1, at 17.
186. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4; RESrATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54, § 102, note 2; Bin
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant" International
Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INIL L. 23 (1965) (arguing that long usage was not
needed to establish, after World War I, the principle of national sovereignty over
supejacent airspace or the principle of nonsovereignty over the outer-space path
of Sputnik I after it orbited the earth); Chodosh, supra note 6, at 101
("[T]emporality is not a necessary criterion of customary law."). For a critical view
of "instant" customary law in the context of UNCLOS IIl, see Hugo Caminos &
Michael R. Molitor, Perspectives on the New Law of the Sea: Progressive
Development of InternationalLaw and the PackageDeal, 79 AM. J. INT% L. 871, 889
(1985) (arguing that "the true test for the existence of a customary norm of
international law is state practice").
187. The second requirement for customary law posited in Article 38 of the
Statute of the I.C.J. is "acceptance as law," often referred to as opinio juris sive
necessitatis or its shorthand form opinio juris. See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 89
n.6. The Restatement of Foreign Relations law defines this second element as
practice "followed from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supranote 54, § 102(2).
188. For a discussion of the effects of treaty law on noncontracting states,
see Luke T. Lee , The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INTL.
L. 541, 542-43 (1983) ("many provisions in the Convention [are applicable] to
states not parties either because such provisions are codifications of antecedent
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frequently ambiguous in order to

19 2
time-consuming in negotiation,

customary law, or because they reflect what has become customary law during
and as a result of the Conference on the Law of the Sea. It suggests that in some
respects, perhaps, the Convention is generating customary law for the future and
many provisions therefore may come to apply to nonparty states at some time
soon.").
189. See Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 176, cited by
JOSEPH GABRIEL STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATONAL LAW 297 (7th ed.,
1972). Starke defines a treaty as:
[A]n agreement whereby two or more States establish or seek to establish
a relationship between themselves governed by international law. So long
as an agreement between States is attested, any kind of instrument or
document, or any oral exchange between States involving undertakings
may constitute a treaty, irrespective of the form or circumstances of its
conclusion.
Id. However, some authorities distinguish between rights and duties when
discussing a written requirement. See KELSEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 126, at
345-50; Lee, supra note 188, at 544 (discussing provisions in Article 35 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which require that third states'
acceptance be "in writing" in the case of obligation. In the case of rights, however,
Article 36(1) states that "assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not
indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.").
190. To demonstrate the "softness" (i.e., the imprecise character of treaty
law), Wel cites many examples, including the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning
certain nuclear weapon tests, Article IV of which provides, inter alia, that "each
Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." 1963 Moscow
Treaty, Aug. 5, 1967, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43,
cited in Well, supra note 10, at 414 n. 4; see also FRANCK, supra note 11, at 206
("[A]n indeterminate new treaty may exert a less powerful pull to compliance than
a venerable and clearly understood custom.").

191.

See discussion of constructive and destructive aspects of ambiguity in

FRANCK, supranote 11. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) appears on its face not to apply directly to subnational political units
(e.g., states or provinces) which would allow for state regulations in restraint of
trade and would cause significant embarrassment to the United States and
Canada, which have represented in the negotiations with Mexico, which lacks
such a federalist structure, that such sub-national authorities would be equally
bound. This ambiguity in the treaty may have allowed greater probability of
passage, wherein the United States and Canada could have its cake (i.e., Mexico
thinks NAFTA applies to states) and eat it too (i.e., states and provinces think
NAFTA does not apply to them). The issue of states' rights abrogated by treaty
has a long history. See Francesco Fancioni, Book Review, 87 AM. J. INM'%
L. 493
(1993) (reviewing MARIA CLARA KAFFSI, LA PROTEZIONE INTERNATIONALE DELLE SPECIE
ANIMALE MINACCIATE (1993)) (noting the decision of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920) (Holmes, J., holding that the "conservation of wild birds under a treaty
with Great Britain was a proper subject for federal regulation and that states
could not oppose such a treaty and the implementing statute on the basis of the
'original'jurisdiction guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment")).
192. See Chamey, supranote 2, at 551 ("Treaties often require considerable
time to be negotiated, adopted, and brought into force.").
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inelastic, 193 preventative of "rapid modifications to cope with new
needs," 194 entered into unwittingly, 195 presumed to be nonbinding
on noncontracting states, 196 and not always considered
However
exclusively authoritative by domestic courts. 19 7
inaccurate the dichotomous view may be, there is nothing illogical
about the notion of mutual exclusivity it entails. The illogic
manifests itself only when one holds the two to be mutually
exclusive, despite the empirical evidence of overlap, which is
shown below.
2. Impracticability
By making distinctions facile, and by assuming polar,
mutually exclusive opposites, the dichotomous view is
inconsistent with the current state of the rules that inform the

treaty/customary law distinction. Indeed, the treaty/customary
law dichotomy is contradicted by both I.C.J. case law and

193. Although treaty provisions may be considered rigid once they are
agreed to, the process of treaty reservations draws criticism as being too flexible.
See Edward F. Sherman, Jr., The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the
Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69 (1994).
194. Christas L. Rozakis, Treaties and Third States: A Study in the
Reinforcement of the Consensual Standards in InternationalLaw, 35 ZErrSCHRIFr
FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTICHES RECHr UND VOLKERRCT 1, 39-40 (1975) (quoted
in KENNEDY, supra note 121, at 23 n.21).
195. This comment is without publicly acknowledged support, but rather
relies on several private conversations with professionals who work as
international negotiators and who have remarked that many countries do not pay
much attention to the precise implications of particular treaties. It is perhaps
also generally true that in most countries less political attention is paid to treaty
issues, than to exclusively domestic legislation.
196. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 925-26 (8th ed. 1955) (treaty
rights and obligations are legally limited to contracting parties); see also Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at
141 (June 7, 1932) ("Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is not binding upon
Switzerland who is not a Party to the Treaty, except to the extent to which that
country accepted it."); Upper Silesia Case, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 29 (May
25, 1926) ("A treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties to it;
in case of doubt no rights can be deduced from it in favour of third States."); U.S.
v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding conviction of Colombian
nationals abducted on Canadian vessel by U.S. Coast Guard more than
approximately 200 miles off U.S. coastline, reasoning neither Canada nor
Colombia (as noncontracting parties) could rely on provisions of the Convention
on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200)).
197. Societe Nationale Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist.

of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding Hague evidence treaty not exclusive source
of transnational discovery rules).
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pertinent treaty provisions related to source. 198 In Nottebohm, the
I.C.J. ruled that treaty provisions may be evidence of customary
19 9
international law, even as between nontreaty, litigating parties.
2
°
In Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 0 the I.C.J. recognized that
treaties do not necessarily override customary rules on the same
subject.
Moreover, Article 38 of the Vienna Convention excludes the
automatic dichotomization (or mutual exclusivity) of treaty and
customary law, by providing that "[n]othing in articles 34 to 37
precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon
a third State as a customary rule of international law."20 1 Thus,
where two categories of source overlap on the same issue, one
(treaty) need not entirely override the other (customary law).
Finally, the dichotomous view ignores the rules of recognition

that are stipulated in Article 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J. Article
38
does
not
refer to
the
polarities
noted
above:
written/unwritten,
explicit/implicit,
long/short
use,
conscious/unconscious, consent/nonconsent, or soft/hard. The
characteristics frequently attributed to treaty and customary law
are therefore extralegal.
If understood merely as cross-referential, the dichotomous
view of treaty and customary law is easily administrable provided
that the decision-maker determines as a preliminary matter that
an alleged source of international legal obligation is one or the
other. However, if that determination is not made, categorization
requires sub-reference to an attribute that differentiates the two
sources in a polar relationship. As is discussed below in the
analysis of relativity, the precise distinction between the attribute
and its opposite presents practical interpretive difficulties.
3. Irreconcilability
The dichotomous view excludes the possibility of other
architectonic views of the treaty/customary law distinction. First,
it does not allow for an accurate classification of rules that are

198. The dichotmous treatment of treaty and customary law and the
inconsistency between this treatment and the current state of the law itself may

be related to the a priorinature of dichotomy itself. See NEEDHAM, supranote 13,
at 219-20 (citing the point made by Kant as fundamental that "all a prioridivision
of concepts must be by dichotomy." (Citation omitted)).
199. See, e.g., Nottebohm, Second Phase (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4, 2123 (Apr. 6) (holding that provisions in bilateral "Bancroft treaties" enabled Mr.
Nottebohm's Liechtenstein nationality to be invoked against Guatemala, even

though the treaties were not in force between the disputing states).
200. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
201.
Id.
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both treaty and customary law, as would be emphasized in an

overlapping conception, 2 0 or one of equivalence, wherein treaty
and customary law are equated, (e.g., treaty as evidence of
customary law). Second, this view does not convey the relativity
of the oppositional attributes that dichotomy interpolates, (e.g.,
long/short, conscious/unconscious), whether manifested in
203
treaty, customary law, or some other form of legal authority.
Third, dichotomy does not allow one to see the interplay between
treaty and customary law, (e.g., treaty codification of customary
law, the passing of treaty into customary international law,2 04 or
the interdependence between the two concepts). 2 05 For example,
treaty enforcement often depends on the customary rule of
respecting legal obligation (e.g., the principle of pacta sunt
servanda);20 customary law depends on rules of recognition
contained in international agreements (e.g., Article 38 of the
Statute of the I.C.J.). Finally, value-neutral dichotomizations of
treaty and customary law presume that these are the only two
sources or manifestations of international law. Applying the
treaty/customary law dichotomy, nontreaty, noncustomary
sources of international obligation necessarily 20 7 fall into one of
two groups. Either the source is (1) "included in one of the two...
categories," 20 8 and is therefore deemed to be customary law
because the "less clearly defined is the more likely candidate for
expansion,"2 9 or the source is (2) "excluded from the realm of law
altogether."2 1o Any additional source of international law is
thereby excluded.

202.
203.
204.

See discussion infra Section ]I.B.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
The most illuminating studies of this relationship appear in treatments

of the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea.

These scholarly

examinations of treaty codification of customary law and recognition of customary
law based on treaty are cited herein at notes 5, 188, 267, 268, 270, 272 and 304.
See discussion infra Section III.D.
205.
206. This principle, itself, initially derived from treaty. D'AMATO, CONCEPr OF
CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 65. See generally GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE
FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962).
207.
Conversely, relaxation of the dichotomy would allow the recognition of
nontreaty, non-customary law, which I have called "declarative international law."
See Chodosh, supranote 6, at 89.
208. Id. at 90.
209. Id.
210.
Id.
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4. Lack of Resolving Power

The dichotomous view of treaty and customary law may be
effective at reaching source determinations, but only where it is
conceded that the rule is derived from one source and the issue
remains whether the rule falls into the second category as well.
For example, if it is conceded that a human rights rule is one of
treaty, the dichotomous view would conclude that it may not also
be one of customary law; therefore, nontreaty parties would not
be bound by the rule. If, on the other hand, it is not conceded
that the rule is derived from one or the other source, knowing
only that the sources are mutually exclusive provides no
assistance in reaching a determination.
B. The Overlapping View
According to the overlapping architectonic principle, treaty
and customary law are distinct, yet overlapping, categories of
international law. Certainly, this conceptual structure allows one
to see the same. rule of international law as treaty in some
instances and customary law in others, 2 1 1 and to treat treaty as a

211. Gamble, supra note 5, at 312 (casting treaty and custom as
"intertwined threads in the fabric of international law" (citing MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (Max Sorensen ed. 1968))). "[Slome rules of international
law then are of a mixed sort... [e.g.,] codification ....
also where a practice
originally based on particular treaties acquires those characteristics of generality
and continuity which the process of creation of customary rules demand." Id.;
see also Bos, supra note 149, at 74 ("[A] rule of customary international law may
be prevailing between more than two States and is codified [in treaty] only
between a restricted number of them."); Report of the International Law
Commission to the GeneralAssembly, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n
364, 368, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
"A principle or rule of
customary international law may be embodied in a [treaty, binding on the State

parties thereto]; yet it would continue to be binding as . . . customary
international law for other States."); Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to
the General Assembly, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 364, 368, U.N.

Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1.
A principle or rule of customary international law may be embodied in a
bipartite or multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated limits,
conventional force for the States parties to the agreement so long as the
agreement is in force; yet it would continue to be binding as a principle or
rule of customary international law for other States.
Id. See also Luke T. Lee, The InternationalLaw Commission Re-Examined, 59 AM.
J. INrL L. 545, 545-46 (1965); Baxter, supra note 5, at 101; Hersch Lauterpacht,
Codificationand Development of InternationalLaw, 49 AM. J. IN'rL L. 16, 29 (1955);
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNAIONAL LAW, supra, at 129; D'AMATO, CONCEFr OF
CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 107-08 (referring to "double source of obligation");
Vierdag, supranote 5, at 786 (referring to a "double regime").
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source of customary international law.2 12 The overlapping view is
empirically accurate, logical, consistent with current law, and
administrable. However, it is not reconcilable with each of the
other conceptual conclusions, and by itself the overlapping view
contains no resolving power in particular disputes, other than to
refute other conclusory conceptions.
1. Theoretical Coherence
Relaxation of the dichotomy between treaty and customary
law allows one to explore an overlapping conception of the
treaty/customary law distinction. The distortions of putative
mutual exclusivity noted above are rejected by the overlapping
view because an overlapping architectonic principle provides a
means of arguing that treaty and customary law are not
hierarchically dichotomous.
In his frequently cited critical
treatment of the treaty/customary law dichotomy, John Gamble
concludes his criticism of the dichotomy by drawing diagrams
2 13
that depict treaty and customary law as overlapping categories.
The overlapping view does not conclude prematurely which rules
of treaty and customary law overlap; it merely allows for the
conclusion in specific cases that one or the other or both may
apply, depending on the independent rules of recognition for each
source.
2. Practicability
An overlapping architectonic principle also may be used to
reconcile disagreement generated by the applications of the
dichotomous and interdependent principles that distort existing
law. Such abstractions have practical, juridical consequences. In
one notable instance, a commentator 21 4 criticized the I.C.J. for
"wholly" severing positive treaty and customary international law

212.

See Gamble, supra note 5, at 313 ("[T]reaties, if repeated often enough,

can form the basis of customary international law."). Taken to its extreme (the
phrase "if repeated often enough"), this view of the relationship between treaty
and customary law is not substantially different than the view allowed by the

equivalent architectonic principle discussed infra Section MII.E; see also MARK
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INERNAMONAL LAW 9-34 (1988) (nonparty to a treaty
may nonetheless be bound by its terms when the "rules of a treaty pass into
customary international law").

213. Gamble, supra note 5,. at 318. Both diagrams drawn by Gamble to
represent the competing traditional and suggested views reflect overlapping
conceptions; the second merely reflects greater overlap.
214.

Plofchan, supra note 154, at 229-30.
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in its opinion, Military and Paramilitary Activities.2 15
This
commentator argued that "the International Court erred by
treating customary international law and international treaty as
two separate and unrelated sources of international law." 2 16 This
criticism of the I.C.J. treats customary law itself as a source of
secondary rules of recognition upon which the primary rules of
2 17
treaty depend and with which they interact symbiotically.
However, this commentator's view that customary law provides
secondary rules and treaty provides primary rules is not only
another dichotomization; it contradicts the treaty source of Article
38 of the I.C.J. statute, which the I.C.J. is bound to observe.

In the Military and ParamilitaryActivities opinion, the I.C.J.
did not dichotomize treaty and customary law, nor did it
necessarily deny any alleged "symbiotic" relationship. It merely
treated
customary
law
as
an
independent-albeit
overlapping-source of international obligation. The I.C.J. held
that the overlap of treaty and customary law (i.e., when "a treaty
norm and a customary norm relevant to the present dispute were
to have exactly the same content")2 18 does not provide "a reason
for the Court to take the view that the operation of the treaty
process must necessarily deprive the customary norm of its
separate applicability. .. .19
It should be noted that I.C.J. case law supporting the
overlapping view is not inconsistent with treaty provisions relating
to sources of law. Although Gamble suggests that Article 38
"obscures the fact that these two principal sources interrelate," 2 20
other than in an arguable implication of a slight hierarchy 221 in
the sequence, the mere enumeration of sources is silent on the

215. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (rejecting U.S. claim that multilateral treaty reservations barring
adjudication also barred claims based on even identical rules under customary
international law).
216. Plofchan, supranote 154, at 229-30.
217. DAmato also views "custom [a]s a secondary rule for discovering the
content of primary or substantive rules of international law." D'AMATO, CONCEPT
OFCUSTOM, supra note 169, atxiii, 41-44. Plofchan, supranote 154, at 229-30.
218. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93-

96.
219.

Id. Contrary to the views expressed in the Plofchan note, supra note

154, the substantive rules of customary international law themselves are not
secondary rules; rules concerning the recognition of customary international law
(e.g., satisfaction of general practice and acceptance as law) are secondary. See
Chodosh, supranote 6, at 96.
220. Gamble, supranote 5, at 307.

221. Id. Arguably, one may infer that a priority has been placed on those
items first mentioned in any list; however, the inference may suggest nothing
more than the expectation that the I.C.J. would be applying treaty more often
than customary law.
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relationshipbetween them. Moreover, the overlapping view is also
supported by pertinent provisions in the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. 22 2 First, as noted above, Article 38 of the
Vienna Convention excludes the automatic dichotomization of
treaty and customary law, by providing that "[nlothing in articles
34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international
law."2 2 3
Second, as noted below, Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention excludes the automatic equivalence of treaty and
customary law, according to which the existence of a treaty
provision itself, with little more, would provide evidence of a
customary, universal legal obligation. Article 34 provides in
pertinent part that a "treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent."22 4 Thus, treaties,
alone do not make customary law.
The overlapping view is a matter of simple categorization. It
carries no administrative difficulties; however, it presupposes an
independent analysis of the satisfaction vel non of the rules of
recognition for each independent category. Thus, the overlapping
conception, unlike dichotomy, is a nonprejudicial conclusion,
rather than an interpretive method for the recognition of sources
based on interpolated oppositions.
3. Irreconcilability
The overlapping conception is reconcilable with each
alternative conceptual conclusion except the dichotomous view
and relativity.
It is inconsistent with dichotomy because,
logically, categories cannot be both mutually exclusive and
overlapping.2 2 5 It is inconsistent with a relative view because, if
treaty and customary law represent two polar extremes (e.g., hard
and soft, or consensual and nonconsensual), a rule may not be
logically both hard and soft or both consensual and
nonconsensual. However, the overlapping view is consistent with
interdependence, which at most suggests overlap (i.e., if treaty
creates customary law, the two overlap) or at least is silent on
overlap (i.e., customary law is codified in treaty, which by its
terms supersedes customary law). The most extreme form of
overlap is consistent with equivalence (i.e., where treaty and

222.
223.
224.

Vienna Convention, supra note 176.
Id.
Id.

225.

Compare Needham's critique of Dumont's pronouncement as fallacious

(r[G]ood must contain evil while still being its contrary.").
13, at 133.

NEEDHAM, supra note
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customary law overlap completely, they are the same).226 Finally,
overlap is not necessarily inconsistent with the notion that the
distinction between treaty and customary law is so subjective that
it is too indeterminate to be law.
4. Lack of Resolving Power
Despite the foregoing advantages of the overlapping
conception, it merely provides a way to conceptualize a conclusion
that some rules are both treaty and customary law and others are
only one. The statements that some treaty is customary law and
that some customary law is treaty do not provide any particular
guidance in the resolution of whether there is overlap in a specific
case. Therefore, one must look to other conceptions to resolve
issues of source recognition.
C. The Relative View

Applying a relative architectonic principle to the
understanding of treaty and customary law, one sees the
distinction between treaty and customary law as a matter of
relative degrees. Without a determination of (1) the defining
attribute(s) consistent with preexisting law, (2) the thresholds for
satisfaction of such defining attribute(s), and (3) the extent to
which those thresholds are met in specific cases, relativity is
empirically inaccurate, illogical, inconsistent with existing law,
inadministrable, inconsistent with the overlapping and equivalent
architectonic principle, and devoid of any resolving power.
1. Theoretical Incoherence
Relativity may be either cross-referential or sub-referential.
However, even cross-referential, relative views of nonoppositional
terms, such as treaty and customary law, require sub-reference to
an attribute considered to differentiate between two terms (e.g.,
hard/soft, consensual/nonconsensual).
Thus, the crossreferential, relative view of treaty and customary law presumes
the dichotomous view in one critical respect. In order for treaty
and customary law to represent opposite ends of the international

normative spectrum, it is necessary to imbue the two sources
226. This does not imply that equivalence is a justifiable conclusion based
on overlap alone: "liltis an illicit use of 'identical' to say that a part of anything is
identical with the genus under which it is subsumed." NEEDHAM, supra note 13,
at 129 (critiquing Dumont's statement that a part is "identical" to the whole, in an
attempt to argue that because it is also not identical, the "double relation"
produces a "logical scandal").
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with polar attributions, like those enunciated in the dichotomous
view
(e.g.,
written/unwritten,
intentional/unintentional,
explicit/implicit, etc.).2 2 7 The critical disadvantage of relativity,
which it shares with dichotomy, is not that it refers to the
attributes that differentiate treaty from customary law, but that
such attributions are frequently inconsistent with the well-settled
expressions of defining characteristics, which in the case of treaty
and customary law are not counterposed.
In theory, relativity is the most empirically accurate of the
architectonic principles identified herein because of its attention
to differences of degree. For example, in his discussion of the
quasi-legislative nature of General Assembly resolutions, Richard
Falk suggests that there is a "rather indefinite line that separates
binding from non-binding norms governing international
behavior."2 28
The indefinite nature of the line allows new
phenomena to be categorized as law: "Thus the formal limitations
of status, often stressed by international lawyers, may not prevent
resolutions of the General Assembly, or certain of them, from
acquiring a normative status in international life."2 2 9
Falk
justifies this position by asserting that "[t]he degree of
authoritativeness that a particularresolution will acquire depends
upon a number of contextual factors." He includes many related
criteria of consent and effective power (e.g., "the expectations
governing the extent of permissible behavior, the extent and
quality of the consensus, and the degree to which effective power
is mobilized to implement the claims posited in a resolution").230
Thus, relativism holds the advantage of making a fine-tuned,
multifactored case-by-case analysis possible. Relativity provides
the opportunity to view the existence vel non of customary law as
a question dependent upon relative contexts. 2 3 ' The relativist
view of treaty and customary law, in particular of the latter
source, would reject the "formalistic distinction between binding

227. See supra Section III.A.
228. Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INrL L. 782, 784 (1966).
229. Id. at 786.
230. Id. at 786 (cited in KENNEDY, supra note 121, at 19-20 n.17); see also
Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
DeterminingPrinciples of InternationalLaw in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J.
876, 877 (concluding that "[r]esolutions serve as valuable hortatory evidence of
emerging legal principles, they should not constitute independent, authoritative
sources of international law").
231. See ZDENEK J. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL

SHELF 174 (1968) (describing the factors creating a customary norm as "relative to
the conditions in which those factors operate") (cited in D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 12).
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and nonbinding law. The distinction between more or less
binding norms reflects the natural intuition that some norms are
232
more important than others and should be so treated."
However, in practice, relativity carries propensities for profound
impracticability.
By itself, relativity, unless applied to true oppositions, is
illogical. Without attribution, one is left without a consistent
scale of gradient degrees on which to evaluate arguable rules.
That is, relativity is only logical when distinguishing between two
oppositionally defined terms. If treaty and customary law are
deemed opposites in the dichotomous ways described above (e.g.,
soft/hard, long/short, etc.), there is nothing illogical about
relativity. However, if treaty and customary law are defined by
independent standards of recognition that are not necessarily
counterposed, then relativity may be considered illogical in its
propensity to reconfigure the standards, without justification for
the adjustment, according to an underlying dichotomous
framework.
2. Impracticability
As with the dichotomous view, the relative view effectively
rewrites the rules of recognition contained in Article 38 of the
I.C.J. Statute. As noted above, Article 38 does not refer to the
polarities suggested by many of the scholars utilizing either a
dichotomous or relative view.2 3 The characteristics attributed to
treaty and customary law are therefore extralegal.
According to the treaty that guides the International Court of
Justice in its source determinations, treaties are "international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States."23 4 In contrast,
customary law is "international custom, as evidence of general
practice accepted as law."2 35

Many standards of recognition of

treaty and customary law therefore are not necessarily
counterposed.2 3 6 Customary law must be general, but treaties

232. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 107, at 348 (describing those who view the
relativism of customary law as a positive phenomenon).
233.
See discussion supra Section III.A.
234. STATUrEOFTHEI.C.J., supra note 7, art. 38, l(a).
235.
Id. art. 38, 1(b). Although the order of the words custom and practice
should be arguably reversed, see Chodosh, supra note 6, at 98 n.46, the
difference in order is insignificant: "What is clear is that the definition of custom
comprises two distinct elements: (1) 'general practice' and (2) its 'acceptance as
law." HENKIN, CASES AND MATERIAiS, supranote 126, at 36.
236.
See RESTATEMENr OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54, §102(2)
(defining customary law as "a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation").
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may be general or particular. Customary law must be not only
No such practice requirement,
general, but also practiced.
however, applies to the recognition of treaty. For treaties to
become law, decision-makers need not wait to observe practice
before applying treaty as binding because, if that were the rule,
treaties would never be deemed binding for lack of a first instance
Treaty must be expressly recognized, whereas
of practice.
customary law must be "accepted as law," whether explicitly or
implicitly. None of these standards requires that customary law
necessarily be unwritten, temporally long in the making,
unintentional, nonconsensual, soft, implicit, or ambiguous.
Therefore, many relative understandings of treaty and customary
law are subject to the same criticisms of empirical inaccuracy
lodged against the dichotomous view.
Academic support for relativity is countered by Prosper Well's
searing critique. 23 7 Wel illuminates the legal implications of
relativity in undermining the settled rules of recognition for

customary international law. The expansion of customary law, in

part based on the relaxation of the criteria 23 8 of recognition,
presents "a danger of imposing more and more customary rules
on more and more states, even against their clearly expressed
will." 2 3 9
Wel warns of the great risk that "a majority or
representative proportion of states is considered to speak in the
name of all and thus be entitled to impose its will on other

237.
See generally Weil, supra note 10; see also Fernando R. Tes6n,
International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT' L. 869
(criticizing normative relativism as it applies to international human rights). The
following sources are cited in Charney, supra note 5, at 993 n.92, as examples of
General Assembly resolutions as law: Western Sahara 1975 I.C.J. 12, 29-36
(Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16); AMERICAN LAW INSTIUIE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, reporters' notes at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 6); M.
BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 134-44 (1979); G.
TUNImN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 168, 172 (1974); S.K. Agrawala, The
Role of GeneralAssembly Resolutions as Trend-Setters of State Practice,21 INDIAN
J. INTL L. 513 (1981); Cheng, supra note 168; Richard A. Falk, On the
Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782
(1966); Gross, The United Nations and the Role of Law, 19 INTM ORG. 537, 555-58
(1965); Hiyashi, The Role of Resolutions of the United Nations GeneralAssembly in
the Formative Process of International Customary Law, 25 JAPANESE ANN. INT% L.
11 (1982); Oscar Schachter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-6 (1976); Oscar Schachter, The Relation of Law,
Politicsand Action in the United Nations, 109 R.C.A.D.I. 165, 173-84 (1963).
238. Wel, supra note 10, at 436 ([T]he generality of practice has been
reduced to a minimal requirement, [while] the generality of the normative effects
of customary rules has been undergoing the reverse process of constant

expansion.").
239.

Id. at 434. See Chodosh, supranote 6, at 104-05.
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states."2 4 °
The shading of treaty into customary law is no
exception to this trend: "[T]he profound transformations . . .
affecting the substance of the sources of law, and more
particularly the theory of customary law and the interrelation of
[treaty] and customary rules, have been gradually fostering the
idea that there are certain obligations that are incumbent on
every state without distinction."2 4 1 Well attacks the blurring of
the "normativity threshold: i.e., the line of transition between the
nonlegal and the legal, between what does not constitute a norm
and what does."2 42 Without a threshold to differentiate between
the legal and the nonlegal, there is insufficient means to
determine what is law and what is not.
The one critical difference between the dichotomous and
relative views is the presumed simplicity or complexity of making
such distinctions between polar opposites. With a dichotomous
view, nothing falls between extremes, and the determination of
whether grey is black or white is considered an easy task. On the

other hand, with a relative view, differentiating black and white is
a matter of degree. Therefore, each of the potential oppositions
may be understood as representing extreme characterizations of
more subtly differentiated phenomena. Focusing on the grey
renders the determination, previously thought so simple,
extremely difficult.
For example, is a transcript of an oral
statement written or unwritten? 2 43 Is an interpretive inference
explicit or implicit? Is five years a sufficient period of time for
"long use" or does it remain too short?2 44
Are statements
regarding international responsibilities the basis for imposing
obligations or mere puffMg? 2 45 How many states must consent
for a rule to be consensual? 24
What amount of domestic

240. Wel, supranote 10, at 420.
241. Id. at 422.
242. Id. at 415 (citing, inter alia, Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
Non-Binding Agreements, 71 AM. J. INrL L. 296 (1977), and Michael Bothe, Legal
and Non-Legal Norms: A Meaningful Distinction in InternationalRelations?,9 NETH.
Y.B. INT'LL. 65-95 (1980)).
243. See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 97-98 (discussing traditional focus on
distinction between written and unwritten law in defining customary law). An
interesting anecdote illustrates this problem well. One senior colleague at
another law school attempted to give an oral exam in one of her classes. She was
informed that oral exams were against university policy based on the perception
that students would be unable to challenge grades not based on a written
performance. When this colleague suggested reasonably that a tape recording of
the exam could be made and, if necessary, a transcript typed from the recording,
these arguments did not prevail, and the right to give an oral exam was denied.
244. See id.at 100-101 (stating that element of long use not necessarily
used to determine whether customary law has been formed).
245. Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
246. See Chodosh, supranote 6, at 102-03 (on generality requirement).
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tradition is necessary in order to characterize a type of normative
24 7
source as being deeply rooted in municipal legal culture?
Relativity, without guiding the selection of differentiating
attributes or thresholds designed to distinguish the
satisfaction/nonsatisfaction of these standards, renders the
treaty/customary law distinction inadministrable.
Hence, the relativity principle may have the advantage of
subtlety and empirical accuracy. However, as Weil stated, it
tends to subvert the distinctions with which one begins: it risks
"succumb[ing] to the heady enticements of oversubtlety and loose
thinking" and "risks launching the normative system of
international law on an inexorable drift towards the relative and
the random."2 48 Law poses a particularly practical problem for
relativity. Academic endeavors aimed at comprehension of graded
phenomena do not necessarily suit the legal decision-maker. "It
is one thing for . .. sociologist[s] to note down and allow for the

infinite gradations of social phenomena. It is quite another thing
for [their] example to be followed by [legal decision-makers], to
whom a simplifying rigor is essential."2 4 9 Weil's emphasis on the
impracticality of relativity led him to this conclusion, drawing
attention to the imprecise legal character of resolutions of
He accordingly criticizes the
international organizations. 25 0
relativist view, writing that "there is no longer any straightforward
either/or answer to the problem of the normative force of the acts
25 1
of international organizations; it is all a matter of degree."

247.
248.
249.
250.

Trimble, supra note 87, at 669-70.
Wel, supranote 10, at 440-41.
Id. at 441.
As Koskenniemi points out, one

school

of

critics

of

recent

developments argues that
INlot only are many such standards ambiguous but their relative
importance and methods of verification have become uncertain. The
distinction between binding and non-binding standards becomes blurred.
The tendency of international law-maling to move from treaty into
instruments of the most varied kinds (decisions, recommendations,
reports etc.) has put strains on the ascertainment of valid law. Its
normativity has become a matter of more or less'....
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 107, at 346-347 (citing Helmut Strebel, Quellen des
Volkerrechts als Rechtsordnung, 36 ZaoRV, 331, 331-32 (1976); Weil, supra note
10, at 415-18, and THIRLWAY, supranote 184, at 71-79).

251.

Weil, supra note 10, at 416 ("'[T]here are no tangible, clear, juridical

criteria that demarcate with precision the zones of binding force'; there are only
Even if
'hazy, intermediate, transitional, embryonic, inchoate situations.'
resolutions do not attain full normative stature, they nevertheless constitute
'embryonic norms' of 'nascent legal force,' or 'quasi-legal rules. ' ) (citing
expressions found "with variants," from the writings of several contemporaries,
borrowed from JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OP UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
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Weil's critique of relative normativity does not refute the view that
normativity may be determined by degree. 25 2

Weil's attack is

more practical: the relative view of normativity is "quite beyond
the grasp of intellect."2s
He distinguishes between phenomena,
such as resolutions, that may reflect the evolution of norms, and
the actual norms themselves. 2 5
He seeks to preserve certain

176 (1969)); cf. Jorge Castaneda, La Valeurjuridiquedes resolutions des Nations
Unies, 129 R.C.A.D.I. 205, 320 (1970).
Weil also cites the award in
Texaco/Calasiatic v. Libya: "UN resolutions 'have varying legal value;' 'While it is
now possible to recognize that resolutions of the United Nations have a certain
legal value, this legal value differs considerably.' Well, supra note 10, at 416
(citing 17 I.L.M. 28-29, paras. 83 and 86 (1978)).
252. Franck distinguishes between legal obligations, as absolute (e.g.,
pedestrian street-crossing rules) and social rules, as matters of degree (e.g., the
social convention of keeping appointments). See FRANCK, supranote 11, at 37.
The legality of a law (as distinct from its legitimacy) is not a matter of
degree, even if the laws' enforcement may at times be lax or corrupt... ,
[whereas the] social rule about keeping appointments is not a law and its
ability to achieve compliance is not an either/or proposition but a matter
of degree, which, in turn, depends on whether, and how much the
subjects of the rule believe themselves obliged-despite their
countervailing self-interest-to act in accordance with the rule.
Id. According to this formulation, customary "law" is not law and thus a matter of
degree because the identification of customary "law" itself depends on "whether,
and how much the subjects of the rule believe themselves obliged ... to act in
accordance with the rule," which is a restatement of the acceptance-as-law
requirement of customary international law, opinio juris sive necessitatis. Id.
Franck defends his application of relativity to international rules by arguing that
there is a fundamental distinction between law as binary---"a text either is or isn't
law"-and rules as matters of degree---the degree to which a rule is obeyed
affects the degree to which it is cognizable as a valid obligation; frieciprocally, the
extent to which a rule is cognizable as a legitimate obligation affects the extent to
which it is obeyed." Id. The distinction at the core of Franck's differentiation
between law and rules is remindful of the linguist's quip about the difference
between a language and a dialect-unlike a dialect, a language has an army and a
navy. Similarly, Franck restates the positivist's distinction between law and
nonlaw-law has a legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally
organized sanctions. FRANCK, supra note 11, at 40 (citing HART, supra note 16, at
206) (discussing misgivings about application of the term "law" in the
international context). Surely, as Franck would concede, the mere existence of
legislatures, courts and police does not prevent the perception that violations of
street-crossing rules are "legal" in innumerable jurisdictions because there is no

expectation of any meaningful court or police sanction resulting from violation of
the expressed rule. Likewise, even where sanctions may be expected (e.g., speed
limit violations), studies have shown that a change in the rules may have little
effect on actual behavior. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A13
(discussing limited effect of rise in speed limit from 55 to 65 mph on actual
highway speed).
253. Weil, supra note 10, at 416.
254. Id. at 417 ("Resolutions, as the sociological and political expression of
trends, intentions, wishes, may well constitute an important stage in the process
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formal requirements, or rules of recognition, to distinguish norms
from nonnorms. Unlike other scholars for whom shades of
obligation are more readily classified as law, Weil acknowledges
the difficulty in identifying the line between the legal and the
nonlegal, but he does not shrink from the assertion that a
dividing line exists nonetheless. 2 5 However, asserting the clarity
of such a line, Weil tends to deny shades of grey in the application
of standards to behavioral phenomena by emphasizing the
distinction as one between black and white: "[O]n one side of the
line, there is born a legal obligation .. . on the other side, there is
nothing of the kind."25 6 Without a clearly delineated threshold,
identifying legal obligations is not so facile as Weil insists.
3. Irreconcilability

The

relative view is consistent with every architectonic

principle except the overlapping and equivalent structures.

As

mentioned above, it is very similar to the dichotomous view. It is

concurrently reconcilable with interdependence, which does not
deny the polar extremes, but adds a dynamic dimension to the
relationship between poles.

Among its inadequate features, it is

consistent with indeterminacy, which emphasizes the lack of
guidance
relativity
offers in
differentiating
shades
of
satisfaction/nonsatisfaction
of legal standards.
However,
relativity is inconsistent with the overlapping view to the extent
that grey must be either black or white but not both.2 7 It is also
inconsistent with equivalence; soft and hard lose their meaning if

of elaborating international norms; in themselves, however, they do not constitute
the formal source of new norms.").
255.
1. at 417 ("True, it is not always easy to draw the frontier between the
prelegal and the legal ....
It is nonetheless true that the threshold does exist.").
256.
Id. at 417-18 (emphasis added). Wel is not only critical of the
relativity between norms and non-norms, but also between different norms; some
are "now held to be of greater specific gravity than others, to be more binding
than others." Id. at 421.
257. The extent of overlap is a relative question. For example, in his attack
on the dichotomous view of treaty and customary law, Gamble employed two
diagrams: the first shows little overlap between treaty and customary law; the
second shows significant overlap between the two. Gamble, supra note 5, at 318.
Gamble then attributed the inaccuracy of the first diagram to the Statute of the
World Courts rather than to any extra-textual reading of it. Id.
Gamble's
conclusion is a relative one: treaty and customary law overlap more than not, but
this is more a matter of conclusory perception than empirical investigation. The
relative view is supported by the foregoing overlapping one. Any overlapping
architectonic principle assumes a relative one because the overlapping
architectonic principle, by itself, does not translate into a quantification of the
degree to which treaty and customary law overlap.
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they turn out to be the same. 25 8 Finally, if, like dichotomy,
relativity posits treaty and customary law as opposites, then it
precludes recognition of phenomena that are neither treaty nor
25 9
customary law.
4. Lack of Resolving Power
Without a determination of the defining attribute(s), the
thresholds for satisfaction of such defining attribute(s), and the
extent to which those thresholds are met in specific cases,
relativity has no explanatory power.2 60
Relativity informs
decision-makers that distinctions are relative, but does not inform
the specific degree of deepness of grey that should be classified as

black.
D. The Interdependent View

Drawing in large part on the overlapping principle, applying
the interdependent architectonic principle, it is possible to see
treaty and customary law as "interrelating," when customary
rules are codified in treaty, or when treaty is sufficiently general
261
to meet the requirements for recognition as customary law.

258. See KENNEDY, supranote 121, at 31.
259. See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 89 (identifying declarative international
law as neither treaty nor custom:
Although it is often mistaken for customary law, declarative international
law is a distinct, identifiable body of law. Like customary law, declarative
international law is not based exclusively on treaties and may evolve
through an informal law-making process.
However, declarative
international law differs from. customary law in one key respect:
declarative law is not accepted as law by a generality of states.
Declarative rules are those that are declared as law by a majority of states
but not actually enforced by them, or rules that are both practiced and
accepted as law, but only by a minority of states.
Id. (citations omitted)).
260. See discussion, infra Section IV.
261. Gamble, supranote 5, at 319 (concluding "[t]he interesting point to be
watched in the future is how these sources or evidence of international law [treaty
and custom] . . . will interact, vie for position, and influence one another.")
(quoting Baxter, supra note 5, at 103-04) (citations omitted). As Anthony A.
D'Amato aptly noted in an adaptation from his many articles in Treaty-Based
Rules of Custor, in D'Amato, ANTHOLOGY, supranote 112, at 95, many writers at
the turn of the twentieth century rejected the dichotomous view of Oppenheim
that treaties never generated new customary norms. Id. (citing WILLIAM HALL, A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (A.P. Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 1 LAMA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 733-34 (Hersch Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1995)). See,
e.g., D'AMATO, ANTHOLOGY, supra note 112 (citing BLuNrscHu, LE DROrr
INIERNATIONAL CODIFE 5 (4th ed. 1886); DESPAGNET, DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

76-77 (4th ed. 1910); 1 CALVO, LE DROYT INTERNATIONAL THEoREIQUE Er PRACTIQUE
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Relativism often evolves into an interdependent architectonic
principle.
For example, one scholar observed that the
treaty/customary law "relationship is not so much one of a
distinction as of a reciprocating effect. .. [because] . .. the line
between codification and progressive' development is a shadowy
one," and analogous to the equally shadowy "line between custom
as a material source of a codificatory treaty provision and a treaty
provision as a material source of new rules of customary
26 2
international law."

Interdependence may be achieved in three ways, each of

which is distinguished by distinct causal and temporal processes:
treaty (retrospectively) may reflect preexisting customary law;
treaty (contemporaneously) may create customary law; and treaty
(prospectively) may anticipate it. 2 6

160 (5th ed. 1896); 1 FIORE, TRATrATO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO 147 (4th
ed. 1904); 1 FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 53-54 (M. Henry
Bonfils, ed., 8th ed. 1922); 1 HAUrnEUILLE, DROITS DE NATIONS NEtYIRES xiv-xv (3rd
ed. 1868); 1 PRADIER-FODERE, TRAITE DE DROLT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 82-86 (1885);
1 PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (3rd. ed. 1879); 1 NYS, LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 161-66 (2d ed. 1912); LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (7th ed. 1910); SMI, (EARL OF BIRKENI-IEAD), INTERNATIONAL
LAW 25 (6th ed. 1927); 1 WESILAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (2d ed. 1910);
WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (8th ed. Dana, 1866); CAVAGLIERI,
LEZIONIDI DIRITLO INTERNAZIONALE 25-27 (1925); POLITIS, THE NEW ASPECrS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1928)).
262. R.Y. Jennings, The Discipline of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTM CONFERENCE HELD AT MADRID 620, 624

(1976).
263.
See Charney, supra note 5, at 971 (International agreements "can
codify" preexisting customary law, "they can cause the law to crystallize, and they
can initiate the progressive development of new law.") (citing North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 37-38). Charney
points out that "with the exception of some recent judgments, [citing ocean
boundary decisions relating to UNCLOS I, e.g., Continental Shelf (Malta v.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30; Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294; Continental Shelf (Tunisia v.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 3, 38, 48-49], the [International] Court [of
Justice] had been clear that state practice dehors the agreements and opiniojuris
were the principal considerations, and that international agreements played
limited roles."). Chamey, supra note 5, at 971-22. See also RESATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATONS, supra note 54, § 102(3) (1986) ("International agreements
create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary
international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted."). Wel noted the difficulties of such
differentiation:
Everybody knows how difficult, yet at the same time how necessary, it is to
distinguish within such a convention between, on the one hand, what is
declaratory of an already formed customary rule or crystallizes a
customary rule that had been in process of formation, and, on the other
hand, what constitutes a development of the law (i.e., a new norm). It is
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treaty/customary

law

distinction is theoretically sound, being both empirically accurate
in specific cases and not illogical. It is practicable in that it is
consistent with current international law; however, it is very

difficult

to

administer

in

specific

instances.

Still,

the

interdependent view may be reconciled with other principles,

except the dichotomous view. Finally, it may accurately describe
a process of customary law formation by treaty or treaty
formation by codification of customary law. However, alone it
provides no resolving power in particular cases.
1. Theoretical Coherence
Theoretically, there is nothing empirically inaccurate about
the statement that treaty and customary law are interdependent.
The rules of recognition for customary law itself are contained in
various treaties. 2 6
Treaties are interpreted against customary
principles of treaty formation, interpretation, and enforcement. 26 5
However, an overly generalized view of interdependence is blind to
particular customary rules that do not depend on treaty, as well
as to treaty rules that do not codify customary law.
Logically, it is not invalid to suggest that two phenomena,
even those considered to be oppositional, depend on one another.
Such interdependence may be one of meaning alone (e.g., the
meaning of white depends on the meaning of black).
Alternatively,
the
phenomena
themselves
may
exhibit
interdependence. Either way, the interdependent view of treaty
and customary law is not illogical.
2. Practicability
The interdependent view is consistent with both the rules of
recognition for each treaty and customary law and the rules
concerning the relationship between them. As this Article notes
above,
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention excludes the
automatic dichotomization (or mutual exclusivity) of treaty and

difficult because the two categories are often closely intermingled;
necessary, because, in the first case, provisions are involved expressive of
rules opposable to all states, even those not parties to the convention,
whereas in the second case only the parties are bound.
Weil, supranote 10, at 427-28.
264. STAIUTE OF THE I.C.J., supranote 7, art. 38; Vienna Convention, supra

note 176, arts. 34, 38.
265. For example, pacta sunt servanda(pacts shall be served) and rebus sic
stantibs (circumstances change). See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION MO
INIERNAIONAL LAW 9, 11, 23, 32-33, 54 (1988).
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customary law, by providing that "[n]othing in articles 34 to 37
precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon
a third State as a customary rule of international law."2 66 Thus,

customary law may derive from treaty. Yet, nothing in the law
suggests that interdependence is necessary. Such a claim would
be inconsistent with the current state of the law.
The ability to differentiate any particular provision as
reflecting, creating, or anticipating customary law causes
enormous epistemological problems.
The interdependence
between treaty and customary law is difficult to apply in
particular cases.2 67
When a treaty both codifies existing
customary rules and develops new conventional rules,
determining which provisions
fall into each category may present
2 68
considerable difficulties.
3. Irreconcilability
The interdependent view may be reconciled with some but not
all architectonic views of the treaty/customary law distinction.
First, because it accurately describes a potential process of
customary law formation by treaty or treaty formation by
customary law, it is inconsistent with the dichotomous view.
Second, it is not inconsistent with the overlapping view because
interdependence allows for a rule to be both customary and
treaty.
Third, it is consistent with relativity because the
interaction of polar opposites may produce one phenomenon or
the other (e.g., a male and a female together may produce either a
male or a female). Fourth, interdependence is also consistent
with equivalence in the case of equating treaty with customary
law because treaty crystallized or created customary law. Finally,
it is even consistent with the indeterminate view in its more selfcritical forms of concession that it is hard to tell when treaty has
created customary law and when customary law is codified in

treaty.

266. Vienna Convention, supranote 176, art. 38.
267.
See Howard, supra note 5 (discussing practical problems of deriving
customary rules from severed, albeit general, treaty provisions agreed to as a
package deal); Scott & Cart, supranote 5.
268. Caminos & Molitor, supra note 186, at 880 (discussing juridical
implications for the traditional treaty/customary rules in cases of interdependent
treaty provisions in UNCLOS Ill).
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4. Lack of Resolving Power
Due to the impracticality of applying interdependence as a

method of source identification,

this principle provides no

explanatory power in particular cases.

Identifying two terms or

phenomena as generally interdependent by itself does not mean

that

this

relationship

is

either

necessary

or

universal.

Interdependence, then, is only a conclusion, the justification for
which one must look elsewhere.
E. The Equivalent View
The more overlapping and interrelated the concepts, the more
frequently they will be viewed as effective equivalents.
The
equivalent architectonic principle tends to deny the distinction
2 70
between putative opposites. 2 6 9 Hence, treaty is customary law.
In some writings and expressions of foreign policy, there is a
tendency to recognize customary law in treaty rules 2 7 1 even if
unratified,2 7 2 without ensuring satisfaction of the basic
269. See, e.g., HENRY FIELDING, THE HISTORY OF TOM JONES Book VI, Ch. 13
(1749) ("Distinction without a difference."); JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL
JOHNSON 266 (1791) ("If he does really think that there is no distinction between
virtue and vice, why, sir, when he leaves our houses let us count our spoons.").
270. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 5, at 275; Leslie M. MacRae, Customary
InternationalLaw and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INTL
L.J. 181, 221-22 (1983) ("The United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, despite
protestations to the contrary, has codified with almost unanimous international
consent, customary law of the sea."); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human
Rights in International Law, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1110, 1138, 1146-47 (1982)
(concluding that "generalizable provisions in treaties (especially multilateral

treaties) ipsofacto generate customary rules," but leaving open the possibility of a
temporal requirement of "reasonable time").
271. For a comprehensive effort to differentiate treaty rules that give rise to
new custom, see Charney, supra note 5, at 971 ("Recently, .

.

. writers,

international courts, and statesmen have given support to the view that
international agreements, with little more, could give rise to new customary
international law that is binding on all states regardless of whether or not they
participated in the negotiations or became parties to the agreement.").
272. Id. ("There is even some support for the view that international
agreements that are not yet in force could give rise to instant international law.").
After the 1982 UNCLOS, the United States Government subsequently stated its
position that the Convention, with the exception of the deep seabed mining
provisions, reflected existing customary international law. See President's EEZ
proclamation of March 10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383-84 (Mar. 10,
1983), reprinted in 77 AM. J. INM' L. 619-20 (1983); see also Lee, supranote 188,
at 542-43; S. EXEC. DOC. L., 92D CONG., ISr SESS. 1 (1971) ("[A]lthough [the
Vienna Convention is] not yet in force, the Convention is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.");
Preference of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (Advisory Opinion of
June 21 on Namibia) ("The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach
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requirements of customary international law under the
As Charney writes,
"Such
conventional
defmition. 2 73
developments [of equating treaty rules with customary law] in the
rules for establishing customary international law could have
27 4
profound implications for the international legal system."
As noted above, equivalence, draws on interdependence and
may be achieved in three ways, to be distinguished by distinct
causal and temporal processes. Treaty may reflect preexisting
customary law (retrospectively); treaty may create customary law
(actively); and treaty may anticipate it (prospectively).275 In its
most extreme form, the equivalence principle supports not only
the first and third views (better understood in the context of the
interdependence of treaty and customary law), it also supports
the second-treaty with little more can itself constitute customary

law. 276 For example, Anthony D'Amato argues that "generalizable

(adopted without a dissenting vote) may in many respects be considered as a
codification of existing customary law on the subject.").
273.
See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 89 n.2 ("Customary international law
and treaty law now appear to be increasingly interdependent and overlapping,
rather than mutually exclusive or hermetically sealed bodies of international law.
However, it does not follow that all treaty law is customary law simply because
the two categories overlap."). For an argument that treaty may become customary
law, but for specific reasons, see Caminos & Molitor, supranote 186, at 880.
Therefore, those treaty provisions which traditionally create rights and
obligations for third states may do so for two reasons: either they reflect
custom that existed prior to the negotiation of the treaty or, as a result of
the place within the treaty of a particular provision, it has provided the
impetus for the creation of a new customary rule.
Id.
274. Charney, supranote 5, at 971.
275.
See supraSection llI.D.
276.
See Louis B. Sohn, "GenerallyAccepted" InternationalRules, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 1073, 1077-78 (1986) and THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 80 (1989) (arguing that the "customary
character" of universal human rights treaties may obligate "states that are not
parties to the instrument in which the norm is stated") (both cited in FRANCK,
supra note 11, at 189-90, 281 n.441) ("[A] treaty ratified and implemented by
most states may... create a prevalent pattern of behavior, which as 'customary
law' obligates states that have not accepted the treaty."). In contrast to the views
that equate treaty with customary law, Franck's formulation preserves (in slightly
different terms) the standards of recognition for customary international law, e.g.,
"most states" (generality), "prevalent pattern of behavior" (practice), "ratified and
implemented" (accepted as law).
Additionally, Franck does not focus on
interpretation of Article 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J. as "a secondary rule, or rule
of recognition;" instead, Franck's study concentrates on what he calls the
"ultimate rule of recognition," the question of "why those, or any other, rules
should determine the outcome of a dispute." FRANCK, supranote 11, at 190. This
Article, in contrast, is concerned with interpretation of the secondary rules of

recognition that define the potential sources of obligation.
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provisions in bilateral and multilateral treaties generate
customary rules of law binding upon all states."2 7 7 He suggests
"that [such generalizable] treaties become customary law at the
moment they are ratified."2 78 But generalizability should not be
equated with generality.
The following Section will argue that the equivalent view of
the treaty/customary law distinction, though arguably easy to
administer, is empirically inaccurate because treaty alone does
not satisfy the rule of recognition for customary law, illogical in its
conclusion that practical problems of differentiation are indicative
of equivalence, inconsistent with the law as interpreted by the
I.C.J., and reconcilable with only extreme versions of the
overlapping and interdependent principles.
Moreover, the
equivalent view has only limited resolving power in particular
2 79
disputes.
1. Theoretical Incoherence
The critique of equivalence is similar to the relativity critique.
Weil views both relative normativity and treaty/customary law
equivalence through the same critical lens. Both relativity and
equivalence share the common feature of erosion of the
"autonomy of the conventional rule vis-a-vis the customary
rule."2 8 0 Weil acknowledges the inadequacy of the dichotomous
view of treaty and customary law,2 8 1 and the historical
acceptance of the interdependent view. 2 82

277.

However, Weil is

D'AMATO, CONCEPrOF CUSTOM, supranote 169, at 104, 163-64.

278. See Chodosh, supra note 6, at 101. Weil argues that the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case lends itself to the conclusion that "nothing more [than a
conventional rule] was needed to prompt the conclusion that, in the eyes of the
Court, a provision of treaty law adopted by enough sufficiently representative
states could undergo instantaneous transmutation into a rule of customary
international law," noting that the Court in the Barcelona Traction case explicitly
mentioned "international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character." Weil, supra note 10, at 435 (quoting Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J.
32).
279. Equivalence, like dichotomy, has resolving power if applied to disputes
in which a treaty rule is argued to apply to a nontreaty state. However, it reaches
the opposite result. Equivalence would resolve the dispute in favor of the state
party to the treaty by arguing that treaties are customary law, and thus
universally binding, even on a nontreaty state.
280. Wel, supranote 10, at 428.
281. Id- ("Admittedly, these two categories have never been divided by an
insuperable barrier....").

282. Id. at 438 ("[I]t has always been accepted that a treaty could codify or
contribute to the formation of a customary norm."). Wel also cites to the S.S.
Wimbledon case, in which "J. Basdevant spoke of a rule possessing 'the dual
quality of being both a conventional rule and a customary rule."' Id. at 438 n.100
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critical of the "three variant erasers of the frontier between
conventional and customary norms"28 3 (i.e., treaty reflects
customary law, treaty creates customary law, and treaty
resulting in "a veritable
anticipates customary law),
28 4
deconventionalization of conventional rules."

The equivalence architectonic principle in D'Amato's writing

is supported by his view that the temporal threshold at which
point a treaty becomes customary law is indeterminate. He
utilizes a descriptive indeterminacy to support equivalence by
arguing illogically that "the fact that no one can specify a time" at
which a treaty passes into customary law suggests that "there is
no such dividing line."28 5 In other words, because one cannot
identify, by sound alone, when the tree fell, it has already fallen.
This position is seriously flawed not only because distinctions
may be made, but more importantly because such distinctions
must be made. Otherwise, parties have no way of forecasting
what customary law is or will be. Moreover, sound does not
determine whether a tree has fallen.
Stated otherwise, D'Amato creates an attributional
"strawman" by implying that time or its length is the defining
attribute of customary law. Not only is this an extratextual
attribution nowhere contained in the contemporary rules of
recognition regarding customary international law, 28 6 but more

importantly he states that it is impossible to determine the
threshold of temporality allegedly defined by that attribute.
Therefore, he defines customary law in part by identification of an
attribute that is impossible to recognize and therefore (however
illogically) deemed to be nonexistent. Accordingly, because the
attribute posited as differentiating customary law from treaty is
unrecognizable and does not even exist, one may equate
customary law and treaty. In sum, treaty equals instantaneous
customary law because no one can specify the amount of time
required for treaty to become customary law.

Time, however, is not a defining factor. Rather, at least in
I.C.J. jurisprudence, the conjunctive standards contained in the

phrase "general practice accepted as law" define customary
international law. Thus, the equivalent view tends to interpose a

(citing S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, and Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.

C) No. 3-I, at 182 (Aug. 17)).
283.

Weil, supranote 10, at 438 (citing Baxter, supranote 5, at 73).

284.

Weil, supranote 10, at 430.

D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 163-164 (quoted in
285.
Chodosh, supranote 6, at 101 n.60).

286.

See Chodosh, supranote 6, at 100-01 (describing the lack of temporal

requirements for recognition of customary law).
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nondefinitional factor and then posits that because it is
inadministrable it does not really apply. This view leads to an
inaccurate identification of customary law as evidenced in treaty,
regardless of the independent rules of recognition for customary
87
law. 2
For these reason, equivalence suffers from faulty logic. First,
it is based on a false premise that time is an important factor in
differentiating treaty and customary law. Then, it points out the
difficulties in applying a temporal test. Finally, it concludes that,
because one cannot determine how much time is required, no time
is required.
2. Practicability
Like those who apply a dichotomous framework to the
understanding of treaty and customary law, as well as those who
reject such a view, D'Amato turns some attention to Article 38 of
the I.C.J. Statute. He argues not only that the "statute does not
attempt to separate treaties from customary law, nor to exclude
the effect of one upon the other... ," but that the "opposite may
be closer to the truth."2 8 8 D'Amato presents a strained argument
that because paragraph (a) "is restricted to rules in treaties that
are 'expressly recognized by the contesting states',
[c]onsiderable room is left in paragraph (b) for the impact of
treaties upon general custom."28 9 It does not necessarily follow,
however, that if the I.C.J. is only to apply treaty rules expressly
recognized by contesting states, treaties are to be applied qua
customary law to states that do not expressly recognize those
rules. D'Amato's argument at best supports an overlapping view;
but it certainly does not support an equivalence of treaty and
customary law.
Indeed, equivalence is patently inconsistent with both I.C.J.
jurisprudence and the pertinent treaty provisions. First, the
I.C.J. has repeatedly counseled for caution in reaching the
conclusion that treaty is evidence of customary law.2 90

Second,

287. Another related approach to equating treaty and customary law is to
deemphasize the contractual features and to exaggerate the noncontractual
features of treaty law in order to draw it closer to customary law, which is not
necessarily based on contractual arrangements between states.
See, e.g.,
D'AMATO, ANIHOLOGY, supra note 112, at 96 (arguing that a "treaty isn't a
contract").
288.

D'AMATO, CONCEPrFOFCUIoM, supra note 169, at 109.

289. Id.
290. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20). See also I. SINCLAIR, THEVIENNA CONVENnON ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 23
(2d ed. 1984) ("[TJhe [North Sea] judgment suggests clearly defined limits to the

process of generation by treaty of customary rules, and these limits involve the
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the I.C.J.'s views are supported by Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention, which excludes the automatic equivalence of treaty

and customary law, so that the existence of a treaty provision
itself, with little more, provides no conclusive evidence of a
customary, universal legal obligation. Article 34 provides in
pertinent part that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent."2 9 1 Thus, treaties
2
alone do not make customary law. 9
The modem tendency not only to define customary law in
terms of treaty, but to equate the two is strong. However, the

International Court of Justice has resisted this tendency in many

prominent cases.2 93
For example, the I.C.J. rejected the
equivalent view of treaty and customary law in the Asylum case
(Colombia/Peru)2 9 4 and the case of the North Sea Continental
Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands).295
In Asylum and North Sea, the I.C.J. rejected the view that
treaty necessarily reflected preexisting customary law, crystallized
or anticipated customary law, which was formed in later reaction

consideration of criteria external to the treaty itself."); D. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 285 (3d ed. 1983) ("The North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases have shown that it must not be too readily assumed that a treaty
provision even in a 'law-making' treaty states a rule of customary international
law.").
291. Vienna Convention, supranote 176, art. 34.
292. Article 38 (rejecting the dichotomy) does not "modify" Article 34
(rejecting the equivalence), as Gamble suggests. See Gamble, supra note 5, at
306-07. Article 38 merely ensures that one does not illogically conclude a mutual
exclusivity from the rejection of equivalence. Taken together, the two provisions
reject dichotomy and equivalence as ways of structuring comprehension of the
distinction. Treaty and customary law are not mutually exclusive opposites, see
Vienna Convention, supra note 176, art. 38; nor are they necessarily equivalent,
id. at art. 34. Stated otherwise, that treaty does not necessarily create customary
law (Art. 34) and does not imply that the two categories are mutually exclusive
(Art. 38). There is nothing contradictory in these provisions; treaty is not
necessarily customary law (Art. 34) but in some cases (i.e., where the rules of
recognition of custom are satisfied) treaty law may also be customary law (Art.

38).
293.
Cases discussed more briefly in this section and more thoroughly in
Section IV illustrate the extent to which judicial decision-makers take the STR
approach proposed in this article. These decisions are generally consistent with
this approach in viewing customary international law according to its own
definitional attributes, but inconsistent to the extent that they do not identify
specific thresholds that differentiate the satisfaction vel non of such defining

standards. See discussion infra Section IV.
294. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
295.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20).
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to or acceptance of treaty. In Asylum, 2 96 for example, the I.C.J.
rejected Colombia's assertion that "a large number of extradition
treaties" 2 97 and cases in which asylum was granted according to
the asylum-granting State's claim to unilateral and definitive
qualification were sufficient to identify the existence of customary
law binding on Peru, which had not ratified such treaties. The
I.C.J. held that Colombia's evidence of customary law was
insufficient to qualify under Article 38 as general practice
accepted as law.
The I.C.J. based its holding on several
interrelated observations. The I.C.J. cited the irrelevance of the
cited treaties, 2 98 the lack of generality of states that ratified
them, 2 9 9 the lack of practice, 3 00 and the lack of indication that
such practice was followed out of a sense of legal obligation. 30 1 In

this way, the I.C.J. rejected Colombia's equivalence of treaty with
customary law. Likewise, in North Sea, the I.C.J. rejected the
view that treaty necessarily reflects customary law. The court
concluded that the relevant treaty provision "did not embody or
3 °2
crystallize any pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law."

The court recognized that a rule was embodied in the treaty, "but

296. The case of the North Sea Continental Shelf, id., is discussed more
extensively infra Section IV.
297. Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277.
298. The I.C.J. found that Colombia cited conventions and agreements
"which [did] not contain any provision concerning the alleged rule," and invoked
conventions which had not been ratified by Peru, such as the Montevideo
Conventions of 1933 and 1939. Id.
299. Second, the I.C.J. observed that the 1933 convention had been ratified
by "not more than eleven States" and the latter 1939 convention "by two States
only." Id. In particular, the I.C.J. rejected Colombia's contention that the
Montevideo Convention of 1933 "merely codified principles which were already
recognized by Latin-American custom, and that it [was] valid against Peru as a
proof of customary law." The I.C.J. stressed "the limited number of States which
[had] ratified [the] Convention" and the language of the Preamble, which stated
that the convention modified a previous convention, rather than codified
customary law. Id. The I.C.J. further rejected Colombia's claim that the
conventions codified specific, Latin American customary law. Id.
300. In reviewing the facts, the I.C.J. observed "so much uncertainty and
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic
asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been
so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified
by some States and rejected by others" that "it is not possible to discern in all this
any constant and uniform usage." Id.
301. The I.C.J. did not find sufficient evidence in Colombia's citation to "a
large number of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted
and respected" that asylum was granted in such situations out of a sense of legal
obligation, rather than for "for reasons of political expediency." Id.
302. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. at
3, 41 (Feb. 20).
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as a purely conventional rule."m
In both cases, the I.C.J.
resisted the tendency to equate treaty with customary rules.
On its face, the equivalent view could not be more easily
administered. If a rule is one of "generalizable" treaty, then it is
also customary law-this is the formula for equivalence.
However, under this view, it is necessary to define "generalizable"
vs. nongeneralizable treaty provisions, ° 4 as well as to delimit
what, beyond more than the existence of the treaty, is required for
customary law to exist.
Both present profound practical
30 5
difficulties.
3. Irreconcilability
Equivalence cannot be reconciled with the dichotomous and
the relative views, because, logically, X may not also be not-X,
unless X is meaningless. 3 0 6 Equivalence is reconcilable with the

overlapping view to the extent that complete overlap may be
considered effective equivalence. The equivalent view is only
illogically reconcilable with interdependence: the inherence of two
terms in one another is not incompatible with a distinction
between them.3 0 7 Equivalence is necessarily reconcilable with
indeterminacy, because indeterminacy is premised on postulated
dichotomies that are later contradicted. But, as D'Amato's views
reflect, equivalence may also lead to the view that if treaty is
always customary law; customary law has, by itself, no
independent meaning.
4. Lack of Resolving Power
Given the existence of a widely executed treaty addressing
global issues, such as human rights or the environment, the
equivalent view renders such treaties customary law as well,
thereby extending the binding obligations contained in such
treaties to nontreaty parties.
However, even accepting the

303.

Id.

304.

See, e.g., L.A. Howard, The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L. J. 321 (1981); R.Y. Jennings,
Law Making and Package Deal, in M8LANGES OFFERTS A PAUL REUIER, 347-55

(1981).
305.
See John K. Gamble & Maria Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and
Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 491 (1984).
306.
See Rogers & Molzon, supranote 111.
307.
See application of architectonic principles, including the principle of

equivalence, to Reisman's description of law and politics. INTERNATIONAL LAW
ESSAYS, supranote 120.
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equivalent view of treaty and customary law, if one does not
already have a treaty in hand, if various treaty regimes conflict,3 0 8
or if a previously recognized customary rule conflicts with a new
treaty rule, 3 °9 the equivalent view has little or no resolving power.
Without relevant treaty provisions, the equivalent view of treaty
and customary law could not inform a determination of
customary law on its own terms. Moreover, equivalence does not
by itself determine which of conflicting treaty provisions should be
considered customary law. Finally, the equivalent view, far from
heightening the importance of customary law, dictates that
customary law has no independent force when treaty conflicts
with previously deemed customary rules.
F. The Indeterminate View

When applying an indeterminate architectonic principle, the
distinction between treaty and customary law becomes
meaningless, and takes the relative degree of overlap or
interdependence as evidence of the indeterminacy of these
sources of law. The view of customary law-if not treaty-as
indeterminate is neither new nor novel.3 1 0
Although the

308. Compare approaches in the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22,
1989, 20 LL.M. 656 (permittingtransboundary movement and disposal), currently
ratified by thirty-three countries, with those of the Bamako Convention on the
Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Waste Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 775
(banningtransboundary movement and disposal). Although not yet in force, the
Bamako Convention has been ratified by ten countries.
309. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 134 (June 14) ("[A] later custom... prevails
over an earlier treaty.") (citing PAULE REUIER, INTRODUCION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES
107-08, para. 216 (1989)). The I.C.J. stated that an "integrated legal system
would provide some method of determining which rule [when two or more conflict]
ultimately prevails; for the same facts cannot at one and the same time be subject
to two contradictory rules." Id. at 179.
310. See C. WILFORD JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
263 (1964); HERSCH LAUrERPACHr, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY TIE
INTERNATIONAL COUR 378 (1958); Alf ROSS, A TEXIBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91
(1947); Hans Kelsen, Theorie du Droit International Coutumier, I Revue
International de la Theorie du Droit 253, 266 (1939); SORENSEN, LES SOURCES DU
DROrITINIERNATIONAL 110 (1946). All of the foregoing authors are cited in D'AMATO,
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 17 n.23-27 for the argument, with which
D'Amato disagrees, that "proof of custom is a matter for the 'arbitrary discretion'
or 'free appreciation' of courts." D'Amato's disagreement with this view is based
in part on the very complexity of their theories. Id. ("[L]ong, complex and
unresolved inquiries into the theoretical nature of custom ... constitute not a

theory but the absence of one, as they give neither the reader nor the judge
himself any idea of how to proceed to find proof of custom."). In contrast,
D'Amato attempts to "show that custom is not founded upon unfettered discretion
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architectonic

it fails to reconstruct what it

deconstructs.

The seeds of indeterminacy inhere in the equivalent view of
customary law as "a style of legal argumentation,"3 13 rather than
as a set of legal phenomena. Under this view, customary law is a
process3 14 of competitive persuasiveness, 3 1 5 rather than a set of
phenomena that meet a list of predetermined, "objective"
standards of recognition. The question is not whether certain
phenomena meet the standards of recognition as customary law
per se, but which litigant has a more persuasive argument in a
particular case. This latter form of casuism provides fuel for the
critical fire of the indeterminacy school. The view of customary
law as a process of legal argumentation is bolstered by the view
that customary law is a vacuous subset of international law (i.e.,
an empty hole in the net), defined in terms of what it is not (i.e.,
treaty), rather than what it is.
As D'Amato writes, "legal
argumentation tends to be based upon [custom] because there
3 16
was no treaty or agreement covering the situation."

but rather upon objectively determinable and replicable procedures of legal
methodology." Id. This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with D'Amato's selfdescribed "claim-oriented" theory. Id. at 18. A "process by which the better of
two claims prevails" that "takes account of the relative superiority of
persuasiveness" is patently inconsistent with so-called "objectively determinable"
methodology. Id. D'Amato's claim of freedom from "subjective discernment" is
incompatible with his claim-oriented approach. Id.
311. Indeterminacy in the law is not necessarily always considered to be a
negative characteristic. See, e.g., supra note 11, discussing Franck's views of
constructive indeterminacy in treaty texts; KENNEDY, supra note 121, at 294
("[The interminability of international law seems the subtle secret of its
success.").
312. For a critique of indeterminacy as it applies in different fields of law,
see Rogers & Molzon, supra note 111. See also STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN
GOOD FAITH (1992).
313. D'AMATO, CONcEPOF CUSOM, supranote 169, at xiii.

314.

See id. at vii (Richard A. Falk's Foreword to D'Amato) (describing the

"shift away from the largely deductive orientation toward inquiry of the classical
jurisprudence of international law" as involving "the acceptance of law as process

315. Compare RONALD DWORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 283 (1977)
(describing legal propositions as "true" if they are more consistent with the theory
of law that best justifies settled law than the contrary proposition). Unlike
Professor Dworkin, I would not define truth as a function of consistency, because
a legal proposition may be consistent and false, but I do believe that consistency
in the law is one of several important standards of justice, which is necessary for
the stability and predictability of legal outcomes.
316. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 169, at 4. This statement
may seem inconsistent with equivalence; it is, but only in one direction. The
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But indeterminacy makes an even bolder claim, drawing on
the technique of "deconstruction."
According to this view,
because language is relational, distinctions are necessarily
indeterminate.
The logical leap from descriptive relativity to
conclusory indeterminacy may be found in Koskenniemi's
explanation of his critical methods. 3 17
He writes that a
deconstructive study sees international law as "constituted by a
conceptual
opposition."3 18
Koskenniemi
describes
the
international legal discourse as an argument over which
opposition takes priority over the other.
In this sense,
indeterminacy descriptively postulates a dichotomous set of
concepts: apology/utopia (the is/ought nature of international
law), normativity/concreteness (the standards of recognition), and
ascending/descending (the trajectories of legal argumentation).
He argues that priority can never be established because of the
interdependent meaning of the opposing terms: "[A]Ithough the
participants [in the discourse] believe that the terms are
fundamentally opposing (that is, that their meanings are nonidentical), they turn out to depend on each other,"31 9 and
therefore "alternative arguments" are "not alternative at all"
because "they rely on the correctness of each other."3 20
Herein lies the critical weakness of indeterminacy's logic. It
begins by postulating that differentiated terms or concepts are
necessarily either "fundamentally opposing" (dichotomous) or
"identical" (equivalent).
No other relationships are possible.
Whenever indeterminacy identifies significant exceptions or

qualifications to the absolute dichotomy (e.g., overlap, relativity,
or interdependence), it concludes that the previously considered
absolute distinction (dichotomy) is really no distinction at all
(equivalence). In such cases, indeterminacy concludes that "law"
is indeterminate, subjective, and thus, political. Applying its own
rigid opposition between law and politics, indeterminacy
concludes that international "law" is not really law.3 2 1 Ironically,

statement that all treaty equals customary law does not logically necessitate the
conclusion that all customary law equals treaty.
317.
See KOSKENNIEMNI, supranote 107, atxx-xxi.
318.
Id.
319.
Id.
320.
Id.
321.
Id. For an excellent critical review of Koskenniemi's work, which has
greatly influenced this analysis, see lain Scobbie, Note, Towards the Elimination of
InternationalLaw: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism, 1990 BRrr
Y.B. INT-L L. 339, 349 (1991) (noting in particular the opposition between
objectivity and subjectivity at the core of Koskenniemi's analysis, and pointing out
that "in giving content to standards. . ., the judge surely does not rely on some
objective or subjective meaning; rather, an intersubjective assessment will be
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but not surprisingly, Koskenniemi falls into his own trap by
posing his conception of law in an absolute dichotomous
If legal systems are "absolutely
relationship with politics.
determinate" 3 22 (a utopian and ascending postulate), and if they
evidence any indeterminacy (an apologetic, concrete, descending
observation), then such indeterminacy renders such a system
political and nonlegal.
The following subsections argue that the indeterminate view
of the treaty/customary law distinction is frequently empirically
accurate due to nonrigorous applications of the rule of recognition
for customary law and reconcilable with other principles except

dichotomy, but it is illogical because of its rigidly structural
interpolations, inconsistent with the law in its restatement of the
rules, and nonadministrable possibly due to its overly critical
emphasis. Furthermore, the indeterminate view has no resolving
power in particular disputes because it fatalistically concludes
that the concepts of international law themselves are too
indeterminate to resolve disputes in an objective way.
1. Theoretical Incoherence
If the indeterminacy critique of the applications of customary
international law is empirically accurate, it is not for the reasons
claimed by scholars of that school. There is nothing inherent in
the concepts of treaty and customary law that makes source
The indeterminacy of
identification hopelessly indeterminate.
customary international law lies in the ignorance of preexisting
rules of recognition and in the frequent lack of rigor in applying
them.
That the distinctions between treaty and customary law may
be indeterminate does not in itself support the hyperbolic
assessments and faulty logic used to reach that conclusion. The
progression from the view of customary law as an empty hole to
As Koskenniemi writes,
indeterminacy is rather immediate.
"[M]odern legal argument lacks a determinate, coherent concept of
custom. Anything can be argued so as to be included within it as
3
The very definition of
well as so as to be excluded from it." 3 2
customary law-general practice accepted as law-incorporates
the two forms of dichotomous legal argumentation that
Koskenniemi identifies. First, he denominates as "ascending"

made in much the same way as a municipal judge determines the requirements of
standards such as 'the reasonable man' or 'the officious bystander."').
322. KOSKENNIEMI, supranote 107, at 16.
323. Id. at 361-62.
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those trajectories of argumentation that base order and obligation
on ideas of justice, nature, progress, etc., as "anterior, or
superior, to State behaviour."3 2 4 This trajectory correlates to the
acceptance-as-law requirement of customary law. Second, he
identifies as "descending" those trajectories of argumentation that
base "order and obligation on State behaviour, will or interest."3 25
This trajectory correlates to the "general practice" requirement of
customary law.
Koskenniemi argues that ascending and descending forms of
argumentation are mutually exclusive: "Either the normative
code is superior to the State or the State is superior to the code.
A middle position seems excluded."3 2 6 However, the definition of
customary law incorporates both criteria conjunctively (i.e., both
must be satisfied to reach a finding of customary law). The
exclusion of the middle position is not a result of the opposing
lines of argumentation. It is one of Koskenniemi's own creation,
an either/or fabrication. If judicial findings of customary law are
indeterminate, that is not because "modern legal argument lacks
a determinate, coherent concept of customary law" but rather
because the determinacy and coherence of the traditional concept
are eroded by nonrigorous applications of Article 38's rule of
recognition.
2. Impracticability
In order to hold fast to the indeterminacy conclusion, one
must largely ignore the rules of recognition embodied in the
operable authorities. Indeterminacy is a function of ill-attention
to these defining standards; it is not the result of any inherent
incompatibility between the alleged retrospective 'apology" of
"general practice" and the prospective "utopia" of "acceptance as
law." It is not inherently inconsistent to support a rule of
recognition claiming that nations should behave in the future
(utopia) as they have generally behaved in the past (apology).
Unless absolutely anything may be legitimately categorized as (1)
general, (2) practice, (3) accepted, and (4) law, then the
indeterminacy view is at best hyperbolic and at worst deliberately
ignorant of the rules of recognition currently-albeit at times
loosely-applied by the I.C.J. and other fora.

324.
325.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.

326. See David Kennedy, Theses about International Legal Discource, 23
GERM. Y.B. INTL L. 353 (1980) (arguing that sovereign authority and community
membership constitute the contradiction that controls a variety of opposing

doctrines).
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Koskenniemi offers no alternative concept that would meet
his standards of determinacy and coherence. In this respect,
indeterminacy is a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it may lead
decision-makers to shrink from their responsibilities, fearing that
subjective discretion corrodes a process that is presumed to 3be
27
purely objective. This appears to make best the enemy of good.
As one scholar puts it, "To identify existing customary
international law in a treaty text is not always easy but is
indispensable."3 2 8 Koskenniemi's argument that "international
law is singularly useless as a means for justifying or criticizing
international behavior"3 2 9 only serves to criticize, not to
reconstruct, and thus tends to undermine international law itself.
Koskenniemi's indeterminacy argument is itself based again on a
dichotomous distinction between law and politics. Hence, the
argument: if international law is political, it is not law, and thus
0
useless.3
3. Irreconcilability
Indeterminacy is inconsistent with the claims of dichotomy,
except insofar as some of the dichotomous views agree that
However,
customary law is a hopelessly indeterminate source.
indeterminacy draws strongly on the other principles: overlap (as
support for rejecting rigid dichotomies), relativity (as support for
illuminating the lack of determinate thresholds), interdependence
(as support for showing interreliance between purported
opposites) and equivalence (as support for the view that
customary law may be whatever the beholder wishes, even its
purported opposite, treaty).
4. Lack of Resolving Power
The purpose of the indeterminate view is mainly critical. It
does not purport to determine what characterizes either treaty or
customary law, because it concludes that any source distinction
is too indeterminate to apply consistently with the objective
standards presumed to accompany legal determinations.
Therefore, rather than attempting to resolve the difficulty in

327. The Honorable Guido Calabresi, former Dean of Yale Law School, is
fond of admonishing scholars to avoid this tendency.
LEE, supra note 188, at 554.
328.
KOSKENNIEMI, supranote 107, at 48.
329.
Koskenniemi "attack[s] the idea that international law provides a non330.
political way of dealing with international disputes." Id. at 50.
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making distinctions, indeterminacy simply criticizes, but fails to
offer any better, more determinate approach to these problems.

IV. SUB-REFERENTIAL THRESHOLD RELATIVITY (STR) AS AN APPROACH
TO THE TREATY/CUSTOMARY LAw DISTINCTION

A. Summary of Problems
As Section III discusses, none of the architectonic principles
applied above to the treaty/customary law distinction is at once
theoretically coherent (i.e., empirically accurate and logical),
practicable
(i.e.,
consistent with preexisting
law
and
administrable), and generally reconcilable with each of the others
in case-specific contexts. Finally, with limited exceptions, none
has any resolving power in particular disputes involving at least
one nontreaty contesting party.
The dichotomous view is logical and arguably administrable,
but also is empirically inaccurate, inconsistent with the law, has
limited resolving power, s 1 and is irreconcilable with other
architectonic principles. 33 2
The overlapping view is logical,
administrable, empirically accurate, consistent with the law, and
reconcilable with other architectonic principles (except dichotomy
and relativity), but it has no resolving power in particular
disputes, other than to refute conclusory utilization of other
architectonic principles. 3 33 The relative view, without some subreferential attribution and threshold identification, is illogical,
nonadministrable, empirically inaccurate, inconsistent with the
law, and not reconcilable with overlap and equivalence, and has
no resolving power in particular disputes.33
The interdependent
view is logical, empirically accurate, consistent with the law, and

reconcilable with each principle except dichotomy, but it is not
easily administered and has no resolving power in particular
disputes. 3 3 5 The equivalent view of the treaty/customary law
distinction is arguably easy to administer, empirically inaccurate,
illogical, inconsistent with the law, and irreconcilable with other

331. Dichotomy has resolving power if applied to disputes in which a treaty
rule is argued to apply to a nontreaty state. Dichotomy would resolve this dispute
in favor of the nontreaty state by arguing that, if a rule of treaty applies, the
customary rule must be different or nonexistent.
332. See supra Section mI.A.
333. See supra Section IH.B.
334. See supra Section mI.C.
335. See supra Section Ill.D.
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6
views except extreme forms of overlap and interdependence.33
Moreover, it has only limited resolving power in particular
disputes.3a 7 Finally, the indeterminate view is reconcilable with
other views except dichotomy, but it is illogical, inconsistent with
and has no resolving power in
the law, nonadministrable,
8
particular disputes.33

B. The Common Problem of Cross-Reference
The common disadvantages of each of the foregoing
architectonic principles applied to the treaty/ customary law
distinction rest in the cross-referential nature of the competing
The dualism between treaty and
conceptual structures.
customary law presupposed by the foregoing, cross-referential
views is unfortunate, because treaty and customary law (general
practice accepted as law) are not inherently counterposed.33 9 The
distinction between treaty and customary law is different in this
sense than cross-referential, polar oppositional distinctions, such
as hot and cold or hard and soft. To say that treaty and
cust6mary law should not be understood as a dualism is not to
conclude that, as legal-linguistic phenomena, they may not
For example, from the overlapping
overlap and interact.
viewpoint, H2 0 may be both hot and soft (water), and cold and
hard (ice). From the interdependent viewpoint, heat (above
freezing) causes H20 to be soft (water) and cold (below freezing)
causes H2 0 to be hard (ice). ° But simply because heat may
cause H2 0 to be soft and cold may cause H20 to be hard, it does
not necessarily follow that hot is soft and cold is hard. Nor does it

necessarily follow that because soft and hard (and hot and cold)
are interdependent expressions in meaning, they necessarily are
interdependent as phenomena. The heat does not depend on the

336.
337.

See supra Section III.E.
Equivalence, like dichotomy, has resolving power if applied to disputes

in which a treaty rule is argued to apply to a nontreaty state. However, dichotomy
and equivalence reach the opposite results. Unlike dichotomy, equivalence would
resolve the dispute in favor of the state that is party to the treaty by arguing that
treaties are customary law, and thus universally binding, even on a nontreaty
state.
338. See supra Section III.F.
339. Koskenniemi hints at the inadequacy of this dualism when he writes
that "discourse does not maintain a neat threefold distinction between a fully
The initial
naturalistic principle, custom and fully consensual treaty.
differentiation between custom and treaty tends to push the former into natural
law." KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 107, at 353.
340. It is of interest to note that application of the terms hot and cold
requires a threshold, freezing, or 32 degrees fahrenheit or 0 degrees centigrade, to
distinguish the two.
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cold any more than softness depends on hardness, even though
one term is meaningless without the other. Finally, if soft and
hard and hot and cold are interdependent in meaning, it does not
follow that the distinction is either nonexistent or indeterminate.
The argument here is that the distinction between treaty and
customary law is more similar to the distinction between soft and
hot 341 (possibly, but not necessarily, overlapping and
interdependent) than it is to the distinction between soft and
hard. Generally speaking, the two sources of obligation may
overlap, and they may even be interdependent in that one
generated the other. But neither the overlapping conception nor
the interdependent one alone informs the determination of what
conditions need be satisfied to make such a conclusion of softness
or heat.3 2
C. ProposedSolution: Sub-Referential Threshold Relativity (STR)
This Article proposes the approach of sub-referential
threshold relativity (STR) and argues that it is more theoretically
coherent, practicable, and powerful than common, crossreferential conceptions of the treaty/customary law distinction.
STR involves a four-step approach to source determination. First,
STR refers to the independent standards of recognition for
customary international law (e.g., Article 38, l(b) of the I.C.J.
Statute, describing international customary law as "evidence of
general practice accepted as law),343 rather than to another
source 34 4 (e.g., treaty, defined in Article 38, l(a), as "international

341.
Cf., NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 84 (An oppositional link between two
terms "would seem strange if the oppositions were instead right/below or
left/above [and] is less obvious in the case of sun/moon, and not at all so with
such Kaguru oppositions as red/white or sperm/blood.") (citing T. 0. Beidelman,
Kaguru Symbolic Classification, in RIGHT & LEFr ESSAYS ON DUAL SYMBOLIC
CLASSIFICATION 151 (Rodney Needham ed., 1973).
342. In this critical respect, STR may be differentiated from the overlapping
conception, which is static and merely categorical, and which does not provide
any explanatory power in the determination of which phenomena satisfy the
criteria for inclusion into the overlapping category. Only sub-reference provides
the criteria; and only relativity, as described herein with the modifications of
establishing a polar context and thresholds, has the ability to determine
coherently and accurately whether those standards are satisfied.
343.
STAIWUE OF THE I.C.J., supra note 7, art. 38. This author has argued
that generalpractice and acceptance as law (opiniojuris siue necessitatis)are two
criteria of the traditional definition of customary international law that should not
be relaxed, but rather more rigorously applied. See Chodosh, supra note 6, at
103-05.
344. Thus, instead of seeing customary law as (i) dichotomous to treaty, (ii)
overlapping with treaty, (iii) relative to treaty, (iv) interdependent with treaty, (v)
the equivalent of treaty, or (vi) in indeterminate relationship to treaty, STR would
define customary international law according to defining attributes that are not in
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conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States").3 45 Second, STR
places such sub-referential attributes on a relative scale bounded
by absolute polarities.- 4 6 Hence, generality would be placed on a

scale bounded by the extremes of no states on one end and all
states

on

the

other.

Third,

it

is

necessary

to

establish

threshold347 standards or ranges of recognition, to differentiate

any way related to treaty. Such defining attributes of customary law, i.e., general
practice accepted as law, bear no necessary or intrinsic relation to treaty, i.e.,
international conventions "establishing rules expressly recognized." STA'TUrE OF
THE I.C.J., supra note 7, art. 38.
345. Id.
346. See, e.g., NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 207-09 (discussing the
distinction between day and night in making the case against natural
oppositions). Needham's analysis postulates that the attribute that differentiates
day and night is the existence vel non of natural light. Needham's example
establishes a scale in which "the upper horizontal (+) stands for a maximum
intensity of light; this is an arbitrary limit, but we can imagine it as that of the
naked sun. The lower horizontal (-) stands for a complete absence of light; this
limit is not arbitrary, though it is virtual and not real." Id. at 207. If one were to
record on a photometer the "circumambient light such as would normally impinge
on the human eye," id, the points of maximum and minimum intensity both "will
fall within... certain range[s]." Id. at 208. Needham argues that there "is no
clear line of natural contrast between day and night except by means of the
arbitrary, and hence culturally variable, criteria of collective representations." Id.
at 209. However, Needham's diagram quantifies these points of collective
variation in such a manner as to allow an estimation of photometric
differentiation between day and night Id. at 208, fig. 5. See also his treatment
of the distinction male/female and related references to alternative differentiating
attributes (e.g., chromosomal, social), id. at 210-12, and that of right/left ("As an
act of classification, moreover, it depends on the tracing of a vertical boundary,

such as the median line postulated by the Temne, between what are thereby
distinguished as the two sides."). Id. at 214. Needham writes: "Let us imagine a
vertical center line within the body, and stipulate that 0/360* is straight ahead.
Ideally it might be taken that right would be at an angle of 90 ° and left on a
bearing of 270 ....
In ordinary discourse, 'right' can easily be any direction
within, say 45 degrees and 135 degrees." Id. at 216.
347. See CHARLES K. OGDEN, OPPOSITION 58-59 (1967) (quoted in NEEDHAM,
supranote 13, at 65: "Opposites... may be either the two extremes of a scale or
the two sides of a cut; the cut marking the point of neutrality, the absence of
either of two opposed characters in the field of opposition."). I refer to the two
extremes as absolute polarities denoting a maximum difference of contrariness in
Aristotelean terms and to the "cut" as a threshold that marks the proper
categorization of phenomena as belonging to different parts of the "scale."
Needham points out the challenges of determining the precise locaion of the "cut"
by giving a legal illustration:
[When someone is charged under English common law with breaking and
entering, it has to be determined whether or not he was inside the
property in question. There are numerous cases demonstrating that this
is in fact an imprecise and contentious matter, and sometimes such as
has to be settled by a judgment of the court. The uncertainty is not the
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between gradient degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction348 of
the attributive standard.34 9 This counters the further erosion of
the generality requirement.- s 0
A threshold of four-fifths of
relevant3 s1 states may be established as the standard for

result of ignorance of where precisely the boundary to the property is; this
may be absolutely sure, and yet there can be doubt as to whether or not
the defendant was inside it. So in such a case the conceptual clarity of
inside/outside is not replicated in the assessment of an action.
NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 67. As Needham points out, Ogden's cut should not
be understood to preserve the dichotomy; rather, any boundary between inside
and outside "is a point, more or less precisely determined, mid*ay on a scale
running through a 'field of referents." Id. at 69. The cut that delimits the inside
and the outside of a house, for example, assuming utilization of the doorway as
the point of most common ingress and egress, may be equated spatially with the
threshold.
348. See, e.g., NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 40 (describing sides of a
cylinder).
With this, there is strictly speaking no discrete side but instead the visible
portion of a continuous curve. Nevertheless, this facing surface is spoken
of as a side, and it actually has an opposite side. This is a notional and
relative surface, not of course one given by the conformation of the object;
it is defined by reference to a line projected from the viewer through the
middle of the visible surface, and diametrically through the center of the
can, to an opposite point on the invisible and converse curve. All the
same, there is no falling off in the careful accuracy with which it is said
that a particular point, say an emblem or a letter on the label, is opposite
some other mark on the far side of the cylinder.

Id.
349. Developing such thresholds would serve to make distinctions between
different sources of law more legitimate. As Franck writes, "[tro be legitimate, a
rule must communicate what conduct is permitted and what conduct is out of
bounds." FRANCK, supra note 11 at 57. However, one prominent threshold

provided by Franck appears to be the traditional "hah-hah" test:

"[a] rule's

determinancy may thus be tested by measuring how far exculpatory definitions
can be stretched before those doing the stretching are-in Ezekiel's
phrase--laughed to scorn." Id.
350. As I have noted elsewhere, Chodosh, supranote 6, at 102 n.69-70, the
United States Supreme Court and the Permanent Court of International Justice
have deduced rules of customary international law from the practice of fewer than
a dozen states. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); S.S.
Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, and Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at
15, 25, 28 (Aug. 17) (citing Suez Canal and Panama Canal "regimes" as
"precedents" for the rule involving the Kiel Canal); S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 29 (Sept. 7) (citing as decisive precedents cases
involving only five states: France, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium).
351. Depending on the subject matter, the relevant states may be delimited
(without limitation) by region, stages of technological or economic development, or
trade relationships.
This qualification of relevance obviously creates greater
indeterminacy. However, it may be important to allow specific customary law to
develop without requiring universal participation. Frequently, "relevant" means
the most powerful. As Jonathan Charney wrote, "when authorities examine the
evidence necessary to establish customary law, they consider actions of a limited
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satisfaction of generality. In order to undo the circularity of the
acceptance-as-law criterion, one may establish the sub-referential
standard of the state's internalization of the rule into domestic
law and practice (e.g., "a ratified treaty or domestic legal
restraints on the use of force"). 1 2 Finally, at this point, STR
applies the evidence of compliance with the standard to the
threshold thus established. 353 In the event of more than one
standard and the attendant conjunctivity or disjunctivity of
multiple standards, STR would apply the same four-step analysis
to the remaining standards.
As an approach to international legal source identification
and in comparison to the competing cross-referential conceptions

that Section III critiques, STR is more empirically accurate in its
attention to degree and its ability to grasp and classify rules that
are arguably simultaneously general, practiced, and accepted as
law, 35 logical in its interpretive steps, more consistent with
current law in its attention to preexisting standards of
recognition, and more administrable than any of the competing

number of states, often the largest, most prominent, or most interested among
them." Charney, supra note 2, at 537. This demonstrates that what courts and
scholars have frequently referred to as customary international law is not
customary at all, due to the lack of generality necessary to support the rules of
recognition for customary international law. I have referred to this as declarative
international law or ius; it may also be referred to as "authoritarian" law. See
generally Chodosh, supra note 6, at 95, n.26 (citing Pospiil, supra note 12, at
27).
352. This proposal was first made in Chodosh, supranote 6, at 104.
353. This is consistent with the idea of developing and measuring legitimacy
of international rules and institutions, propounded by Professor Franck, and the
theoretical coherence and practicality of understanding relative factors by
reference to hypothetical absolutes between which are posited gradient degrees.
See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 11, at 204-05.
Legitimacy is to rules as the Greenwich Mean Longitude is to time, or as
the Paris Metre Bar is to distance. It is a hypothetical absolute, contrived
to facilitate the understanding of some relative factor--distance, for
example, or time ....

The common assumption of a meter bar also

permits the making of further logically deducible subsidiary assumptions,
such as minutes or centimeters, as well as aggregate assumptions, such
as months and kilometers.... Legitimacy is not a measure accepted by
states, anymore than people any longer specifically "accept" the meter, or
time. These simply exist as functions of living in a society which uses
those measures.
Id.
354. To the extent that the I.C.J. and other tribunals have failed to apply
the rules of recognition for customary international law, the STR approach would
be inconsistent with those opinions; however, it is consistent with the standards
that-if they were not-should have been applied, according to established rules
of recognition.
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approaches.3 5 5
Furthermore, this approach is not only
reconcilable with other architectonic principles3 5 6 as general
conclusions about the treaty/customary law relationship, 35 7 but
it also has the greatest resolving power in particular disputes.
1. Theoretical Coherence
STR is more empirically accurate than competing views in
three critical respects. First, by referring to independent defining
standards
of recognition,
STR
rejects
cross-referential
generalizations that tend to prejudice determinations in specific
cases.
For example, acceptance of either dichotomy or
equivalence makes determinations of customary law dependent
on the existence of treaty; however, the rule of recognition for
customary law makes reference neither to treaty nor to any
particular attribute of treaty.
Second, by acknowledging the
relativity of language, STR avoids conclusory applications of terms
to phenomena. Accurate determinations require the realization
that the term "general" is not only located somewhere on the scale

between the polar extremes of "no" states on the one end and "all"
states on the other, but farther along the scale than the point of
acceptance by merely a "few" states.
Third, by seeking a
threshold to differentiate satisfaction from nonsatisfaction of

defining standards of recognition, STR has the capacity for

355. Yet another advantage of STR, related to accuracy, consistency,
administrability, and resolving power, is the transparency of this approach. Even
when there is disagreement about the attributes selected as defining customary
law, or the particular threshold articulated and applied, such disagreement would
be transparently expressed, rather than implicitly made in conclusory decisions.
356. The STR approach may be reconciled with each of the other competing
architectonic principles. The only critical difference would be that the other
architectonic principles would be conclusions based on utilization of relativity in
specific disputes, rather than conclusory assumptions that skew the analysis.
Applying STR, a particular treaty rule may be the rejection (mutual exclusion) of
the customary rule, or it may overlap. The treaty rule may be seen as dependent
on the customary rule, where the former codifies the latter, or the customary law
may be dependent on the treaty, where the treaty has been accepted as law by a
generality of states. In both instances, the treaty and the customary law may be
equivalent
357. Only after one has made independent determinations on a case-bycase basis of whether the alleged norm belongs to one source or the other, or to
both, neither or some other source, may one accurately structure general
knowledge about the relationship between the two sources. Each architectonic
understanding of the treaty/customary law relationship is then possible. In
particular cases, treaty and customary law may be mutually exclusive and
contradictory, overlapping, interdependent, equivalent, or indeterminate.
Knowledge is better structured as a conclusion from rigorous analysis than as an
assumption that prejudices legal analysis in specific cases.
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greater precision in making accurate identifications of
international legal sources.
STR is also logical; it carries no propensity to reconfigure the
independent standards of recognition for customary law based on
associational reactions to treaty standards. STR assumes neither
mutual exclusion nor equivalence between treaty and customary
law.
In contrast, dichotomy, relativity, equivalence, and
indeterminacy define customary law in terms of treaty, whether
those terms are opposed, relational, equivalent, or some
combination thereof.
STR does not interpolate standards of
recognition for customary law based more on conceptions of what
it is not, rather than what it is. STR thereby avoids many of the
conceptual problems encountered in the false opposition of treaty
and customary law and the equally binary, cross-referential
attacks on the dichotomous view (e.g., equivalence and
indeterminacy in particular).
2. Practicability

Compared particularly to the dichotomous and equivalent
views of the treaty/customary law distinction, the STR approach
is more consistent with the current rules of recognition for
international law. In addition, STR does not deny that treaty and
customary law may generally overlap, be interdependent, or even
carry relative
ambiguities
or indeterminacies
in their
identification. Although the case law does not expressly take the
STR approach, many courts implicitly employ one or more steps
of this approach.
As noted above, the I.C.J. employed many of the STR steps in
rejecting claims that states were bound by customary law based
on treaty in two exemplary cases:
the Asylum Case
(Colombia/Peru),3 5 8 and the case of the North Sea Continental
Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands). 35 9 In neither Asylum nor North Sea did
the I.C.J. define or seek to identify customary law crossreferentially in terms of treaty. Instead, the opinions applied the
independent, sub-referential attributes that define customary
legal obligation.
In Asylum, the I.C.J. stated that a party that bases its claim
on customary international law must prove that it has become
"established in such a manner that it has become binding on the

358.
359.

Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 3 (Feb 20).
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In the court's opinion, the general practice

criterion can be satisfied by a "constant and uniform usage
practiced by the States in question"3s1 and the acceptance-as-law
attribute requires that "this usage [be] the expression of a right
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent
on the territorial State."3 62 Although the I.C.J. did not identify
specific tests for determining the satisfaction/nonsatisfaction of
these articulated standards, the I.C.J. rejected Colombia's
assertion that "a large number of extradition treaties"3 63 and
cases in which asylum was granted according to a claim of
unilateral and definitive qualification by the State granting
asylum were sufficient to identify the existence of customary law
binding on Peru, which had not ratified such treaties.
The I.C.J. held that Colombia's evidence was insufficient to
qualify under Article 38 as general practice accepted as law.
Consistent with the STR approach, the I.C.J. based its holding on
several interrelated observations, including the irrelevance of the
cited treaties, the nongenerality of states that ratified them, the
lack of consistent practice, and the lack of indication that such
practice was followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
First, the I.C.J. found that Colombia cited conventions and
agreements "which [did] not contain any provision concerning the
alleged rule," 36 and "invoked conventions which [had] not been
ratified by Peru, such as the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and
1939."-6
Second, the I.C.J. observed that the 1933 convention
had been ratified by "not more than eleven States" and the latter
1939 convention "by two States only."3 6 6 In particular, the I.C.J.
rejected Colombia's contention that the Montevideo Convention of
1933 "merely codified principles which were already recognized by
Latin-American custom, and that it [was] valid against Peru as a
proof of customary law."3 67 The I.C.J. stressed "[t]he limited
number of States which [had] ratified [the] Convention"3 68 and the
language of the preamble, which stated that the convention
modified a previous convention, rather than codified customary
law.3 9 The I.C.J. further rejected Colombia's claim that the

360. Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 276 (citing Art. 38 of the STATUTE OF THE
I.C.J., supranote 7).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 277.
364. Id.
365. Id.

366.

Id.

367.
368.

Id.
Id.

369.

Id.
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conventions codified specific, Latin American customary law.3 70
Third, in reviewing the facts, the I.C.J. observed "so much
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and
discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the
official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so
much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on
asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others... [that]...
it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform
usage.. . ."71 Finally, the I.C.J. did not find sufficient evidence
in Colombia's citation to "a large number of particular cases in
37 2
which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected"
that asylum was granted in such situations out of a sense of legal
obligation, rather than 'for reasons of political expediency." 37 3 In
each of these points, the I.C.J. identified sub-referential,
definitional criteria of customary law, and found evidence of
satisfaction of these attributes to be insufficient. -Although not
consistent with the STR approach, the court did not identify what

level of general practice and acceptance-as-law would have been
required to support a finding of customary law. Had Colombia's
assertions come closer to meeting the court's implicit threshold
standards, however, it would, could, and should have articulated
and applied such threshold standards.
As in Asylum, in North Sea the I.C.J. rejected the view that
treaty necessarily reflects customary law. The court concluded
that: "[T]he Geneva Convention did not embody or crystallize any
pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law."3 7 4 The court
treated the rule that "the delimitation of continental shelf areas
between adjacent States must, unless the Parties otherwise agree,
be carried out on an equidistance-special circumstances
basis,"37 5 which was embodied in Article 6 of the Convention, as a
"purely conventional rule."37 6 Consistent with the STR approach,

370. [E]ven if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between
certain Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru
which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary,
repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo Conventions of
1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule concerning the

qualification of the offence in matters of diplomatic asylum.
Id. at 277-78.
371. Id. at 277.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
41 (Feb. 20).

375.
376.

Id. at 41.
Id.
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the I.C.J. reached this conclusion by rigorous application of the
general practice and, in particular, the acceptance-as-law 377
standards of recognition for customary law.3 7 8
The court based this conclusion on an inference from the
faculty of reservation contained in the treaty for the Article 6 rule.
The court argued that if a state may make a reservation from a
particular provision of the treaty, thereby exempting itself, and if
customary law does not allow for such exemption, then the treaty
cannot be said to reflect customary law.3 7 9 In other words, even
the general practice of failure to make reservations cannot be said
by itself to reflect acceptance-as-law, since the treaty by its own
terms makes such election voluntary and not obligatory. If each
state is free to reserve or not to reserve, then it cannot be
assumed that an election either way reflects that state's sense of
legal obligation to do one or the other. The opportunity to state
reservations on adherence to Article 6 was thus central to the
court's view that this treaty provision did not reflect customary
law. At the time of the I.C.J. opinion, there had been four

reservations to Article 6, none of which "purported to effect such a
total exclusion or denial,"3 8 0 but at least one of which "was
somewhat far-reaching." a*' The I.C.J. could have inferred from
this general lack of reservations that a generality of states had
expressed their acceptance of this provision by not stating any
However, the I.C.J. rejected this argument,3 8 2
reservations.

377. Inconsistent with the STR approach, however, the court at one point
treated the acceptance-as-law requirement somewhat tautologically to mean
"acceptance as customary law." Id. at 44.
378. The court interpreted the faculty for reservation in light of its
contextual observation that customary law and treaty differed in at least one
critical respect. Unlike treaty, customary law has "equal force for all members of
the international community and therefore cannot be the subject of any right of
unilateral exclusion." Id. at 38.
379. Id. at 39. The I.C.J. opined: "The normal inference would therefore be
that any articles that do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of
reservation under Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously
existing or emergent rules of law; and this is the inference the Court in fact

draws in respect of Article 6 (delimitation)...." Id.
380.

Id. at 40.

381.

Id.

382.

The I.C.J. also rejected the contention

of Denmark and the

Netherlands:
that although prior to the [Geneva Convention], continental shelf law was
only in the formative stage, and State practice lacked uniformity,.. . 'the
process of the definition and consolidation of the emerging customary law

took place through the work of the International Law Commission, the
reaction of governments to that work and the proceedings of the Geneva
Conference'; and this emerging customary law became 'crystallized in the
adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the Conference'.
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observing that "no valid conclusions can be drawn from the fact
that the faculty of entering reservations to Article 6 has been
383
exercised only sparingly and within certain limits."
Consistent with the STR approach, by rejecting equivalence,
and treating customary law as an independent source of law, the
I.C.J. did not embrace dichotomy.
Indeed, the I.C.J.
acknowledged that treaty and customary law were not mutually
exclusive sources of law; rules that are conventional or
contractual in origin may pass "into the general corpus of
international law, ... accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as
to have become binding even for countries which have never, and
do not, become parties to the Convention."3 8 4
The court
expressed "no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one
and does from time to time occur."3 8 5 The I.C.J. acknowledged
that "it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by
which new rules of customary international law may be
formed."3 8 6 However, the I.C.J. admonished against a knee-jerk
equivalence of treaty and customary rules: "At the same time this
387
result is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained."
Particularly consistent with the STR approach, the court
reviewed compliance with the "elements usually regarded as
necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have
become a general rule of international law." 38 8 It rejected time as

Id. at 40. The I.C.J. pointed out that the International Law Commission proposed
the relevant treaty provision
with considerable hesitation, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most
de lege ferenda, and not at all de lege lata or as an emerging rule of

customary international law. This is clearly not the sort of foundation on

which Article 6 of the Convention could be said to have reflected or
crystallized such a rule.
I& at 40.
383.

IL at 41. Here the I.C.J. applied a dichotomous view of the distinction

between treaty and customary law based on the distinguishing criterion of
consent. If the treaty itself treats the reservation as an "affair exclusively of those
States which have not wished to exercise the faculty, or which have been content
to do so only to a limited extent, [tiheir action or inaction cannot affect the right of
other States to enter reservations to whatever is the legitimate extent of the right."
The court, however, did leave open the possibility that the rule could eventually
emerge as customary law-"[w]hether it has since acquired a broader basis
remains to be seen"-but the I.C.J. did not provide any guidance as to the extent
of practice or acceptance of the rule reflected in a general lack of stated
reservations. Id.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. .
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
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a necessary attribute of customary law,38 9 and held that the
generality requirement was not satisfied,3 90 even while noting
that the "cases constituted more than a very small proportion of

those potentially calling for delimitation in the world as a

whole."3 9 1

The court neither defined the relevant group of

states 3 2 to be considered nor the precise proportion of relevant
states that need accept a rule in practice prior to its classification
as customary law and its application as universally binding
law.3 9 3
However, short of expressing a more finite threshold
standard of generality, the court nonetheless concluded that "the
number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though
3 94
respectable, hardly sufficient."
Also consistent with the STR approach, the I.C.J. applied the
general practice and acceptance-as-law standards as conjunctive

389. Id. ("[]t might be that, even without the passage of any considerable
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the
convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose
interests were specially affected.").
390.
Regardless of time, the- I.C.J. emphasized that "State practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition
that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved." Id. at 43.
391.
Id. at44.
392.
The I.C.J. noted that "allowance [could be] made for the existence of a
number of States to whom participation in the Geneva Convention is not open, or
which, by reason for instance of being land-locked States, would have no interest
in becoming parties to it." Id. at 42.
393.
The court addressed the relevance vel non of the practice cited as the
basis for the rule:
[I]t appears that in almost all of the cases cited, the delimitations
concerned were median-line delimitations between opposite States, not
lateral delimitations between adjacent States.... The case of median-line

delimitations between opposite States is different in various respects, and
as being sufficiently distinct not to constitute a precedent for the
delimitation of lateral boundaries. In only one situation discussed by the
Parties does there appear to have been a geographical configuration which
to some extent resembles the present one, in the sense that a number of
States on the same coastline are grouped around a sharp curve or bend of
it.
Id. at 45. Additionally, the court rejected any analogous application of "plenty of
cases (and a considerable number were cited) of delimitations of waters, as
opposed to seabed, being carried out on the basis of equidistance-mostly of
internal waters (lakes, rivers, etc.), and mostly median-line cases" as applicable
to the continental shelf. Id.
394. Id. at 42. Even though the court found "over half the States concerned
. . . presumably . . . acting actually or potentially in the application of the
Convention," id. at 44, the court refused to draw from their action any "iference...
as to the existence of a rule of customary international law in favour of the
equidistance principle." Id. at 43.
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requirements. 3 95 The I.C.J. opined that "[n]ot only must the acts
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it." 3s

6

The court distinguished custom from

customary law by emphasizing that "[tihe frequency, or even
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough."3 9 7 With
respect to the practice of states not party to the treaty, the court
found "not a shred of evidence 3 98 that they acted out of a sense
of legal obligation (opiniojuris sive necessitatis). Merely "acting, or
agreeing to act in a certain way, does not of itself demonstrate
anything of a juridical nature."3 9 Thus, the court recognized
that even in circumstances of general practice (custom), if the
acceptance-as-law requirement is not satisfied, a finding of
customary international law is not merited.

In addition to being more consistent with the rules of
recognition for customary law and the application of those rules
by the I.C.J. in specific cases, the STR approach is also more
administrable
than
competing
conceptions
of
the
treaty/customary law distinction in three key respects. First,
unlike each of the competing views, in its sub-referential
orientation, it points the decision-maker to the rules of
recognition for customary law, rather than to those for treaty law
combined with some presupposed or counterposed relation
between treaty and customary law. Second, unlike dichotomy

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
following
for word,
p. 28):

Id. at 44 ("[Tlwo conditions must be fulfilled.").
1& at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court followed "the dictum of the Lotus case," as stated in the
passage, the principle of which is, by analogy, applicable almost word
mutatis mutandis, to the present case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 1927, at

Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found... were sufficient to
prove ... the circumstance alleged... it would merely show that States
had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings,
and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for
only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a
duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom.
The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been
conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand ....
there are other
circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is true.

Id. "There is no evidence that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to
draw them in this way by reason of a rule of customary law obliging them to do
so-especially considering that they might have been motivated by other obvious
factors." Id. at 44-45.

1064

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:973

and equivalence, it acknowledges the difficulties posed by
relational quality of the standards of recognition, which may be
satisfied or not satisfied by degree. It is the grey cases that are
difficult to resolve, and they cannot be coherently resolved by
conclusory arguments that grey is black or grey is white. Third,
unlike overlap, relativity, interdependence, and indeterminacy, it
provides a method for making such determinations. Thresholds
are not easy, but necessary, to articulate and apply if one is
forced to classify some measure of international practice as
sufficiently general and sufficiently accepted-as-law to merit a
finding of customary law.
3. Reconcilability
The open-endedness of the STR approach makes it
reconcilable with each of the other general views of the
treaty/customary law distinction because this approach does not
presuppose any particular relationship in any specific case.
According to STR, in any particular case, the treaty/customary
law relationship may be dichotomous, overlapping, relative,
interdependent, equivalent, or indeterminate. However, STR does
not prejudice the conclusion by assuming any of these
architectonic views. There is nothing contradictory in holding a
general view of the treaty/customary law distinction that
conforms with one of the cross-referential views and applying STR
in specific cases, as long as the general view is informed by the
outcomes of STR rather than vice versa.
4. Resolving Power
Imagine the case of a dispute between a national government
and foreign nationals. The foreign individuals claim that the
government's assertion of power over them constitutes a violation
of international law. Assume that there are treaties that restrict
such assertions of governmental power, but there is no currently
binding treaty in effect between the national government asserting
jurisdiction and the nation of which the individuals are citizens.
Nonetheless, the individuals claim that on the basis of customary
international law the nation is unjustified in its action. The
distinction between treaty and customary law is critical to the
outcome of this dispute. Whereas treaties are binding only on
contracting parties, customary international law is presumed
binding on all nations. Thus, the principles that inform the
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distinction between treaty and customary law may determine
4
which party prevails. W
Applying the dichotomous view, if the rule is one of treaty, it
is necessarily not one of customary law.
The rhetorical
dichotomous reasoning would follow that, if it were customary
law, there would be no justification for codification into treaty.
According to this view, the country would not be obligated to
observe the treaty standard. 4 0I
Applying an overlapping view, the rule or standard may be
one of treaty and customary law. Thus, to determine whether the
treaty rule is customary for purposes of binding a noncontracting
state requires an independent investigation into the satisfaction of
the rule of recognition for that legal source.
Applying a purely relative view, in which treaty and
customary law are viewed as being on opposite ends of the same
spectrum, neither supplies the specific attribute or set of
attributes that provide the scale of differentiation, nor suggests
the point along the spectrum at which one may differentiate
between the two.
An interdependent view of treaty and customary law allows
decision-makers to view treaty as reflecting, crystallizing, or
anticipating customary law. But this alone does not aid the
adjudicator in the determination of which of these three processes
has or has not occurred. Although the interdependent view is
more dynamic than the other views, it is not particularly helpful
in resolving the issue of whether treaties not in effect between
contesting parties nonetheless bind the parties as customary
international law.
Equating treaty and customary law with one another will lead
to the conclusion that the country is bound by the treaty rule
based on the reasoning that if treaty provides a standard, the

400. This pattern differs from the minivan example in one critical respect.
First, in the minivan example, discussed supra in Section II.C, there was no
presupposition that minivans were cars, leaving only the one question open of
whether they were also trucks. In this fact pattern, however, the arguably
applicable rules are presupposed to be ones of treaty. The result of this alteration
is that dichotomy and equivalence in this case will have resolving power, but lead
to contradictory results.
401.
At the risk of repetition, it is important to note that the I.C.J.
recognizes that treaties do not necessarily override customary rules on the same
subject. Moreover, Article 38 of the Vienna Convention excludes the automatic
dichotomization (or mutual exclusivity) of treaty and customary law, by providing
that "[n]othing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from
becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law."
Vienna Convention, supranote 176, art. 38. Thus, where two categories of source
overlap on the same issue, one (treaty) need not entirely override the other
(customary law).
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customary standard is the same. 4 02 Therefore, the nontreaty
party is nonetheless bound by the treaty standard by way of
customary international law.
Finally, indeterminacy criticizes the ambiguity of the
distinction and the standards informing it. Customary law is in
the eye of the person who wishes to see it. If the decision-maker's
interests are furthered by recognition of customary law,
customary law will apply; if they are not favored, customary law
will not apply.
In contrast to the foregoing approaches, STR applies the
following four-step approach to the source determination issue in
the hypothetical.
First, the decision-makers refer to the
standards of recognition of the specific source in question (e.g.,
Article 38, 1(b) of the I.C.J. Statute, describing international
customary law as "evidence of general practice accepted as
law").w Second, they place such sub-referential attributes on a
relative scale bounded by absolute polarities.
Third, they
establish threshold standards or ranges of recognition to
differentiate between gradient degrees of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction of the attributive standard. 4 04 Fourth, they apply
the evidence of compliance with the standard to the threshold
thus established. Finally, in the event of more than one standard
and the according conjunctivity or disjunctivity of multiple
standards, they apply the same four-step analysis.
Applying this approach to the dispute pattern outlined above,
if the rule adopted by treaty parties is practiced by a generality of
states (e.g., over four-fifths), the general practice requirement is
satisfied. If the rule is practiced out of a sense of legal obligation,
such that the generality of states has incorporated the rule into
its domestic law and practice, the acceptance-as-law requirement
is satisfied. If both standards of recognition are satisfied, the
treaty rule is also one of customary law, and the nontreaty party
would be bound. If at least one of the standards of recognition is

402.

However, as noted earlier, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention

excludes the automatic equivalence of treaty and customary law, whereby the
existence of a treaty provision itself, with little more, provides evidence of a
customary, universal legal obligation. Vienna Convention, supra note 176.
403. STATUrEOFTHEI.C.J., supra note 7, art. 38.
404. As James Littlejohn points out, in order to distinguish between right
and left all that is needed is a median line. See NEEDHAM, supra note 13, at 125
(citing James Littlejohn, Temne Right and Left: An Essay on the Choreography of
Everyday Life, in RIGHT & LEFT, supra note 341, at 789. As noted above, supra
note 351, depending on the subject matter, the relevant states may be delimited
by region, stages of technological development, or trade relationships. This
qualification of relevance obviously creates greater ambiguity; however, it may be
important to allow specific customary law to develop without requiring universal
participation.
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not satisfied, the treaty rule is not one of customary international
law and thus not binding on the nontreaty party. In this way,
STR has the ability coherently and practicably to resolve disputes
without prejudicing specific determinations with cross-referential
generalizations. STR therefore has greater potential resolving
power than competing views of the treaty/customary law
distinction.

V. CONCLUSION

The development of an empirically accurate, logical, legally
consistent, administrable, and powerful interpretive theory of
international law is particularly important as the world pursues
uniform rules to regulate international relations and conflicts
caused by intensifications of cross-border activity. This Article
attempts to provide such an interpretive theory.
This Article identifies several competing architectonic
principles that structure comprehension of the distinction
between two terms and the phenomena they seek to grasp. In the
context of 'the important distinction between treaty and
customary law, this Article compares and contrasts these
principles in light of several interrelated jurisprudential goals:
theoretical coherence (empirical accuracy and logic), practicability
(consistency with current law and administrability), reconcilability
with other general views, and resolving power Each of the six
architectonic
principles
(dichotomy,
overlap,
relativity,
interdependence, equivalence, and indeterminacy) carries the
disadvantage of a cross-referential orientation, according to which
customary law is understood in terms of treaty. As a potential
solution to the common problems associated with these six crossreferential principles, this Article proposes a new interpretive
approach, called sub-referential threshold relativity (STR).
STR is a coherent, practicable, and powerful approach to the
legal interpretation of distinctions. This approach consists of four
steps: first, the identification of the standard of recognition;
second, the setting of this standard on a universal scale bounded

by polar opposites; third, the establishment of a threshold or
range of recognition for the standard on such scale; and fourth,
the application of evidence of compliance with such threshold
standard. As applied to the distinction between treaty and
customary law, this Article argues that STR better meets the
interrelated goals of theoretical coherence, practicablility,
reconcilability, and resolving power.
The importance of STR as an approach to legal interpretation
may extend beyond the limited context of the treaty/customary
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law distinction. This approach to interpretation may be applied
successfully to a wide number of distinctions within international
and domestic legal doctrine and scholarship, such as those
between national and international law, horizontal and vertical
theses of international party structures, or substance and
procedure. This approach aspires to cultivate an unexplored field
of jurisprudential inquiry, which would facilitate evaluations of
the manner in which legal knowledge is structured around
distinctions,

as

well

as

the

consequences

of

competing

architectonic principles chosen to inform such distinctions. With
these broader concerns in mind, this Article seeks to make a
modest contribution both to the development of international law
and to the related, albeit more general, endeavors of
jurisprudential theory.

